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FOREWORD 
 
 
 
The 11th Partnership for Peace International Research Seminar on 
“Ukraine and Regional Co-operation in Security: Looking Ahead” was held in 
Kyiv from 23 to 26 June 2002. Organised in co-operation with the National 
Institute for International Security Problems, the Centre for European and 
International Studies and the Institute of International Relations of the Taras 
Shevchenko University, the Seminar’s topical theme and the high quality of its 
speakers attracted a large number of participants from a broad spectrum of 
backgrounds and disciplines. 
First of all, I should like to express my appreciation to the participants, 
including former President Leonid Kravchuk, as well as all the experts and 
researchers for sharing their knowledge with us, and to commend the organisers 
for their very competent assistance and expertise. 
The programme for this year’s Seminar was particularly wide-ranging 
and the following issues were discussed: 
- Ukraine’s main security concerns: terrorism, organised crime, illegal 
immigration and economic and democratic foundations of state 
sustainability. 
- The results of five years of the NATO-Ukraine Partnership. 
- Various aspects of regional security, in particular Ukraine and the Black 
Sea. 
- Achievements within the framework of GUUAM (a sub-regional 
organisation of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova). 
- The effect of the European Union’s enlargement on Ukrainian security.  
It would be somewhat tedious to list all the main aspects of this meeting 
and the reader will have no difficulty in navigating his way through this report. 
For those who are interested in Ukraine as such, reference is made to Serhiy 
Pyrozhkov’s contribution, in which he clearly defines the country’s main internal 
and external security concerns, in particular drug trafficking and organised crime 
in general, the underground economy, environmental issues, economic and social 
imbalances and terrorism. David Collins, for his part, challenges Ukraine’s 
aspirations to integrate itself fully into Europe, and recommends the further 
implementation of reform in the political, economic and security fields if the 
Ukrainians are really determined to progress beyond the current arrangements. 
In response to this perception, Oleksandr Pavlyuk points out that, after 
two years of reform, the differences that existed between Ukraine and the Central 
European states at the beginning have widened even further, whereas Ukraine 
has drawn closer to the other member countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in economic, cultural and psychological terms. In order to 
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reverse this trend, Ukraine needs more support from the NATO and the 
European Union countries. In this respect, it would be desirable for neighbouring 
states to simplify their procedures governing the issuing of visas to Ukrainian 
nationals. 
It was difficult within the space of a few days to make a full assessment 
of the difficulties encountered and the concrete and positive progress achieved 
by Ukraine within the framework of regional co-operation. Notwithstanding, 
participants went away from this Seminar with the picture of a young, dynamic 
and courageous country that has succeeded in keeping the peace within its 
borders and building up trust with its neighbours for the purpose of preserving 
regional and international peace and security.  
I hope the reader will enjoy reading this Seminar report. 
 
 
 
AVANT-PROPOS 
 
 
 
Le 11ème Séminaire du Partenariat pour la Paix, consacré au thème 
“L’Ukraine et la Coopération régionale de Sécurité: quel avenir?” s’est tenu à 
Kiev du du 23 au 26 juin 2002. Il a été organisé en co-parrainage avec l’Institut 
National des Questions de Sécurité Internationale, le Centre pour les Études 
Européennes et Internationales et l’Institut des Relations Internationales de 
l’Université Taras Shevchenko. Le séminaire a bénéficié d’une large audience, 
particulièrement intéressée par l’actualité du sujet et la qualité des conférenciers. 
Je souhaite tout d’abord rendre hommage aux participants, parmi 
lesquels on comptait l’ancien Président Leonid Kravchuk, aux nombreux experts 
et chercheurs qui ont partagé avec nous leurs connaissances, et saluer le savoir-
faire impeccable des organisateurs.  
Le menu de ce séminaire était particulièrement abondant. Ont été ainsi 
abordés les thèmes suivants: 
- les principales préoccupations de sécurité de l’Ukraine: terrorisme, crime 
organisé, immigration clandestine, fondements économiques et 
démocratiques de l’État; 
- le bilan de cinq ans de partenariat avec l’OTAN; 
- les divers aspects de la sécurité régionale, en particulier l’Ukraine et la Mer 
Noire; 
- les réalisations dans le cadre du GUUAM ( organisation sub-régionale 
regroupant la Georgie, l’Ukraine, l’Ouzbekistan, l’Azerbaïdjan et la 
Moldavie); 
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- l’impact de l’élargissement de l’Union Européenne sur la sécurité de 
l’Ukraine. 
Il serait fastidieux d’énumérer les principaux aspects saillants de cette 
réunion. Le lecteur fera lui-même son chemin à l’intérieur de ce rapport. Ceux 
qui sont intéressés par l’Ukraine en tant que telle pourront se référer à la 
présentation faite par Serhiy Pyrozhrov. Ils y trouveront une claire énumération 
des facteurs qui définissent les préoccupations de sécurité interne et externe de 
l’Ukraine, en particulier le trafic de stupéfiants et le crime organisé en général, 
l’économie souterraine, les questions d’environnement, les distorsions 
économiques et sociales, le terrorisme. David Collins, pour sa part, met en 
question la volonté ukrainienne de s’intégrer totalement à l’Europe et 
recommande de poursuivre les réformes dans les domaines politiques, 
économiques et de sécurité, si l’on veut aller au-delà des compromis actuels. 
Réagissant à ce point de vue, Oleksandr Pavlyuk, fait justement 
remarquer qu’après deux ans de réformes entreprises, le différentiel entre 
l’Ukraine et les pays de l’Europe centrale s’est creusé tandis que la proximité 
économique, culturelle et psychologique des pays de la Communauté des États 
Indépendants s’est consolidée. Pour inverser cette tendance, l’Ukraine aurait en 
réalité besoin de recevoir davantage de soutien de la part des pays de l’Union 
Européenne et de l’OTAN. A ce titre, une simplification des procédures d’octroi 
de visa de la part des États frontaliers serait la bienvenue. 
Il était difficile de dresser en peu de temps un tableau exhaustif des 
difficultés mais aussi des réalisations concrètes et positives de l’Ukraine dans le 
cadre de sa coopération régionale. Il reste que les participants retiendront de 
l’Ukraine après ce séminaire l’image d’un Etat jeune, dynamique et courageux, 
qui sait maintenir la paix civile à l’intérieur de ses frontières et qui a su nouer 
avec ses voisins des liens de confiance propre à préserver la sécurité et la paix 
régionale et internationale. 
Je souhaite aux lecteurs de passer un excellent moment à lire le compte-
rendu de ce séminaire. 
 
 
 
Jean-Paul RAFFENNE 
Lieutenant General 
French Army
Général de corps d’armée 
Armée de terre française 
 
  
 
  9
EDITORS’ REMARKS 
 
 
 
 
This publication of the 11th Partnership for Peace International Research 
Seminar is the 16th in the Seminar Report Series edited and published by the 
NATO Defense College. It is appropriate that we express our deep appreciation 
to all those who contributed to the successful completion of the Seminar and this 
publication. 
For their assistance in designing the programme and organizing the 
Seminar, we would like to thank Anatoly Gutsal, Prime Deputy Director of the 
National Institute of International Security Problems as well as Dr. Leonid 
Hubersky, Director of the Institute of International Relations of Kiev National 
Taras Shevchenko. In addition, a particular word of thanks is due to Dr. Hryhoriy 
Nemyria, Director of the Centre for European and International Studies and his 
wife who successfully arranged much behind the scenes. All of them, with their 
staff, assisted the College in determining the subject matter and in inviting a 
number of the distinguished lecturers that addressed the participants. Special 
thanks are also due to Mr. Leigh Merrick, Head of the NATO Liaison Office to 
Ukraine, whose support was highly appreciated, before and during the Seminar. 
We are also grateful to the Commandant and to the Dean of the NATO Defense 
College as well as to the Director of Academic and Policy Planning for their 
advice and encouragement as we prepared for and then conducted the Seminar in 
Kiev. 
Last but not least, particular thanks are due to Mrs Mary Burke, 
Translator, and to Mrs Laurence Ammour, Publication Assistant, for their superb 
editorial and technical support. 
The views expressed in this Seminar are solely those of the authors and 
should not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. Extracts of this Seminar may be quoted or reprinted without 
special permission for academic purposes, provided that a standard source credit 
line is included. 
 
 
The Editors 
Rome, September 2003 
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY: 
A UKRAINIAN PERCEPTION 
 
 
 
 
Serhiy I. PYROZHKOV1 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Broadly speaking, the national security of Ukraine is understood as the 
way of self-preservation of the Ukrainian people who have achieved a level of 
organization in the form of an independent state. This way provides for (makes 
possible) Ukraine’s state-organised existence and free self-development, reliable 
protection from external and internal threats. Its national security may be defined 
as a system of state, legal and social guarantees that provide for the stability of 
its vital activities and the development of the state-organised people of Ukraine 
in general and of every individual citizen of the State, together with the 
protection of their basic values and legitimate interests and the sources of their 
spiritual and material welfare from potential and real internal and external 
threats. 
Traditionally, national security has been defined as a system of state and 
social guarantees that provide for the stable development of a nation and the 
protection of its basic values and interests and the sources of its spiritual and 
material welfare from external and internal threats. 
As a community of all the nationalities living on Ukraine’s territory, the 
Ukrainian people are considered to be the subject of national security. 
National values–attitudes to material and spiritual objects, which have 
acquired a determinative significance for the self-identity and existence of the 
Ukrainian people. This is the basis for the Ukrainians’ motivation, self-
development and activities. 
                                                          
1 Professor Dr. Serhiy I. Pyrozhkov is Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence 
Council of Ukraine and Director of the National Institute of International Security Problems, Kyiv. 
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National interests–accepted at the level of the highest bodies of State 
Power, the needs of the Ukrainian people in preserving and developing national 
values. Depending on the nature and sphere of their application, national 
interests should be sub-divided into strategic and tactical, political and economic, 
social and environmental (ecological), etc. The defence of national interests is 
aimed at eliminating, or keeping to a minimum, territorial, demographic, 
economic, environmental and other losses during the process of the activities of 
the Ukrainian people and, hence, increasing the useful outcome of social 
development. 
The definition and adjustment of basic national interests is a function of 
the community’s political bodies. The clear execution of this function has played 
an important role in the implementation of national security. The latter is an 
important national interest. 
The most elementary, personal level of the subject of national security 
are the citizens of Ukraine, the representatives of the different nationalities, who 
have, freely and without coercion, integrated themselves into a community of 
‘Ukrainian people’ and regard its national values and interests as their own. 
Thus, the essence of national security is freedom of activities and the 
democratic social as well as the state self-development of the Ukrainian people, 
and the protection of this freedom, its conditions and factors is the essence of the 
activity that is aimed at providing national security. 
The problem of national security and its support emerges as an 
antithesis to such notions as a threat to the national interests of Ukraine. As a 
matter of fact, national security and activities in support of it are acquiring the 
contents of the denial (removal) of a possible threat to the Ukrainian people and 
their national interests. We should understand threats to national security as 
potentially and really dangerous activities (natural and social) against the state-
organised community of the Ukrainian people, capable of causing damage to 
national values or making it impossible to realise vitally important national 
interests. 
Threats may be categorised in accordance with the following factors: 
- quality (reality) of emerging: imaginable and real threats; 
- character of direction: direct and indirect; 
- character of accomplishing: evident (obvious) and concealed; 
- place of a source: internal and external; 
- the character (contents) of the threat: military, economic, social and 
psychological, ecological, ideological, caused by man, informational, etc. 
National security is reflected in the specific activities of social 
institutions. As a specific form of activity, it is directed at creating and 
improving the conditions and factors (guarantees) for the effectiveness of the 
Ukrainian people’s vital activities. 
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Thus, the objective of providing security as an activity boils down to a 
subject achieving the ability to keep all threats at a sub-critical level (level of 
permissible danger), at which all threatening factors would be unable to have a 
harmful effect upon its existence and development. The creation of protection 
capabilities, adequate to meet real or possible threats, implies the creation of 
security guarantees. 
The appropriate social institutions create the system for providing 
national security, which is the necessary internal sub-system of state-organised 
Ukrainian society.  
One of the important sub-systems for national security is State security. 
National security cannot be boiled (narrowed) down to State security, which is 
only one part, albeit a key one, of State security, as it would threaten State 
interests and afterwards State security dominating over the interests of the 
Ukrainian people. 
The system approach allows for the possibility of orienting the National 
Security System in relation to external factors. State security is enhanced if it is 
connected to the collective security system. In this case, in some respects, the 
National Security System acts as an element (sub-system) of a collective security 
system. 
 
2. The Current Priorities of Ukraine’s National Security Policy 
I would just like to give you a quick overview of some approaches 
regarding the defining of the basic priorities of current national security policy 
within the context of drawing up a revised National Security Concept. 
Currently, many countries are revising their concept of ‘national 
security’, particularly since the events of 11 September 2001 in the United 
States. Traditionally, ‘national security’ defines the status of protection of values 
and interests that are vitally important for both the public in general and state 
citizens in particular. 
That is why the defining factor, which influences the formation of State 
policy in this sphere, is threats to those values and interests. And those threats 
may not be limited to the military context but also extend to the wider context, 
including non-military (asymmetric) threats. 
This should be taken into particular account, as the transition from the 
old-fashioned, one-sided militarist paradigm of national security, which 
dominated in the ‘Cold War’ period, has not taken place everywhere, not even in 
all the European states. 
An analysis of the situation in Ukraine and its position in the 
international environment clearly shows that the majority of the threats to its 
national security are internal in origin. They include corruption and organised, 
primarily economic, crime, the expanding use of drugs, the shadow economy, as 
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well as considerable distortion of economic and social development, and serious 
environmental and man-caused problems, etc. 
But, recently, we have been witnessing an increase in the influence of 
external threats: the emergence of a whole series of completely new negative 
factors and a dramatic strengthening of old ones. It is worth mentioning that 
these trends have not been provoked by Ukraine. In my view, they are the result 
of the negative consequences of the extremely dynamic globalisation of the 
world process. 
The vigorous development of communication assets, information 
technologies and transport systems and the emergence of new goods and 
migration flows since the disappearance of the ‘Iron Curtain’ have shortened the 
distances to the most remote parts of the globe and facilitated access to the most 
distant sources of raw materials, goods and service markets, on the one hand, and 
increased sensitivity to the negative processes that may emerge anywhere on the 
planet, on the other. 
This means that an increasing number of factors must be taken into 
account, not only of a national but also of a regional and even a global character 
(scale), in order to secure national security.  
That is why the full range of any country’s national security can 
currently only be provided by close cooperation with influential international 
security organisations at the sub-regional, trans-regional and global level. 
This new trend can be seen very clearly in the wide-ranging fight that 
has been initiated by the civilised (developed) countries against international 
terrorism, which had traditionally been considered as, at least, a potential local 
threat. But since 11 September 2001, international terrorism has become a real 
threat to the whole planet and does not have any geographical limits. The 
terrorist acts committed in the United States on 11 September are a sign that: 
Firstly, almost a new technology for destroying the human and material 
resources of the most powerful and dangerous state was demonstrated, taking 
into account the availability of a phantom aggressor and the non-availability of 
sufficient resources at his disposal to achieve political, economic or military 
victory. 
However paradoxical this may appear at first glance, there are sufficient 
grounds to consider that this model of destruction emerged as a reaction to the 
collapse of the bipolar confrontational world order, in which the Arabs, in their 
conflict with Israel, were searching for (and found!) financial, political and even 
direct military assistance from the former Soviet Union.  
But it is also known that, at the same time, the Soviet Union often 
deterred Arab extremism. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
disappearance of this support and deterrence, Islamic terrorist groups adopted a 
terrorist model of fighting with forces, offering considerable advantages. This 
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model proved to be effective for implementation within the religiously fanatical 
ideology and religious extremism. 
Secondly, for the training of terrorists and the committing of those 
terrorist acts, they used–and one should be quite clear about that–the 
indisputable achievements of ‘western’ civilization–information technologies, the 
globalisation of financial flows, freedom of movement from one country to 
another and hypertrophied liberalism in security regulations on air transport in 
the United States. 
Thirdly, those actions also proved the defencelessness against the threat 
of terrorism of the old national security system, that had been created during the 
bipolar confrontation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
and the ex-Warsaw Pact and which did not undergo considerable (profound) 
transformation when the ‘Cold War’ came to an end but continued to be based 
upon its mainly military constituent and orientation. 
Fourthly, as the facts prove, the terrorists have at their disposal state-of-
the-art armaments and equipment, and, as the second wave of terrorist acts in the 
U.S. shows, they even used anthrax spores, which are weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). 
Huge amounts of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological ammunition 
were produced and stored on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), which is why it would be criminal negligence to consider that 
international terrorist groups would not try to obtain them or, at least, the 
technology to produce them. 
With this in mind, one of the most important tasks of State policy in the 
national security sphere remains the fight against weapons smuggling as well as 
participation in international activities against the proliferation of WMD and its 
components. 
Fifthly, the exceptional danger of those terrorist acts is determined not 
only by the unprecedented scale of their direct consequences but also by those 
consequences that may result from the actions taken by the United States in 
response. 
Ukraine is convinced of the need to root out international terrorist 
organisations and, undoubtedly, supports all possible operations against them. 
But one cannot take into account the possibility of a threat (and not only to 
Ukraine!) resulting from the wide-scale military operation in Afghanistan. 
A crisis situation has developed in a nuclear state–Pakistan–with regard 
to the support by the country’s military leadership of the anti-Taliban campaign. 
There are good grounds to forecast attempts to slacken the international political 
situation in the Central Asian countries, which also support the anti-terrorist 
coalition and provide assistance to the U.S. for the conduct of the military 
operation. 
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Thus, terrorist acts are almost capable of escalating conflicts in many 
areas of tension in the world–the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, 
Central and Southern Asia, etc. 
The risk of wide-scale armed conflicts may increase substantially as 
these countries, which have problems with terrorism, or under the shelter of the 
fight against terrorism, may activate their efforts to deliver preventive strikes 
against their enemies. 
We are sure that states, whose governments provide shelter for 
terrorists, or even support terrorism, may be the objects of ‘peacekeeping 
actions’ or ‘humanitarian interventions’, but such operations should be 
conducted exceptionally on the basis of international law. 
And if international law, that is built on the traditional principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of states, does not correspond to the more 
universal principle of human rights, it should be revised and improved. 
Laws in community and international relations are drawn up and 
introduced by people and can be changed by people, if the need arises. Thus it is 
clearly understood that such important issues should be solved by a consensus 
among the international community. 
It is also important that the international community devise reliable 
political and legal instruments (mechanisms) to regulate the actions of states in 
similar crisis situations. 
Bearing all these circumstances in mind, Ukraine must be part of the 
mainstream with regard to the development of current world processes in the 
security sphere. We have supported the actions of the anti-terrorist coalition but 
we do not participate in military operations in Afghanistan. 
Ukraine has expressed its readiness to participate in humanitarian 
operations in Afghanistan by providing its transport aircraft. So, we are ready to 
cooperate with other members of the international community on humanitarian 
aspects of peacekeeping activities conducted under the auspices of the United 
Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
and NATO and based on legal grounds, though the defining of those grounds 
remains the prerogative of national parliaments and influential international 
structures. 
We can also expect the activation of migration policies by Western 
countries and the United States, as well as the strengthening of visa regulations 
and the fight against illegal migration, etc. Ukraine would be required to conduct 
a series of activities to ban the flow of illegal migration across its territory by 
strengthening the regulations on its borders, especially its eastern borders which 
are the most transparent for illegal migration.  
Missions for enhancing cooperation with foreign partners as well as the 
introduction of new coordination mechanisms at the internal level are being 
brought to the forefront.  
  
  17
Ukraine pays considerable attention to strengthening the role of 
international organisations, primarily the United Nations, in the fight against 
international terrorism, especially in the context of Security Council Resolution 
1373, adopted on 28 September 2001. 
If the realities of national security influence the security status of other 
countries and the international community in general, the protection of 
democracy and the rights and freedoms of citizens becomes an international 
problem, and the fight against international terrorism, organised crime and the 
illegal weapons and drugs trade requires the rule of international law over 
national law. This means that the latter should be brought into line with the 
former and that completely transparent ‘game rules’, which should be equal for 
all international ‘players’, should be created. 
These rules should also be reflected in national legislation, and only 
then will we be able to talk about a joint Europe or a ‘joint scope of international 
freedom’. If international practice has put peace support operations, 
‘humanitarian interventions’ or the ‘actions of the antiterrorist coalition’ ‘on the 
agenda’, then the functions, restrictions and conditions for the use of force 
structures should be clearly identified. 
In these new conditions, within the UN framework (in the context of 
UN structural reform and priority consideration of the problems of the fight 
against terrorism at the global level), Ukraine could initiate the development of 
EU and OSCE agreements for the setting up of coordination meetings between 
the heads of appropriate structures (in this respect, cooperation with NATO) in 
the sphere of international terrorist counteraction.  
Particular attention should be paid to the development of practical 
bilateral interagency interaction (cooperation) with the power structures of 
border regions and leading countries; the issue could be solved by Ukraine’s 
participation in the international organisation of criminal police (Interpol). 
 
3. Improving the Legal Basis in the National Security Sphere 
Turning to the new edition of the National Security Concept, it is worth 
mentioning that experts are beginning to understand that not one legal act but 
several are needed: general legal grounds, which should be represented in an 
appropriate Law. In order to react promptly to external and internal changes, it is 
important to periodically revise the Strategy for Providing National Security, 
which should be approved by the appropriate Presidential Act. 
The current National Security Concept represents a complex of general 
ideas about basic notions and grounds for creating a National Security System, as 
well as an attempt to draw up a list of concrete national interests and threats to 
them. 
The basic notions given in the Concept are not perfect or explicit and 
there are no definitions of threats. And, speaking about the list of national 
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interests, it turned out that, firstly, it was incomplete and, secondly, that, taking 
into account that this category changes over time, some of these interests were 
already obsolete. The provisions for the National Security System are not 
suitable for practical implementation. 
But the Concept has definitely played a role in that it has laid down a 
certain theoretical basis and given the impetus for the further scientific 
development of its provisions. 
With this in mind, it is high time to develop and adopt a full-fledged 
Law of Ukraine ‘On National Security’, in which it would be appropriate to give 
thorough definitions of basic notions and legal mechanisms for identifying 
vitally important national interests and threats, and to clearly specify a National 
Security System and the mechanisms for managing it and the democratic control 
over subjects (legal entities) for providing it, as well as other important issues 
requiring legalisation. 
With respect to conceptual approaches for providing (securing) national 
security in definite historic conditions, this should be defined by a Presidential 
by-law. 
This paper, which might be active for a 3- to 5- year term and be called 
either a concept or a strategy (better a strategy in my view), should contain an 
assessment and a medium-term forecast of the outlook for the current internal 
and external situation. A list of vitally important national interests and threats to 
these interests should be drawn up, based on which a system of objectives and 
ways of achieving them could be defined and included in the missions of some of 
the Government Departments of the National Security System. At the same time, 
military doctrine should not only correspond to the Law and National Security 
System but also form an integral part of the legal documents in the National 
Security sphere for an appropriate period. 
We intend to continue to contribute to international cooperation on 
collective defence, and we are also planning to participate in peacekeeping 
operations and to expand cooperation with NATO at the level of missions, as 
defined by the State Programme of Ukraine for the period 2001-2004 and the 
new Strategy for NATO-Ukraine Cooperation that was approved at the NSDC 
meeting on 23 February 2002. 
One of the State policy priority directions in this sphere is the structural 
and organisational improvement of the National Security System, bearing in 
mind the improvement of its efficiency, especially during crisis situations. 
As already mentioned, the peculiarities of the current international 
situation are driven to a large extent by the process of globalisation, which 
encourages an increase in the number of the so-called ‘bifurcation areas’, in 
which the process may develop in different scenarios, sometimes with tragic 
consequences. 
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In these conditions, the depth of the forecast is reduced over time, as 
well as its probability. This determines the need to increase the efficiency of the 
reaction and operating speed of the National Security System, i.e. its ability to 
react adequately, in the very short term, to threats in order to repulse or neutralise 
them.  
In order to meet this requirement, the structure and the National 
Security System managing mechanisms should be rationalised by refusing inputs 
from inefficient units and managing chains, thereby simplifying decision-
preparing and decision-making procedures. These are the missions the NSDC is 
currently dealing with. 
Currently, a new international security architecture is being created, 
which has partnership and cooperation as its principal imperatives. Today, no 
country in the world is capable of guaranteeing its security solely with its own 
capabilities. In this context, the expansion of NATO and the EU, as the key 
players in the security sphere in Europe, has acquired particular importance. The 
European states’ natural striving for unification in a joint Europe is laying the 
basis of this process. 
Wide-ranging integration processes are currently taking place in the 
regional security sphere around Ukraine. On the one hand, the EU and NATO 
are expanding their boundaries and areas of influence in Central, Southern and 
Eastern Europe. On the other hand, dynamic processes related to the creation of a 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) are developing in line with 
cooperation with NATO’s fight against terrorism and the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) Programme. 
Taking into account the current changes in the international relations 
system and the need to strengthen European security and the role of Kyiv’s 
relations with NATO, it would be illogical for Ukraine to reduce its contribution 
to the level of an enhanced partnership or to a neutral or non-bloc status.  
The political decision taken by the NSDC in 2002 on Ukraine’s future 
accession to full-fledged NATO membership has become a crucial stage in our 
State’s relations with the Alliance, a natural step within the context of its 
transformation from a military and political organisation into a political and 
military one, as well as the globalisation of the international security 
environment after the events of 11 September 2001, together with the 
implementation of NATO’s eastwards expansion strategy. 
This decision is of exceptional importance for Ukraine’s future as an 
influential European regional state, in that it finally defines internal political 
priorities and foreign political development landmarks, assigns difficult, though 
definite, missions to State Government bodies and puts an end to long-lasting 
hesitation and uncertainty. 
In accomplishing its course towards Euro-Atlantic integration, as an 
integral part of Europe, Ukraine is striving to become involved in the 
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construction of a European Security System through cooperation with other 
European states. Refusing participation in such a system would create a threat to 
our country in that it would risk finding itself on the outskirts of European 
integration processes. 
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Part 1 
The Multiple Dimensions of Ukraine’s Security 
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1. Introduction 
When the cold war ended, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) was quick to recognise that one of the key elements for ensuring 
security in the Euro-Atlantic area was Ukraine’s stability and independent 
statehood. The appearance of an independent Ukrainian state proved to be one of 
the biggest strategic and geopolitical developments to have positively 
revolutionised the security landscape on the European continent, and NATO was 
resolved to respond positively to that remarkable change. Since then, the 
Alliance’s policy towards Ukraine has been based on recognition of the 
Ukrainian state and its importance for the Euro-Atlantic community at large. As 
Lord Robertson said in a speech to the Diplomatic Academy in Kyiv on 27 
January 2000: 
A self-confident, democratic Ukraine is a strategic benefit for the 
whole of this continent. We share a common interest in making 
Ukraine strong, stable and secure. 
NATO’s relationship with Ukraine began soon after the country 
achieved independence in 1991. Although Kyiv was initially very cautious about 
developing substantive relations with the Alliance, in accordance with its policy 
of non-participation in military alliances, Ukraine was among those states that 
joined what was in 1991 the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). 
                                                          
1 Mr David B. Collins is Director, Defence Partnership & Co-operation, NATO Headquarters, 
Brussels, Belgium. 
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In 1992, the late Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Woerner, visited 
Kyiv, and the then President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, visited Brussels. The 
visit of the Ukrainian President demonstrated Ukraine’s commitment to a co-
operative approach to its security. On the NATO side, Secretary General 
Woerner’s visit was indicative of further development of the Organisation’s 
policy towards Ukraine. As a next step, Ukraine enthusiastically welcomed 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994, recognising that this 
programme was ideally suited to a country like Ukraine, which was then neither 
in line for NATO membership nor demanding a special status that would 
differentiate it from the other European countries. Ukraine was also the first 
Commonwealth of Independent States country to seek participation in the PfP 
programme, which was, indeed, very telling. As a result, during those early days 
of the programme, Ukraine participated in several exercises within the 
Partnership for Peace framework and hosted a number of PfP exercises on its 
own territory. These steps further signalled Ukraine’s foreign and security policy 
choices. 
Ukraine’s attitude towards the Alliance then evolved dramatically, 
especially following President Kuchma’s visit to NATO Headquarters on 1 June 
1995. Indeed, this may have marked a watershed in our relationship. During that 
visit, President Kuchma proposed a ‘special relationship’ between Ukraine and 
NATO. In 1995, Kyiv also presented its official position on the Alliance’s open-
door policy and for the first time President Kuchma publicly endorsed NATO’s 
potential enlargement to the East. 
The intensification of relations further cascaded throughout the other 
areas of NATO-Ukraine co-operation. Not only did Ukraine become fully active 
in the PfP programme, but it also proposed to expand relations beyond the 
Partnership. On 14 September 1995, Ukraine and NATO issued a Joint Press 
Statement in which the Alliance and Ukraine “…agreed to co-operate in the 
further strengthening of NATO-Ukraine relations across a broad front, including 
the development of an enhanced relationship both within and outside the PfP 
Programme and NACC activities”. In that document, the general principles of 
NATO-Ukraine relations, in Partnership for Peace and in other areas, were 
clarified. An implementation paper was agreed in March 1996, and the first 16+1 
consultation at the NATO Political Committee level took place subsequently, 
with high-level meetings continuing throughout 1996 and the beginning of 1997.  
During that period, Ukraine made some difficult but very important 
choices that proved to be visible examples of its determination to continue with 
its clear-cut security policy priorities. One was an unprecedented decision to 
adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a 
non-nuclear weapons state. Resolving the difficult issues of the Black Sea Fleet 
and Sevastopol with Russia were other examples of crucial decisions aimed at 
pursuing a co-operative and responsible approach to both its own and regional 
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security. The NATO allies also warmly welcomed steps taken by Ukraine to 
improve relations with its neighbours, particularly with new NATO Allies 
Poland and Hungary, as well as with Romania and Russia. Those decisions did 
not go unnoticed by the rest of the Euro-Atlantic community, either. In fact, they 
were tangible signals of Ukraine’s commitment and resolve. 
In May 1997, then Secretary General Javier Solana inaugurated the 
NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, the first of its kind in 
any partner country. The main idea behind the creation of the Centre was to 
improve knowledge and understanding between the Alliance and Ukraine by 
offering information, research assistance and project support to Ukrainian 
citizens and organisations on NATO-related topics, as well as providing access 
to Alliance documents and publications. The Centre’s programme also includes 
the organisation of information tours by Ukrainian visitors to NATO 
Headquarters. 
The next natural step in relations between NATO Allies and Ukraine 
was to formalise their relationship. After several months of detailed discussions 
and exchanges between senior NATO and Ukrainian officials, an agreement was 
reached on a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine, 
which was subsequently endorsed at the highest level by nations. The signing of 
the Charter in Madrid in July 1997 was one of the most visible results of 
meaningful political and institutional change. As a result, it shifted co-operation 
between NATO and Ukraine on to a new plane within but also beyond the PfP 
programme. It was also an obvious sign of the importance NATO attaches to 
Ukraine, her independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Charter also 
aimed to support the reform process in Ukraine as it developed as a democratic 
nation with a market economy.  
The document was also drawn up in line with Kyiv’s declared strategy 
of increasing integration into European and transatlantic structures in the future. 
In this respect, the decisions of the document that support Ukraine’s efforts to 
develop its democratic institutions, to implement radical economic reforms and 
to deepen the process of integration into the full range of European and Euro-
Atlantic structures are of crucial importance. These visionary notions that were 
formulated five years ago should be taken into account as we consider our 
relationship today. 
One of the most meaningful aspects of the Charter was also Ukraine’s 
recognition of the profound transformation undertaken by the Alliance since the 
end of the cold war and its continued adaptation to meet the changing 
circumstances of Euro-Atlantic security, including possibilities for NATO’s out-
of-area crisis management operations. Ukraine’s support of the Organisation’s 
air campaign in Kosovo was just one example of that support. 
At the practical level, the Ukrainian authorities were also determined to 
turn their words into deeds. Ukraine was a contributor to international 
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peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia through the Implementation Force (IFOR) and 
then the Stabilisation Force (SFOR). It is also providing troops to the United 
Nations (UN)-mandated Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping mission in Kosovo 
within the framework of the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion, which in itself is a 
visible sign of how much can be achieved if the will to co-operate with 
neighbouring countries exists. Ukraine has also worked beyond NATO-Ukraine 
co-operation under the Charter to provide contributions to the UN and the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, to support the European 
Security and Defence Policy and to earmark valuable assets for the European 
Union Headline Goal force. 
Under the Charter, NATO and Ukraine also agreed to consult in 
developing Euro-Atlantic security and stability and in areas such as conflict 
prevention, crisis management, and peace support and humanitarian operations. 
The consultation and co-operation set out in the Charter were to be implemented 
mainly through NATO-Ukraine meetings at the level of the North Atlantic 
Council and NATO-Ukraine meetings with the appropriate NATO Committees 
and reciprocal high-level visits. Given the number of meetings of the NATO-
Ukraine Commission and other bodies that have been held so far, one could say 
that this area of our co-operation has proved to be one of the biggest successes 
under the Charter. It has also contributed to the overall increase in mutual trust 
between NATO Allies and Ukraine, although quantity itself does not necessarily 
signal quality. In addition, NATO and Ukraine decided to develop a crisis 
consultative mechanism to consult together whenever Ukraine perceives a direct 
threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. This decision, 
which complemented the security assurances offered to Ukraine by all the five 
nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT, contributed in a major way to the 
stability of Ukraine’s security. 
The document itself is thus one of the most important endeavours that 
the Alliance embarked upon in the Nineties. The Charter is also one of those 
important political instruments that have allowed Ukraine to become a very 
important player in European security. After five years of co-operation under the 
Charter, NATO-Ukraine relations are now on firm ground: political consultations 
take place routinely and practical co-operation in PfP and beyond is considerable 
and growing. Both formally and substantially, Ukraine has made a clear choice 
of intensifying co-operation with NATO under the Charter while also 
maintaining good relations with neighbouring countries. This may be regarded as 
a critical contribution to Euro-Atlantic stability. The period of ‘distinctive 
partnership’ has also produced a more constructive attitude between NATO and 
Ukraine. The co-operation under the Charter was also a meaningful factor in the 
establishment of a new, post-cold-war Euro-Atlantic security culture of which 
Ukraine has been an integral part. 
 
  
  25
2. The Main Achievements of our Common Activities under the 
NATO-Ukraine Charter 
2.1 Defence Reform 
It is a great pity that so few people know that every year NATO and 
Ukraine realise programmes of defence reform-related co-operation 
encompassing literally hundreds of both NATO-Ukraine and bilateral activities. 
Such a large number of activities is mainly due to the fact that the Alliance 
regards defence reform as one of the most crucial areas of NATO-Ukraine co-
operation as it prepares Ukraine to be a net contributor to the Alliance’s security 
initiatives through the development of the required defence capabilities and 
structures. In a broader context, defence reform, along with reform of the 
security sector, also contributes to strengthening civil society. The Organisation 
has been assisting Ukrainian defence reform efforts through a large number of 
initiatives. Improving the interoperability of Ukrainian forces with NATO and 
Partners, supporting the reform of Ukrainian defence structures, advancing co-
operation with the Alliance on defence issues, and co-operation in multinational 
units are among the main areas of defence reform-related activities. Expert and 
senior-level contacts have also been established with the Ukrainian Parliament 
and a number of governmental institutions, including the Ministries of Defence, 
Foreign Affairs, Border Services, Interior, Civil Emergencies, National Security 
and Defence Council. Let me also underscore that the active participation and 
combined efforts of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and National Security 
and Defence Council have been instrumental in taking forward Ukrainian 
defence reform. One could thus say that NATO-Ukraine institutional contacts are 
well in place. 
The Alliance also decided to support Ukraine’s defence reform in a 
tangible way. Like any reform, this requires concrete actions in order to be 
successful. In 2000, NATO and Ukraine decided to use the Planning and Review 
Process as a tool to support the implementation of Ukraine’s State Plan for 
Reform of the Armed Forces. Consequently, it was carried forward in two stages. 
Stage One, the development of a baseline assessment, was completed in June 
2001. Work in the second half of 2001 focused on the translation of aspects of 
the State Programme of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Reform and Development 
until 2005 into achievable and affordable planning targets–termed National 
Defence Reform Objectives. Under this year’s Work Plan, Ukraine adopted 80 of 
them. This ambitious package reflects Ukraine’s priorities in defence reform. 
Many reflect new directions for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. And, at the 
moment, NATO and Ukraine are examining how existing PfP tools and 
resources, including the Partnership Work Programme and the Individual 
Partnership Programme, may be used to support Ukrainian efforts to meet these 
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objectives. The success of these impressive defence reform activities will depend 
on making the best use of Ukrainian, NATO and Allied nations’ resources.  
Further examples of concrete steps in NATO-Ukraine co-operation in 
defence reform include: 
- the implementation of the activities of the Joint Working Group on Defence 
Reform in Ukraine; 
- expert discussions on security sector reform and the reform of the Border 
Guard and the Interior Troops;  
- expert discussions and visits to support the development of a national crisis 
management system;  
- round-table discussions with the Ukrainian Parliament on civil-military 
relations;  
- the implementation of a NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency/Ukraine 
Memorandum of Understanding for the destruction of 400,000 anti-personnel 
landmines, and 
- the holding of a high-level NATO-Ukraine conference in March 2002 in 
Berlin, focusing on challenges and opportunities in the security and defence 
sector and organised by the Aspen Institute. A number of high-level 
representatives of NATO and Ukraine, including Ministers of Defence, 
participated in that event. 
In April 1999, NATO established a NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv to 
facilitate contacts between the Organisation and civil and military agencies 
involved in Ukrainian participation in Partnership for Peace and the 
implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Commission Work Plan. The focus of the 
Centre, which is staffed jointly by the NATO International Staff and the NATO 
International Military Staff, is defence reform and military-related activities. 
NATO-Ukraine activities relating to the economic dimension of defence reform 
include concrete projects in the field of retraining released military personnel and 
a pilot project on the economic management of former military sites. Another 
positive step taken within the framework of NATO-Ukraine defence-related co-
operation includes the approval by the Ukrainian Parliament of the Partnership 
for Peace Status of Forces Agreement and its additional protocol. 
In addition, great potential exists to further develop NATO-Ukraine 
defence-related activities. Examples include strategic airlift transport 
capabilities, improving interoperability with NATO and Partner forces, host 
nation support arrangements, command and control systems, language training, 
logistics, military exercises and related training, enhancing co-operation in 
armaments, standardisation and defence research and technologies, information 
on air defence and airspace management and control, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, military geography, medical services, meteorological support 
and global humanitarian mine action. 
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2.2 NATO-Ukraine Co-operation in Civil Emergency Planning 
Co-operation between Ukraine and NATO in the field of Civil 
Emergency Planning began in 1995 and is one of the most successful areas of 
activities carried out to date. It started following the disastrous floods in the 
Kharkiv region when all assistance from NATO and Partner countries to 
overcome these problems was co-ordinated by the NATO Civil Emergency 
Planning Directorate. The Work Plan for 2002 also presents an ambitious list of 
activities. They include such concrete examples as Ukraine’s participation in the 
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre Exercise ‘Taming the 
Dragon’ or the current highlight of our co-operation which is the implementation 
of the Joint Ukraine-NATO Pilot Project on Flood Prevention and Response that 
is being conducted in the Trans-Carpathian Region.  
 
2.3 Military Co-operation 
Under NATO-Ukraine Military Co-operation, practical efforts have 
focused on interoperability. Looking towards the future, NATO and Ukraine may 
want to consider how to develop a broader framework that will improve the link 
between this practical co-operation and broader political and security goals. This 
would not only make our military co-operation more effective and goal-oriented, 
but also reinforce our broader political and security objectives for enhanced 
NATO-Ukraine relations. 
  
2.4 NATO-Ukraine Co-operation in Science 
NATO-Ukraine co-operation in science highlights the non-military 
aspects of security and brings to the fore the concrete benefits of such co-
operation for the population at large. The Alliance has also supported the 
Ukrainian scientific community through a number of grants 
 
3. Conclusions 
NATO’s co-operation with Ukraine based on the NATO-Ukraine 
Charter has been one of the most successful politically driven co-operative 
projects in the history of the Atlantic Alliance. In part due to its relationship with 
the Organisation, Ukraine’s independence is firm and reform efforts are 
continuing to gain momentum. This is in large part due to the NATO-Ukraine 
Charter and our common efforts. The Alliance has supported this endeavour and 
will continue to do so. We want to build on the steps taken to date in developing 
a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine. It should also be 
noted here that the creation of the new NATO-Russia Council will in no way 
lead to any diminution of NATO-Ukraine co-operation.  
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For our relations to be stronger still, defence- and security-sector reform 
in Ukraine must remain in the spotlight if we are to take our co-operation 
forward. NATO-Ukraine ties are of even greater importance in the light of 
September 11th. Indeed, the Alliance is grateful to Ukraine for the support it 
offered in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States and the 
measures taken by Ukraine in the struggle against terrorism, including its 
decision to open its airspace for overflight by United States aircraft. Ukrainian 
airlift capabilities have also allowed many Allies to deploy their forces in the 
Afghan theatre of operations. As the war against terror continues, NATO-
Ukraine co-operation may become crucial, although it does also depend upon 
whether NATO decides to expand its defence strategy to focus on expeditionary 
warfare in response to 21st century threats. 
This leads us to another strategic issue. One of the goals of Ukraine’s 
foreign policy is full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic political, 
economic and security structures. The outcome of the parliamentary elections 
and the pro-Euro-Atlantic outlook of the new Parliament have further supported 
this policy choice. As a result, the Alliance welcomes Ukraine’s desire for 
greater Euro-Atlantic integration and its enhanced Euro-Atlantic integration 
policy. Indeed, our explicit vision of the future is one in which Ukraine is firmly 
anchored to the Alliance. However, such aspirations must pass the test of 
commitment as much remains to be done in the field of reform in Ukraine. To 
this end, NATO stands ready to further support Ukraine in sparing no effort to 
further implement and intensify reform-related activities. Nevertheless, it should 
be stressed once again that it is crucially important that Ukraine herself be 
determined to further implement the necessary reforms. Ukraine simply must 
demonstrate her commitment by undertaking serious reforms as many Central 
and East European countries have done in the past. In terms of Ukraine’s 
possible ultimate Euro-Atlantic aspirations, this might be termed a building 
block approach. 
In the meantime, however, many opportunities may be promoted for 
deeper co-operation, including, to name just a few, anti-terrorist activities, non-
proliferation and arms control, and further co-operation in peacekeeping along 
with the development of specific defence capabilities. NATO and Ukraine have 
both expressed their desire to deepen and expand their relationship, and political 
consultations are expected to intensify in parallel with the practical work carried 
out under the Work Plan. By November 2002, NATO and Ukraine will have 
worked together towards defining the parameters and goals of this deepened 
relationship, with a view to consolidating the contribution of the NATO-Ukraine 
Distinctive Partnership. This will allow us to focus on the substance of an ever-
enhanced relationship. 
Furthermore, we must not forget that the decisions of the NATO Prague 
Summit may be a turning point for the Organisation’s future. The decisions to be 
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taken in Prague by the Alliance’s leaders will include the enlargement of NATO, 
plans to develop new defence capabilities, and new relationships. As a result, 
they may also set the agenda for a new framework of NATO-Ukraine relations. 
We are on the brink of the creation of a transformed Alliance of which an 
integral component will be an energised focus on NATO-Ukraine relations. 
At the same time, much work remains to be done. The meeting of 
NATO-Ukraine Commission Ambassadors in Kyiv on 9 July 2002 marked the 
fifth anniversary of the Distinctive Partnership and also provided us with an 
opportunity to take stock of our achievements and progress on our common work 
leading to Prague. Previously, the NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting at 
Ministerial level had tasked Ambassadors to explore and develop a deepened and 
broadened NATO-Ukraine relationship in order to take our relationship forward 
to a qualitatively new level, including through intensified consultations and co-
operation on political, economic and defence issues. For, while the Charter 
signed five years ago continues to provide a solid and forward-looking 
framework for building the NATO-Ukraine relationship, it is still up to us as 
Partners to achieve the most we can from this enduring Charter. 
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While it is true that most Ukrainian citizens wishing to work abroad 
usually travel legally, it is also true that once they reach their destination they do 
tend to live and work there without obtaining the necessary permits. By failing to 
obtain residence and work permits in the host country, they immediately class 
themselves as illegal immigrants with all the consequences this status implies. 
Ukraine has about five hundred companies that are licensed to act as 
intermediaries for nationals seeking work abroad, but it takes the Ukrainian 
Prosecutor’s Office about a year to audit these companies’ annual accounts 
because of the violations committed by these firms. 
But there are other ways in which Ukrainian citizens can find work 
abroad. For example, the same service is offered by a number of tourist agencies 
that are ostensibly engaged in sending people abroad as tourists. The largest 
source of these agencies’ income comes from the huge profits they make from 
the fees they charge for this service. However, payment of these fees does not 
entail any responsibility on the part of the company or the agency concerned in 
respect of guaranteeing the preliminary agreed terms and conditions of 
employment and remuneration of Ukrainian nationals abroad or their 
repatriation. Such companies are sometimes involved in the resale of Ukrainian 
labour to foreign customers. 
The worst form of people trafficking is the trafficking of women and 
children for sexual purposes. This is a major problem for Ukraine. According to 
one Ukrainian parliamentary committee on human rights, at least 100,000 
Ukrainian women abroad find themselves in this kind of situation, and while 
15% of them were aware of the situation when they were hired, the majority 
thought that they were being employed to work as waitresses, dancers or maids. 
An international non-governmental organization in Ukraine estimates that there 
are over 500,000 people living and working abroad illegally who are the victims 
of such crimes. 
                                                          
1 Dr. Olena A. Malynovska is Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute of International 
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Ukrainian nationals abroad often become the victims of criminal and 
racketeering acts committed by other Ukrainian citizens. According to illegal 
migrants in Italy, anyone who wishes to settle illegally in this country has to pay 
the racketeers $100. In the Czech Republic, where the fee is about $20-25, all 
Ukrainian workers have to pay the racketeers $20 a month and anyone who 
refuses to pay runs the risk of being robbed, beaten up or even murdered. 
Although Ukraine controls the illegal migration of its citizens, 
Ukrainian criminal groups are expanding their activities abroad. For example, 
40% of the crimes committed by foreigners in the Czech Republic in 2000 were 
committed by Ukrainians. Therefore, it is not surprising that the number of 
Ukrainians arrested by law enforcement bodies abroad is, according to the 
Ukrainian Consular Service, growing. 
Under these circumstances, it is understandable why the countries 
neighbouring Ukraine are so strongly opposed to the introduction of a visa 
regime enabling Ukrainian citizens to travel to these countries reasonably freely. 
According to a recent opinion poll carried out in Poland, over 50% of the Poles 
questioned believe that the positive benefits resulting from the introduction of 
travel visas for Ukrainians will far outweigh the negative consequences for their 
country. The Poles believe that the introduction of visas will help to keep crime 
out and increase law and order. 
But I wonder whether the introduction of entry visas for Ukrainians 
travelling abroad will in fact help to fight the combined threats of illegal 
migration and organized crime. I personally have doubts about that because the 
strict requirements governing the issue of Schengen visas never stopped illegal 
migrants, including Ukrainians, from entering the European countries. I am also 
firmly convinced that while there is a considerable demand for highly qualified 
people in the West and despite salaries in Ukraine being ten times lower, labour 
migration will linger on, notwithstanding all the various control measures.  
Although legal migration is growing, this does not imply that illegal 
migration will disappear. In fact, it will lead to improvements in the capabilities 
of organized crime, which, in turn, will boost the economy in the West, which is 
the major key consumer of illegal immigrants, together with the corruption of 
bureaucrats and border guards and customs officials. The conditions offered to 
illegal immigrants will also worsen because they will continue to make their way 
to the West to find work. In this respect, as far as combating illegal immigration 
is concerned, I believe that Ukraine is facing a number of challenges, one of 
which is finding ways of legalizing the procedure governing the norms for 
Ukrainian citizens who wish to leave for abroad. 
Without wishing to downplay the problem of illegal immigration into 
Ukraine, if you compare the statistics, you can see that the regulation of the 
labour migration of Ukrainian citizens abroad poses a far more serious problem 
to Ukraine. And, while we have employment agreements on employment with a 
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number of countries, including Russia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Slovakia, the scale of these agreements is currently inadequate. Given the 
enlargement of the European Union and the introduction of visa regimes, there 
would seem to be a need to find common solutions to the issue of illegal 
migration from Ukraine in order to avoid destabilization both within Ukraine and 
outside. 
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1. Introduction 
The perception of Ukraine as a new source of concern for national and 
regional security uncertainties arising from terrorism, organized crime and illegal 
migration is directly and indirectly related to the tragic events of 11 September 
2001. By a twist of fate, the most recent Ukraine-European Union (EU) Summit 
also took place on 11 September, at which both sides’ participants emphasized 
the need to continue EU-Ukrainian security cooperation but did not address the 
terrorism problem. However, Ukraine made international headlines on 4 October 
2001 when a passenger plane flying from Israel to Russia was shot down over 
Ukrainian territory. After some false statements, it became clear that the incident 
was an accident caused by a Ukrainian missile. Although Ukraine has not been a 
target for terrorist attacks and is not regarded as a base by international terrorist 
organizations, it is obvious that there are a number of structural factors that 
might be relevant to terrorism. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that 
the agenda of terrorism-related security concerns is partly determined by outside 
events and in particular by the aftermath of 11 September 2001.  
 
2. Identifying New Concerns for National and Regional Security 
2.1 Terrorism 
The problem with analysing terrorism is the absence of any commonly 
agreed definition. According to the United Nations (UN), the following 
definition best describes terrorism: “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of 
repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or 
state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby–in contrast 
to assassination–the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The 
immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of 
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opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target 
population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based 
communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, 
and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it 
into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on 
whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought” (Schmid, 
1988). 
On the basis of this definition, terrorism has not become a serious threat 
for Ukraine’s national security. According to the Ukrainian Anti-terrorist Centre, 
60 terrorist-related activities were discovered in 20002 so that Ukraine can hardly 
be said to be a centre of international terrorism. In addition, international terrorist 
organizations do not regard Ukraine as a target for terrorist activities, although 
there are some factors that might be of structural interest to terrorists, such as 
relatively easy access to nuclear material, porous and badly controlled eastern 
borders, and weak state institutions and civil society. In fact, these same factors 
have led to the following type of assessment that was made by The Economist in 
June 2002: “For the time being, however, the squalor on Europe’s eastern 
frontiers poses a dismal prospect for the West. Both Ukraine and Belarus are 
weapons supermarkets for the worst sort of customer and provide transit for just 
about everything the West wants to keep at bay.”3  
 
2.2 Immigration 
Taking into account its geographical location and specific role as a 
successor state of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine is an attractive country for 
immigration. However, obtaining reliable data about migration in Eastern Europe 
is a problem in itself, due to weak administrations, porous borders and visa-free 
travel among the successor states of the former Soviet Union, which means that 
the statistical data that is available is mostly limited to an overview of officially 
registered migrants. This data shows decreasing trends in both immigration and 
emigration. Overall, the number of officially registered emigrants is significantly 
higher than the number of officially registered immigrants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 See Yuriy Zemlyankiy, Borderless Threats, in http://www.niss.gov.ua/cards/magazine/art15.htm. 
3 The Economist, 1 June 2002, p.30. 
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Table 1 
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According to the United States Committee for Refugees, at the end of 
2000 Ukraine was hosting more than 5,500 refugees and asylum seekers, mostly 
from Afghanistan (1,685), Armenia (229), Russia (218), Azerbaijan (192) and 
Georgia (113).4 In addition to seeking refugee or asylum status, other reasons for 
immigration to Ukraine are related to ethnicity. For example, approximately 
270,000 Crimean Tatars returned to the Crimean peninsula after being exiled to 
Central Asia by Stalin in the 1940s. However, immigrants have to face 
citizenship problems and social difficulties of all kinds, such as housing and 
employment, which considerably weaken their social status. Their difficult social 
status, which is partly the result of their not always clearly defined legal 
citizenship status, and their links to their former Soviet Republics of origin make 
them a potentially good breeding ground for illegal activities. 
Illegal migration to Ukraine is often related to economic aspects, transit 
from Asia further westwards, drug trafficking and trafficking in other goods and 
in people. However, in trying to establish its potential as a soft security threat, 
immigration cannot be considered solely in terms of the total number of migrants 
but must also take into account their place of origin together with structural 
factors. Based on this assumption, Ukraine is an attractive destination for 
migrants/refugees from weak states and, in some cases, migration is related to all 
kinds of illegal economic practices. Because of its porous border with Russia, 
                                                          
4 See US Committee for Refugees, Country Report Ukraine 2001.  
  
  38
Ukraine has long played the role of a transit country for migrant flows from Asia 
to Western and Central Europe. 
 
2.3 Organized Crime 
Organized crime and corruption are legacies of the Soviet past related to 
the endemic corruption of the Soviet Union. Since independence, these problems 
have had a serious impact upon the entire Ukrainian transition process, and led to 
the flight of capital, limited interest on the part of foreign investors, drug 
trafficking and money laundering through casinos, exchange bureaus and banks. 
According to international and regional assessments, Ukraine is a country with a 
high level of organized crime.5 
 
Table 2: 
Organized Crime Groups and Offences, Ukraine and Russia, 1991-1999 
US Department of Justice, July 2001 
 
 Ukraine Russia 
Year No. of 
Groups 
No. of 
Offences 
No. of 
Groups 
No. of  
Offences 
1991 260 2,549 952 5,119 
1995 831 4,500 14.050 23,820 
1996 951 6,410 12,684 26,432 
1997 1,081 N/A 12,500 28,497 
1998 1,157 9,000 N/A 27,097 
1999* 857 6,500 N/A 24,000 
* Denotes first 9 months only. 
Sources: Glushkov, unpublished report; Volodymyr Stashis, presentation to NIJ-sponsored 
conference, 20 November 1999, Kyiv, Ukraine; V.V. Luneev, Prestupnost XX veka, p.303; 
“Legislation and the Law: Impact on OC in Russia, 1997–1998”, Organized Crime Watch, May-June 
1999; and Organizovannaia prestupnost, No.4, Moscow, 1998, p.258. 
 
One might draw a number of critical conclusions from this data. In 
particular, it would appear that organized crime is more significant in Ukraine 
than it is in Russia, due to a higher number of groups, the number of offences 
committed per group (Russia: 2-3; Ukraine 7-10) and a higher growth rate. 
Nevertheless, the data’s comparability depends on size, and the character of a 
‘group’ related to organized crime does eventually have to be qualified.  
Because organized crime is frequently associated with political 
corruption, reference may be made to the comparative Corruption Perception 
                                                          
5 See Louise Shelley, “Organized Crime and Corruption are Alive and Well in Ukraine”, The World 
Bank Group Transition Newsletter, January/February 1999. Organized Crime and Corruption Watch 
Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, American University, Washington D.C. 
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Index that has been researched by Transparency International. According to its 
most recent data, Ukraine is one of the most corrupt countries. 
 
Table 3:  
TI 2001 Corruption Perception Index. 
Ukraine and its Neighbours 
 
Country Rank Score 
Belarus n.a. n.a. 
Hungary 31 5.3 
Moldova 63 3.1 
Poland 44 4.1 
Romania 69 2.8 
Russia 79 2.3 
Ukraine 83 2.1 
Source: http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html by business people, academics and risk 
analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
 
In many reports, organized crime and corruption are seen as a 
widespread transition problem for Ukraine. Indeed, the gravity of the situation 
tempted George Soros to say, “Ukraine gives corruption a bad name.”6 The most 
problematic aspect of organized crime in Ukraine is the alliance among former 
Party elites, members of the law enforcement and security apparatuses and gangs 
of organized criminals. One outstanding case concerns former Prime Minister 
Pavlo Lazarenko, who was involved in money laundering and illicit fiscal 
activities within the oil, gas and coal industries and even charged with ordering 
and paying for the murders of state officials in 1996 and 1997.7 When internal 
and international pressure against Lazarenko achieved a critical mass in 1998, he 
was forced to resign from office and flee to Switzerland, where he was arrested 
as he was trying to cross the border using a forged Panamanian passport, charged 
with money laundering and freed on bail of US $2.6 million. Later, he fled again 
under a forged passport to the US, where the Americans brought their own set of 
corruption charges against him.  
However, it should be emphasized that, even if the Lazarenko case 
represents a ‘worst case’ in the practice of corruption and organized crime in 
                                                          
6 See George Soros (The New Republic, 15 April 2002), in: 
http://www.rferl.org/corruptionwatch/2002/04/15-190402.asp.  
7 See ‘Spotlight: Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Charged with Contracting Murders’, in “Crime, 
Corruption and Terrorism Watch”, Radio Free Europe, No. 2/2002. 
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Ukraine, it cannot be regarded as being limited to the former Prime Minister or 
as an exception to such other structural problems as the weakness of civil 
society, the influence wielded by economically-driven political pressure groups, 
the absence of checks and balances and the lack of free media. Other cases of 
organized crime were related to the murder of Internet journalist Georgy 
Gongadze and to international smuggling rings that imported illegal aliens from 
Ukraine into the U.S. and sold female aliens into prostitution.8 And, in an official 
letter from the Anti-Mafia coalition in the Ukrainian Parliament, Prosecutor-
General Potebenko was also accused of taking bribes. This letter was first 
published in the small opposition newspaper, Soboda, but the Ukrainian militia 
destroyed all editions containing the text of the letter.9 Organized crime was or is 
a concomitant effect of dividing political power and economic influence, for 
instance, in the privatization process. 
 
3. Structural Reasons for New Concerns 
From the above analysis, it may be concluded that the most troubling 
new security risk in Ukraine is organized crime, while terrorism according to its 
classical definition is still of minor importance. Nevertheless, the current 
situation in the country is marked by structural weaknesses, all of which are 
threatening security and stability. 
 
3.1 Border Security  
Ukraine’s borders are a sensitive factor for regional and national 
security. During the Soviet period, its western borders with Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Romania were like a kind of iron curtain between the Soviet Union 
and its western neighbours. Due to the EU’s impending enlargement, Ukraine’s 
western border with the Central and East European accession states has to meet 
Western standards. Since the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the Schengen 
agreement on personal control at the Union’s outer border has become part of the 
acquis communautaire, and as such has to be implemented in order for a country 
to become an EU member state. Even if some countries, such as Poland, have not 
been very keen on introducing Schengen regulations, they have had to agree to 
EU requirements in order to fulfill membership requirements. In July 2003, 
Poland will introduce visa regulations for Ukrainian citizens travelling to Poland. 
In addition, the Union and its member states are also supporting border security 
and border checkpoints on the future eastern border with technical assistance and 
advisory projects. However, the high degree of border security on Ukraine’s 
western border does not correspond to the situation at the eastern border and 
                                                          
8 See http://www.rferl.org/corruptionwatch/2002/05/19-160502.asp. 
9 See http://www.rferl.org/corruptionwatch/2002/04/15-190402.asp. 
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Crimea. With a total length of 1,576 km., the Russian-Ukrainian border is neither 
demarcated nor adequately controlled.10 Until 1991, the Russian-Ukrainian 
border was an administrative boundary between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and decision-
makers had to start from scratch in developing border regulations. While 
Ukraine’s overall goal is to implement border regulations that are based on 
international regulations, Russia’s aim to regulate border relations with other 
former Soviet republics is limited to delimitation. 
Another border problem is related to the Crimean peninsula, which 
historically used to belong to Russia and where the Black Sea Fleet is deployed. 
As a result of the 1997 Black Sea Fleet Agreement, part of the fleet still belongs 
to the Russian Federation. Consequently, by definition, Crimean borders have to 
provide access for the Russian military, which makes the requirement of 
controlled borders even more difficult. At the same time, the Crimea in itself is 
also the cause of many new potential security risks due to its special territorial 
status as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the specific ethnic problems 
arising out of the emigration of Crimean Tatars from other former Soviet 
Republics. 
The third area of concern is the border between Western Ukraine and 
the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic. After Transdniestria’s declaration of 
independence from a successor state to the former Moldovan Soviet Republic in 
August 1991, the Moldovan authorities’ unsuccessful attempts to regain control 
of the region led to a full-scale armed conflict in the spring of 1992. Although 
the military conflict was stopped, national players such as Moldova, Ukraine and 
Russia as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OCSE) have not succeeded in solving the related status problems. In addition to 
the unclear status issue, the autonomous territory contains several sources of soft 
security risks, ranging from a high level of heavy and armaments industries, 
through a huge arsenal of outdated weapons left by the former Soviet army, to 
reports of corruption and the smuggling of goods and people through the 
territory.11 
According to an assessment by the European Union, the OSCE and 
other international players, Transdniestria continues to pose a threat to political 
and economic stability.12 Moldova criticizes the inefficiency and porousness of 
the border and customs control between Ukraine and Transdniestria, which 
threatens Moldova with the trafficking of goods and people, organized crime and 
                                                          
10 See The Legal Status of the Russian-Ukrainian Border: Problems and Prospects, Borders of 
Ukraine. Aleksandr Fomin, “Selenaja,” Graniza Ukrainy, in Den’, 31.1.2001. 
11 See Vladimir Solonari, “Transdniestria: Old Problems, New Developments”, in Iris Kempe (ed.), 
Risks and Challenges beyond EU Enlargement, forthcoming fall 2002. 
12 Moldova: Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & National Indicative Programme 2002-2003, in 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/moldova/csp/, p.3. 
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corruption. Insofar as the control is only organized by the Ukrainians, the 
Moldovan government requires its participation in the border control or suggests 
an international border control, but so far no decision has been reached.13  
Except for its western part, Ukraine is almost completely surrounded by 
open and non-demarcated borders, which makes the country attractive for all 
kinds of ‘business’ related to soft and hard security threats, such as smuggling, 
the arms trade, illegal migration and drug trafficking. 
 
3.2 Ethnic Conflicts 
Ethnic and religious conflicts might be part of the structural causes of 
international terrorism.14 When Ukraine became independent in 1991, ethnic and 
religious factors were of high concern for the existence of a Ukrainian state. The 
risks were related to a potential separatism between the ethnically Russian part of 
the country in the east and the Ukrainian-dominated western part of the country. 
Ukraine’s ethnic mixture is also linked to the absence of a state church and the 
existence of several, sometimes rival, churches. 
Another separatist threat is posed by the Crimean peninsula. 
Historically, this part of Ukraine belonged to Russia and was the homeland of the 
Crimean Tatars. During the Stalinist period they were deported to Central Asia 
and have been migrating back since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
possibility of the ethnically Russian republic of Crimea seeking local powers and 
possible ‘reunification’ with Russia was seen as a potential threat. Furthermore, 
it was feared that a territorial dispute over the Crimean peninsula might arise 
concerning Black Sea Fleet assets and bases. Nevertheless, taking into account 
the high degree of ethnic and religious differences, developments since 1991 
have brought much less conflict than was initially feared ten years ago. 
 
3.3 A Weak Political and Social Transition and Weak State Institutions 
Civil society in Ukraine is still weak, and the system of checks and 
balances between state institutions and social institutions is very limited. 
Ukrainian society may be defined as an event organized by the state, with the 
balance of power mainly driven by economic and political influence groups. 
Political parties are organized from above, and concentrate on the leading person 
in order to run elections. It is symptomatic of former socialist countries in 
transition that political parties are not programme- but actor-driven. The only 
exceptions are the Communist Parties. Closeness to or even pressure by the 
various levels of the state administration restricts the parties’ social 
independence. During election campaigns, international and national election 
                                                          
13 See Allla Svartova, “Country Report Moldova”, in Kempe (ed.), Risks. 
14 Bruce Hoffmann, Terrorismus der ungeklärte Krieg, Frankfurt am Main, 2002. pp.112-171.  
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observers have reported pressure by the executive apparatus in order to influence 
the results.15 The weakness of civil society and the absence of checks and 
balances are also reflected in international rankings. 
 
Table 4:  
Freedom House. Comparative Measures of Freedom 2001. 
Ukraine and its Neighbours 
 
Country Political Rights A Civil Rights C Freedom Ranking 
Poland 1 2 Free 
Slovakia 1 2 Free 
Hungary 1 2 Free 
Romania 2 2 Partly free 
Moldova 2 4 Partly free 
Ukraine 4 4 Partly free 
Russia 5 5 Partly free 
Belarus 6 6 Not free 
Source: The Survey of Freedom 2001/2002, Annual Survey of Press Freedom 2002, Freedom House. 
Ranking: 1 (most free)-7 (least free). 
 
Another important factor for the development of civil society in Ukraine 
is the weakness of the independent media. Although the Constitution guarantees 
freedom of the press, this right is not enforced. The Ukrainian media are heavily 
dependent upon the state, and regional executives put pressure on journalists and 
editorial boards. The methods used range from administrative pressure, such as 
old Soviet methods of intervention by tax inspectors, through shortages of paper 
and distribution problems to physical violence.16 In the ten years since Ukraine’s 
independence, several journalists have been killed and numerous media outlets 
shut down. 
                                                          
15 See OSCE/ OHDIR Election Observation. Ukraine Parliamentary Elections, 31 March 2002.  
16 See Media Reponses to Corruption in the Emerging Democracies: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, 
and Ukraine, A Freedom House Assessment Report, Key Findings and Recommendations, May 
1999. 
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Table 5: 
Press Freedom 2002. Ukraine and its Neighbours 
 
Country A B C Total Rating 
Poland 6 6 6 18 Free 
Slovakia 10 5 7 22 Free 
Hungary 2 8 13 23 Free 
Romania 11 24 24 35 Partly free 
Moldova 22 20 17 59 Partly free 
Russia 13 30 17 60 Partly free 
Ukraine 23 26 11 60 Partly free 
Belarus 26 31 25 82 Not free 
Source: The Annual Survey of Press Freedom 2002, Freedom House, in 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2002/pfs2002.pdf. 
A = Laws and regulations that influence media content, scale 0-30. 
B = Political pressure, controls, and violence that influence content, scale 0-40. 
C = Economic pressure and controls that influence content, scale 0-30. 
Rating: Free 0-30; Partly free 31-60; Not free 61-100. 
 
Since 2000, the restrictive situation of journalism in Ukraine has been a 
matter of growing international attention, following the murder of Jurij 
Gongadze, an Internet journalist, who was well known for his investigative 
reporting on corruption. In September 2000 he vanished, and in November a 
decapitated body believed to be his was found. The subsequent release of tape 
recordings made secretly in President Kuchma’s office by his bodyguard made it 
look as if the President had been involved in the murder. The case has never been 
investigated properly and all attempts by US government organizations to help 
with the investigation have been refused by Ukraine. 
But, the Gongadze case is just the tip of the iceberg of all the other 
restrictive possibilities that prevent Ukrainian journalists from working freely 
and independently. Even the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior announced in 
August 2001 that “seventy-two crimes against journalists” had been committed 
since January 2001.17 In April 2001, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe discussed the possible exclusion of Ukraine because of state pressure 
and violence against journalists and members of parliament–particularly against 
opposition members–and the weakness of the constitutional state. Indeed, the 
                                                          
17 See Ukraine Annual Report 2002, Reporters sans frontières. 
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weakness of civil society makes it easier for Ukrainian state actors to further 
their economic and political interests by means of corruption, criminal acts and 
illegal pressure. The incident in which a Ukrainian missile shot down a Russian 
passenger air jet and subsequent attempts to conceal the facts is one example of a 
security risk caused by the state.18 
 
3.4 Lack of Engagement in International Structures 
Ukraine is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO) Partnership for Peace programme and part of the EU’s Partnership and 
Cooperation policy. Both connections provide links for cooperation but no clear 
membership prospects. While the West prevents itself from being directly 
threatened by new security risks by keeping Ukraine out of Western structures, 
one should also consider the risks of exclusion, which might increase instability 
and security threats. The situation has become even more complicated because of 
Ukraine’s growing Western orientation, which is often refused by Western 
institutions. During the initial period of independence, Ukraine pursued a policy 
of successful integration and cooperation with its Western partners as well as 
balanced relations with Russia. At the time, this orientation between East and 
West was also viewed as a failure on the part of Ukraine to adopt a clear 
position. 
After ten years of independence and Russia’s recent rapprochement 
with the West, the disadvantages of a foreign policy that is balanced between 
East and West have become more obvious, and Ukraine is now trying to 
strengthen its relations with the West by focusing on NATO and EU 
membership. However, so far, the Western side has not responded to Ukraine’s 
initiatives. Transition problems, including the above-mentioned security 
problems, are the main reason why the West, and the European Union in 
particular, is not keen on the potential integration of Ukraine. Nevertheless, 
despite all the West’s understandable concerns, it should also be borne in mind 
that cooperation up to the level of integration increases the options for preventing 
and managing new security threats, including terrorism, organized crime and 
immigration.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In trying to establish whether Ukraine poses a new security risk in terms 
of terrorism, organized crime and immigration, it may be concluded that Ukraine 
is definitely not among the top ten states of concern. While terrorism in Ukraine 
is a phenomenon that has been on the agenda since the tragic events of 
September 2001, Ukraine is not characterized by a high level of terrorist 
                                                          
18 See Ukraine missile may have hit plane, in BBC News, 5 October 2001.  
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activities and is not regarded by international terrorist organizations as a target 
for terrorist acts. Immigration, including illegal migration, is of more serious 
concern because of Ukraine’s high degree of attraction, its porous borders and 
the immigrants’ countries of origin. However, the most dangerous security risk is 
organized crime, which is very often related to corruption. According to 
international surveys, Ukraine is one of the most criminal and corrupt countries 
and is characterized by a high degree of state power involvement in illegal 
actions. 
Although it does not raise concern as a source of terrorism, Ukraine 
could be a potentially good breeding ground for new security risks because of the 
absence of checks and balances to counter a mixture of political and economic 
interests which achieve their ends by all kind of methods, including high-level 
corruption (Lazarenko) and murder (Gongadze).19 However, as long as the West 
continues to involve Ukraine in only a loose kind of cooperation, its influence 
over the prevention of new security risks arising will remain limited. Given that 
the country is in general very receptive to Western cooperation, new structural 
forms of cooperation could be developed to keep it from becoming a potential 
breeding ground for new security risks, although the precondition for any kind of 
institutional arrangements does, of course, depend on the success of Ukraine’s 
transition process. 
                                                          
19 See Roman Kapuchinsky, ‘The Government-Criminal Alliance’, in “Crime, Corruption and 
Terrorism in the former UdSSR”, RFE/RL, Vol.1, No. 3, 16 November 2001. 
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ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS  
OF STATE SUSTAINABILITY 
 
 
 
 
Volodymyr SIDENKO1  
 
 
 
 
The foundations of sustainable economic development cannot be 
separated from the foundations of democracy, because economic pluralism, 
which is the basic feature of a competitive market economy, is basically 
inseparable from political pluralism, which is the basis for long-term social 
consensus. Any deviation from this principle is liable to create security problems 
and may pose a real threat to the country in question and even to the international 
community as a whole.  
In the case of Ukraine, over the last three years we have witnessed a 
certain amount of progress in terms of economic dynamics and the creation of a 
system of institutions to underpin the emerging market economy and democratic 
pluralism. On the whole, this process is making Ukraine stronger and more 
predictable as well as more able to fulfil its international obligations and to 
participate in regional, economic, political and security cooperation. 
Despite these achievements, a number of problems have not yet been 
solved and this is preventing Ukraine from reaching its full potential in terms of 
its contribution to international stability and cooperation. The first problem stems 
from the fact that Ukraine is still in the process of establishing a genuine 
competitive market economy, which is the precondition for the formation of an 
influential middle class that will guarantee political stability and prevent any 
form of social revenge or national or religious extremism. The setting up of an 
adequate system of market economy institutions is of key importance here and 
will require the continuing application of policies of institutional change. 
Clearly, the success of any type of economic policy, be it monetary, fiscal or 
budgetary, depends upon the creation of a critical mass of efficient market 
economy institutions. The important thing here is the continuing development of 
free enterprise, backed up by measures to boost dynamic economic activity, in 
particular by freeing up the entry of new economic players into the market and 
reforming the laws on bankruptcy. The latter is an extremely difficult task that 
                                                          
1 Dr. Volodymr Sidenko is Director of Economic Programmes at the Ukrainian Centre for Economic 
and Political Studies named after Oleksander Razumkov (UCEPS), Kyiv. 
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requires the adoption of measures outlawing the monopolistic practices that 
linger on in Ukraine. 
The solution to this problem lies in better business legislation together 
with independent courts of justice that are empowered to enforce the existing 
laws. In particular, much more attention needs to be paid to enhancing 
privatization and corporate development, inter alia, by introducing 
internationally accepted principles of corporate governance. Failure to 
implement these important changes will not only make it impossible to protect 
the interests of minor investors and outsider shareholders against any abuse by 
insider management but will also produce substantial structural distortions within 
the economy. 
This particular set of problems is closely linked to the profound 
structural changes that must be made to Ukraine’s economy to ensure that it 
achieves a higher level of competitiveness within the global and the European 
market environment. Failure to implement these changes will lead to economic 
and political instability. However, this is not something that can be solved in a 
matter of one or two years, because the formation of efficient market economy 
structures requires a considerable amount of time and resources as well as 
substantial and prolonged efforts in the field of market economy infrastructure 
development. 
One specific problem here concerns the urgent need to modernize the 
existing production infrastructure that was created in Soviet times. This is a task 
that calls for a combination of sound and energetic economic policy on the part 
of the government and far greater involvement by the private sector, including 
foreign capital. Unfortunately, the current state of Ukraine’s government 
machinery leaves much to be desired in terms of its ability to ensure long-term 
strategic development aimed at modernization and innovation. This state of 
affairs is due to the lack of financial resources, as well as the government’s 
institutional inability to set strategic long-term goals rather than short-term 
priorities. Consequently, one of the main current requirements is the 
implementation of administrative reforms and the creation of state machinery to 
set and enforce the rules in accordance with the principles of the market 
economy and democratic pluralism. 
Within the framework of administrative reform in Ukraine, drastic 
changes are called for in order to reverse the insidious practice of ruling by 
executive regulations rather than by laws. Unfortunately, there was no way of 
avoiding the continuation of this practice during the initial phases of Ukraine’s 
transformation to democracy and the market economy as the success of this 
process depended upon the rapid implementation of new regulations. Under 
these circumstances, the presidential decrees, government regulations and 
normative acts issued by the National Bank of Ukraine and the various ministries 
were of primary importance. 
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However, this practice had a number of extremely serious side effects as 
it allowed frequent changes to be made to the regulatory environment, especially 
with regard to taxation, tariffs and customs, registration procedures, licensing, 
and foreign and exchange requirements. This continuing practice led to general 
instability within the regulatory framework and in many instances to the almost 
complete absence of legal rules and regulations. Another important consequence 
of this practice was the regulatory mechanism’s extremely high sensitivity to the 
influence of all the various vested interests, which enabled the legislative system 
to be used as a tool to impede market- and democracy-oriented change and to 
safeguard the interests of a small minority. 
Of course, all these negative consequences are a source of governmental 
chaos and social conflict and are, therefore, a matter of concern for Ukrainians 
and the international community alike. Overcoming this threat will require 
considerable political efforts, together with stricter parliamentary control over 
government activities and increased pressure by the civil society structures that 
are now developing in Ukraine. 
Another issue of major importance for Ukraine’s future development is 
the harmonization of its internal regulatory system with international standards. 
This is absolutely vital in the light of Ukraine’s integration into European and 
international economic structures and the increasingly important role played by 
international organizations. In this respect, further efforts need to be made to 
accelerate economic and social change in Ukraine and to implement all the 
international economic standards that have been adopted by the international 
organizations that it aspires to join. 
First on the list is the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Kyiv must 
implement all the WTO’s rules on trade, investment and intellectual property. It 
should be stressed that WTO membership is not just a matter of trade 
liberalization, as many Ukrainians currently believe it to be, but first and 
foremost the transition to a rules-based economy from an economy based on 
exclusion from rules. This will create the conditions for moving closer towards 
the target set in the partnership and cooperation agreement that Ukraine has 
signed with the European Union (EU) on the harmonization of its economic 
legislation with that of the EU. 
Clearly, in the long run, all these developments will substantially 
benefit the country’s economic environment by making it more secure for 
international investment and innovation, which, in turn, will speed up more 
sustainable social and economic development. The same applies more or less to 
the implementation of the standards set by the Council of Europe for ensuring 
the efficient development of the democratic foundations of Ukrainian society 
together with an adequate level of personal freedom. 
Turning now to the international dimension of Ukraine’s economic and 
democratic development problems, we must carefully consider the multi-faceted 
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geo-political and geo-economic interests that are inherent in Ukraine’s history, 
geography and culture. We must recognize that the setting of Ukraine’s geo-
political and geo-economic orientation is not so much a foreign policy issue as 
an internal policy matter that is rooted in Ukrainian civilization and society. If 
we ignore the ambiguous nature of the Ukrainian nation, its partially European 
and partially Asian character, we may sow the seeds of internal and international 
conflict. 
While it is highly important for Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ to be 
shared and endorsed by the majority of its population through democratic 
procedures, the free development of fruitful cooperation with Ukraine’s post-
Soviet partners is equally important. From Ukraine’s perspective, the formation 
of an integrated European economic and political space based on mutually 
agreed terms and the adoption of European standards is vital. 
In my view, senior policymakers need to pay close attention to the 
following issues that are crucial for strengthening the foundations of both 
European and international security:   
- Firstly, trade liberalization in relations with all European states in order to 
create the preconditions for a future single all-European economic space, and 
the renunciation of discriminatory and protectionist measures within this 
space, including quotas, discriminatory anti-dumping procedures and the 
exercising of political influence in business transactions. 
- Secondly, the creation of a system of stable trans-Euro-Asian energy supplies 
or an integrated energy space in the region to include oil-extracting Caspian 
Sea states, Russia and countries with transit functions, together with the 
development of a network of trans-Euro-Asian transport corridors based on a 
multilaterally agreed concept and distributed in a way that prevents long-term 
conflicts of national interests in terms of benefits and losses. 
- Thirdly, the harmonization of trans-Euro-Asian relations with regard to the 
even development of high-tech production facilities in order to prevent the 
creation of economic divisions in Europe as a result of different levels of 
high-tech development. 
- Fourthly, the conclusion of a pan-European agreement to regulate migration 
and employment. 
- Fifthly, a balanced and mutually advantageous decision regarding any 
negative impact arising out of the EU’s eastward expansion, including any 
negative impact it might have on outsider countries, such as Ukraine. 
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1. Introduction 
It should surprise no Ukrainian participant in Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) activities that the economic and democratic foundations of Ukraine matter 
to the West. It should also surprise no one that these foundations matter so much 
that they are not only the subject of discussion, but concern and on occasion even 
pressure. For this reason, it is easy to forget that these issues are even more 
important to Ukraine. They would be vitally important even if the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) did not exist. To be 
sure, unless the economic and democratic foundations of Ukraine are 
strengthened, Ukraine’s goal of Euro-Atlantic integration will not be realised.  
But the key point is that an even more important goal will fail to be realised: the 
integration of Ukraine itself. In itself, formal independence, nezalezhnist’, cannot 
produce wealth, happiness, let alone genuine self-determination and security. For 
this, a country needs samostiynist’, the ‘ability to stand’ on strong and healthy 
foundations. The foundations of the totalitarian system were, during that 
system’s prime, strong and unhealthy. ‘Post- totalitarianism’ is a system that is 
both weak and unhealthy. 
Whatever might be the case elsewhere in the world, in contemporary 
Europe strong and healthy states have been erected on the foundations of liberal 
democracy and a liberal market economy. But these foundations and the 
relationship between them are widely misunderstood. Western policy, advice and 
‘assistance’ have not always advanced an understanding of these realities and 
relationships in Ukraine. This is partly because there has been too much 
emphasis on the mechanics and too little emphasis on the culture of democracy. 
There has also been too great an emphasis on the narrowly political, as opposed 
to the wider public and civic realm. As a result, many in Central and Eastern 
Europe appear to believe that democracy relates to the conduct of elections, 
rather than the conduct of institutions: as if once elections are pronounced ‘free 
and fair’, it is entirely legitimate for public institutions to behave in ways that are 
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unaccountable, self-serving, arbitrary, autocratic and corrupt. No less worrying, 
key Western institutions have devoted undue attention to the macroeconomic 
sphere (and ‘stability’) rather than to economic relations and their corollary, 
relations of power. These relations are as central to the health (and fate) of the 
political order and political democracy itself. Where the majority of ‘consumers’ 
feel they lack choice, where markets are rigged rather than open, where wealth 
derives from expropriation rather than production and investment, the majority 
of citizens will not only feel that they are shut out of the market economy. They 
will feel that there is no democracy in the country. To a significant extent, the 
struggle for samostiynist’ is the struggle to create economic relations that will 
give this majority faith in the political order and their own future. 
In democratic orders, it is rightly and almost universally assumed that 
governments will not be legitimate unless opposition is deemed legitimate; that 
however ‘freely’ and enthusiastically elected these governments are, they must 
account and answer for their decisions and conduct; and that however 
enlightened and humane they might be, conflicts of interest and outlook will 
arise and must not be repressed. It is also rightly assumed that, within broadly 
agreed rules and conventions, opposition and criticism are not only a right but a 
necessity: that they, like competition in the market place, are essential to 
adaptation and progress. This interplay of interests, perspectives and ideas does 
not guarantee that good decisions will be made. It is simply the precondition for 
making good decisions–and, what is more, for perceiving choices and 
alternatives clearly. Nevertheless, as Lord Dahrendorf has warned, unhealthy 
incongruities and ‘social faults’ will arise if these conditions are confined to the 
narrowly political sphere and not reflected in the workings of public institutions 
as a whole.  Weimar Germany was an unhealthy, not to say fragile, political 
order because the principles embodied in its liberal constitution were 
‘incongruent’ with the traditional social structure and illiberal values of the 
country. As a result, this political order did not command a sufficient degree of 
legitimacy and respect to withstand challenges to it. 
In what ways is this broader ‘congruence’ helpful to mature and 
successful democratic systems? In what ways is its absence harmful to Ukraine 
and other countries of the former Soviet Union?  Let us consider the application 
of two principles widely associated with liberal democracy and ‘good 
governance’: transparency and participation. 
 
2. Transparency 
When we say that institutions lack transparency, we mean that those 
outside them have no ability to see what goes on inside them. Without the ability 
to see, democracy is not a meaningful term. First and foremost, we need to see 
who people really are. This, of course, should not entitle people to see 
everything.  Fortunately, some Western democracies are still civilised enough to 
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treat the private lives of politicians (not to say diplomats, experts and scholars) as 
off limits to public scrutiny. But public lives are another matter. We expect those 
we elect to behave broadly in accordance with the political convictions and 
allegiances they profess. When British voters elect a Labour Party candidate, 
they expect him to enter the parliamentary Labour Party, to remain in it and to 
support most of its programme. If the country elected a Labour majority but 
found within a month that it had become a Conservative majority, British 
democracy would be in a state of crisis, and the country would conclude that we 
had no democracy at all. And if it were discovered that state authorities had 
bribed or threatened MPs elected under one party to defect to another, they 
would be out of office and very possibly in prison. 
The ability to see is also essential to accountable and competent state 
administrations. When Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence claims that the defence 
budget meets only 40 per cent of minimal needs, does the parliament’s 
Commission on Defence and Security have any means of verifying the claim? 
How are ‘needs’ calculated, and who calculates them? Is budgetary expenditure 
presented in sufficient detail to allow an independent assessment to be made, or 
even to provide an intelligent basis for discussion?  Fortunately, within the last 
few years Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) has recognised that the issue of 
transparency is relevant to effectiveness as well as accountability. Its decision to 
join NATO’s Planning and Review Process (PARP) at the end of 2000 was taken 
out of recognition that the MOD itself did not have all the tools required to 
calculate the actual inventories and real costs of its military establishment. By 
comparison with the post-Soviet, not to say Ukrainian norm, it has become quite 
a transparent structure. As a result, the independent Razumkov Centre prepares 
its often critical assessments of defence policy on the basis of the same figures 
used, and made public, by Major General Valeriy Muntiyan, Assistant to the 
Defence Minister for Budget and Financial-Economic Activity. But can the same 
be said of the State Customs Service, Internal Troops, militia and other force 
structures? 
Responsible and enlightened decision making also depends upon the 
ability to see. Transparency implies knowledge of what decisions are made, 
where they are made, by whom they are made and why. The inability to know 
these things leads, at best, to confusion, duplication of effort and loss of money. 
At worst, it leads to illegality, threats to national security and conflict. In the 
former Soviet world (and in some parts of the Balkans), transparency is often 
absent just where it is most needed. A few examples will suffice. When Anatoliy 
Chubays, a former Finance Minister and Acting Prime Minister of Russia, took 
over the giant energy distribution company UES (United Energy Systems), he 
discovered that this firm–by some reckonings the second or third richest in the 
world–did not have a budget. Without a budget, how is it possible to know who 
is making money, who is losing money, who is wasting money and who is 
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stealing it? In Ukraine, as late as 1998 the state “[did] not keep statistics” on 
grain exports (by the admission of the Minister of Agriculture),2 there was no 
system for recording individual pension contributions3 and the volume of inter-
enterprise debt was a state secret. In such conditions, the processes of budgeting, 
financing and monitoring will be carried out poorly, if at all. 
The energy sector, vital to financial solvency, economic growth, ‘good 
neighbourly’ relations and national security, is the most powerful and opaque 
transnational entity in the former Soviet Union. How is one to know who owns 
what–or who owes what to whom–in an energy ‘market’ characterised by 
arbitrary price levels, hidden payment mechanisms, invisible partners, front 
companies, tax fraud and an extensive barter trade? In December 1999, Russia 
accused Ukraine of illegally siphoning 185 cubic metres of gas per day from the 
Druzhba pipeline. In retaliation, it cut off the supply of oil and insisted it would 
not be restored until gas siphoning was reduced to nought. Within a month, the 
Ukrainian authorities were able to reduce the figure to 35 cubic metres per day, 
and the dispute dragged on for another four months. Anyone knowledgeable 
about the chicaneries at work in this sector would ask–and many did ask–
whether these elusive culprits were independent Ukrainian operators or agents of 
Gazprom seeking to prolong the dispute. The culprits were not found, and the 
dispute ended when President Putin stated his terms and President Kuchma took 
the first steps to meet them. 
‘Privatisation’ presents an equally disturbing picture. Prior to Putin’s 
first summit with Kuchma on 15-16 April 2000, Russia published a list of 30 
Ukrainian enterprises of interest to Russian entrepreneurs. These included 
Ukraine’s six oil refineries, already in the midst of a privatisation process, and 
the Mykolayiv aluminium plant. Of the four companies and consortia bidding for 
the latter, two were ostensibly Russian and two of them Ukrainian.  But it later 
transpired that one of the Ukrainian bidders was controlled by the same group as 
one of the Russian bidders, and the other Ukrainian company was founded by 
Russia’s Siberia Aluminium Group. Some ten months later, the two presidents 
approved four intergovernmental documents as well as ten interdepartmental 
documents concerning energy privatisation, common industrial policy, 
shipbuilding and the aerospace complex, along with an agreement to link the 
power grids of Ukraine and Russia. None of these accords was published, and 
even Ukraine’s government was only allowed to see some of them in excerpted 
form! Until information about the ownership, capital and budgets of enterprises 
and banks–information available in any serious British or American library–is 
available to ministers, judges, investors, MPs and interested citizens, how will it 
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3 As lamented by President Kuchma.  See Intelnews, 19 April, 1998. 
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be possible to make intelligent economic choices, let alone see where the 
national interest lies? 
 
3. Participation and Accountability 
Liberal democracy is generally seen as synonymous with participatory 
democracy. But in the most visible sense–participation by ordinary citizens in 
local and national elections–the forms and intensity of participation vary greatly 
from one liberal democracy to the other. In Belgium, voting in national elections 
is a legal requirement. In the United Kingdom, a 60 per cent voter turnout in a 
national election is seen as a sign of disaffection with the political process. In the 
United States, where 40 per cent has become the norm, a 60 per cent turnout 
would be greeted with mild astonishment. 
Does this make the political culture of the United States less democratic 
than the political culture of Russia or Belarus? Most people would say ‘no’, and 
they would be correct for three reasons. First, with some exceptions (e.g. 
Belgium, Switzerland), liberal democracies treat participation as a right rather 
than a duty, whereas in Belarus and much of the Russian Federation the 
totalitarian impulse of compulsory voting is still strong, and national as well as 
local authorities still have the ‘administrative resources’ required to encourage 
voting and influence the choices of voters as well. Second, many Russians (e.g. 
the large number who vote Communist) would say that apart from voting, they 
have no say in the political process because, once elected, the vlasti (powers) 
will use the resources at their disposal to do exactly what they please. Third, and 
for this reason, many Russians (not to say Ukrainians) suffer from a general 
sense of powerlessness. This powerlessness has far less to do with the conduct of 
elections and far more to do with the conduct of leaders, officials and 
institutions. 
Let us again consider the United States. It is no secret that George Bush 
Jr. has long been supported by oil interests. On the positive side, one should note 
that it is no secret: the connection is easy to discover and document (as, to be 
sure, is the connection between Presidents Clinton and Carter with labour unions 
and public sector employees, as well as the environmental and race relations 
lobbies). It is expected that these interests will influence policy, and it is 
expected that other interests will be mobilised to oppose the President’s policy. 
Because there will usually be a plurality of interests, national leaders will be 
obliged to argue, persuade and compromise. This interplay of interests is what 
we mean by politics. 
But the less obvious point is more significant. Politics has very little 
bearing on how the tax authorities, the police or the customs service define their 
duties or carry them out. Whilst very few citizens like the tax authorities in the 
United States, the overwhelming majority trust them and are confident that they 
will behave impartially. Attempts by a president to use the Inland Revenue (or, 
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for that matter the FBI and CIA) for partisan or ‘subjective’ ends are grounds for 
impeachment. Allegations that President Nixon sought to tamper with these 
institutions played an important role in inducing him to resign his office. No less 
important, an American president and a British prime minister have no influence 
on the authority, the independence and the decisions of the courts.4 Far from 
viewing the courts as an instrument of government or other powerful interests, 
citizens have repeatedly used them to challenge and overturn unjust and unlawful 
actions by executive authorities and private corporations. Perhaps it is not 
coincidental that whilst American election turnouts are the lowest of any 
advanced democracy, the United States is also the most litigious country in the 
world. It is a country in which the majority of citizens feel that they, not the 
state, are the principal ‘architect of their fortunes’ and that this will remain the 
case, whatever happens on election day. 
In short, there is a difference between having elections and having a 
democracy. The defining features of an effective liberal democracy are the open 
interplay of interests, the integrity of the legal order, the probity of public 
institutions and the accountability of authorities. A country which is democratic 
simply on election day is not a democracy. 
 
4. The Culture of Administration 
Can a country’s political culture be democratic if its administrative 
culture is authoritarian? In rare cases it can be, but the contradiction between the 
two is likely to produce clashes and, in Dahrendorf’s words, ‘social faults’. 
France might be said to be such a country, and it has been the theatre of a 
number of clashes between the state and body politic over the course of the 
twentieth century. It is a country in which democracy has definitely triumphed, 
but it is also one in which authoritarian instincts and practices survive. Many 
would say that after much turmoil and failure, the constitution of the Fifth 
Republic has finally produced a workable synthesis between the two. If so, it is 
because France is a country in which civic instincts and the ethic of individual 
initiative and responsibility are remarkably strong. 
But in post-Communist countries, where democratic and civic instincts 
are weak, an authoritarian administrative culture can only inhibit the 
development of civil society. The French Sovietologist Françoise Thom has 
defined totalitarianism as a system of war against civil society. The 
bureaucracies that Russia and Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union were an 
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and pending confirmation by Congress. Many presidential nominees are rejected by Congress. No 
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instrument of this war. They not only reflect the weakness of civil society. They 
also prolong it. 
Today it is not only necessary to ask whether this culture harms 
democracy, but whether it is administratively effective. The question is not as 
new as it might seem. Many have observed that imperial Russia and the Soviet 
Union were not only oppressively over-governed, but notoriously under-
governed. On the one hand, they were characterised by mass mobilisation, rapid 
modernisation and an extraordinary degree of intrusiveness by the state. But, as 
Bruce Clark notes, they were also countries made up of ‘dysfunctional elites’ in 
which ‘pockets of conservatism, conspiracies of laziness or incompetence build 
up whenever given the chance’.5 It is widely recognised that as Communist 
control structures lost their cohesion in the 1980s, these conspiracies of laziness 
and other ‘negative phenomena’ proliferated. In the absence of civil society, 
perestroyka did not arrest the growth of these negative phenomena, but 
accelerated them. 
Two examples, both of them relevant to security and defence, might 
serve to illustrate the differences in administrative culture between weak and 
strong civic orders. During the Cold War, Norway, Finland and Switzerland 
possessed defence systems designed to mobilise the entire able-bodied 
population within 24-72 hours. In Finland’s case, the ratio between standing, 
peacetime armed forces and the forces after mobilisation was 1:17. This 
capability was achieved with an extremely lean and economical administrative 
structure and a defence budget equivalent to 1.8 per cent of GDP. None of this 
would have been possible without an extraordinary degree of civic mindedness 
in the country at large. 
A second example is relevant to the process of defence reform that is 
now well underway in Ukraine. Several years ago in a visit which took place 
within the framework of the British-Ukraine Bilateral Programme of 
Cooperation, a British general was asked whom he consulted before making a 
decision. His answer was that he communicated ‘one level up, one level down, 
one level to the left and one level to the right–and, if time permits, two’. In 
shorthand, this answer meant that he was guided by his subordinates as much as 
his superiors; no less significantly, he was guided by those in different branches 
and departments who might be affected by his decisions. 
His answer is reflected in the working arrangements of the British 
Ministry of Defence, as well as NATO Headquarters. In both institutions, much 
policy is initiated and much of it made at mid level by committees: committees 
that are civil-military and interdepartmental in composition, with access to all 
information relevant to their responsibilities. This results in a clear relationship 
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between ideas from below and directives from above. It helps to break down 
departmental barriers and knit institutions together. It also helps to ensure that 
decisions are implemented swiftly and intelligently, because subordinates have 
participated in the process and have enough information to know what they are 
doing and why. This approach, which centres on increasing the horizontal 
integration of institutions, is in plain contrast to the Soviet approach to 
administrative problems, now revived by President Putin: strengthening the 
‘administrative vertical’. It is far from clear that this is the best way to improve 
the motivation of individuals and the performance of institutions. Dare one ask 
the delicate question? Did the ‘administrative vertical’ prevent the Nord-Ost 
tragedy? Would horizontal integration within institutions–and working-level 
cooperation and trust between them–not have stood a greater chance of doing so? 
Through no fault of those now responsible for Ukraine’s defence 
reform, the fact remains that there is a civic deficit in Ukraine, and until this is 
remedied, Western approaches to administration and management might not 
have the intended effect. But how does one remedy that deficit? The experience 
of Ukraine-NATO cooperation–cooperation which is becoming widespread and 
effective at working level–does suggest that elements of the NATO approach are 
having a beneficial effect in Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence and armed forces. 
Today there is reason to believe, and not only hope, that the development of 
individual initiative, participation and transparency in these structures is having a 
beneficial effect on the longer-term effort to strengthen civic values in Ukraine 
as a whole. 
 
5. Democracy, Information and Security 
These illustrations of the role that civil society and transparency play in 
defence and national security lead to an obvious question: were the totalitarian 
‘security states’ really more secure than their liberal democratic counterparts? 
However we answer this question, there is no doubt that post-totalitarian states 
are not. This was well recognised in Ukraine’s (1997) National Security 
Concept. This Concept dwelt upon three dangers: that Ukraine’s economic, civic 
and institutional weaknesses could become vulnerabilities; that these 
vulnerabilities could be exploited by internal and external actors with harmful 
political ends; and that crises and ‘emergency situations’ could escalate in 
magnitude and geographical scale into civil, local and regional conflict. The 
message was clear: in post-totalitarian conditions, the issue is not so much how 
states might be threatened, but how they might be undermined. The Concept 
rightly identified ‘strengthening civil society’ as the greatest of nine national 
security priorities. 
The Concept also stressed the importance of the information sphere, and 
today the challenges posed by information are routinely referred to by all 
Ukrainian structures with national security responsibilities. The problem is that 
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these challenges are fundamentally misunderstood. The term ‘global information 
order’ encapsulates the misunderstanding perfectly, because such a thing does 
not exist. Information disorder exists. In these conditions, a shrewd information 
policy will aim not to suppress information, but to create trust. This is not 
because information cannot be suppressed. It can. Censoring the television 
media, threatening journalists and dragging newspapers into the courts certainly 
suppress a lot of it. But even within one’s own country, one will never suppress 
enough, and the mere act of suppressing it, which cannot be disguised, fans 
distrust, even when trust in the state becomes vital to its survival: when, in the 
words of President Kuchma, it is essential that ‘people pull together at a critical 
moment’. Should one need to remind Ukrainians of the consequences of the 
Soviet regime’s attempts to suppress information about the Chernobyl 
catastrophe? 
Moreover, outside one’s own country, one will hardly be able to 
suppress information at all. If Ukrainian authorities and news media do not 
provide full and timely information about military accidents, environmental 
disasters, banking scandals and arms smuggling, then other interested parties–
Russian, Moldovan, Turkish, Romanian–certainly will, and these parties might 
not have Ukraine’s interests at heart. Already, a large amount of ‘facts’ 
‘revealed’ about Ukraine in Western newspapers comes from Russian sources. In 
fact, these Russian sources–official, semi-official and ‘private’–are so 
forthcoming, so ‘comfortable to deal with’ and Ukraine’s official sources so 
defensive and irritating to deal with that a number of Western journalists have 
simply acquired the habit of consulting them rather than Ukrainian sources about 
what is happening in Ukraine. An hour spent reading such sources on the web is 
always an hour well spent. The coverage is intelligent, detailed and sophisticated, 
but it requires quite a bit of knowledge to discover that it is also distorted and 
written for a purpose. The main purpose of such sites is not to provide a bad 
image of Ukraine (although they often succeed in doing that). The purpose is far 
more ambitious: to make Russia the main source of information about Ukraine. 
In this ‘information struggle’, Ukraine is handicapped for a historical 
reason. Ukraine never experienced a ‘Gorbachevian revolution’. Of course, this 
Gorbachevian revolution failed. But it produced a whole new class of people 
who knew that the USSR was losing the information struggle and knew why it 
was losing it.  This class and its descendants understand the competitive and 
disordered conditions in which information is produced, exchanged and believed. 
It was overwhelmingly Russian, not Ukrainian, and today it serves Russia. 
Instead of such a class of ‘information technologists’, Ukraine has a corps of 
journalists, analysts and professionals who believe in the truth. But today they 
are regarded as a threat by the state authorities, rather than an asset. Until this 
changes, Ukraine’s ‘information policy’ will damage Ukraine’s interests. 
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What is the future for a country that allows post-Soviet practices and 
their analogues–‘shadow structures’, ‘subjective interests’ and ‘financial-
informational struggle’–to go unchecked?  The consequences are plain to see on 
Ukraine’s borders in Transniestria (the so-called Pridnestrovian Moldovan 
Republic). There the merger between business, crime, security services and state 
structures is complete. Whereas the connections between these different spheres 
constitute a source of weakness in Ukraine, for Pridnestrovie, this merger is the 
source of the entity’s strength. For this reason, de facto states like Pridnestrovie 
(ditto Abkhazia and South Osetia) can fairly be described as pathological states. 
Yet these pathologies are not simply a local problem. They feed on the state and 
civic weaknesses of their neighbours, as much as a parasite feeds on an 
unhealthy host. The containment and eventual eradication of these entities 
depends on the strengthening of state and society in neighbouring states. If this 
does not happen, the pathologies will spread. If there is any doubt that 
democracy is relevant to security, one need only look at Pridnestrovie. Perhaps it 
is time for Ukraine to do so with open eyes–and then draw the necessary 
conclusions. 
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Any discussion about the new European security system cannot exclude 
Russia and Ukraine, which have to become fully-fledged participants in this new 
system. Europe is a unique region in the sense that it was here that the European 
security system was originally created. Indeed, the system worked quite well 
during the Cold War and effectively prevented the outbreak of a large-scale war 
in Europe. Of course, the situation has changed radically since then and we now 
have to build a new system with new parameters to meet the new security 
challenges. Indeed, over the years the concept of security has taken on a broader 
meaning and is no longer confined to the purely military sense in which it was 
previously understood. Consequently, priority is now being given to problems 
that are not directly related to military issues. 
At the same time, we can talk about terrorism in terms of a military 
challenge to security in Europe because of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 
the United States, although the problem of terrorism emerged in Russia long 
before that. Back in 1989, two houses in a residential district of Moscow were 
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completely destroyed as a result of a terrorist attack and since then Southern 
Russia has been hit by a series of terrorist attacks that have so far killed more 
than four hundred people. Of course, the situation in Chechnya and the terrorist 
groups and gangs that operate there pose a special challenge to Russia. Generally 
speaking, then, we can say that there has been a change in the parameters of 
military threats.  
The nature of armed conflicts has changed, too, in the sense that they 
have become more local, and it is believed that up to 80% of all contemporary 
armed conflicts are of an internal nature. The hostile parties to such conflicts are 
making increasing use of guerrilla and terrorist warfare, including groups that are 
equipped with sophisticated weaponry and which totally ignore the rules of 
international law. These conflicts usually entail huge numbers of refugees and 
displaced persons and this factor poses a threat to European security. 
Mention should be made of one other important change that will affect 
the parameters of a new European security system and that is the change in the 
role of the armed forces as a policy-making instrument. Whereas the 
employment of armed force used to be regarded as a last resort, we are now 
witnessing a more proactive and flexible use of armed force at various stages in 
the process of resolving political issues. As a result, we are seeing military 
activism that is no longer expressed in fully-fledged classical military operations 
but in numerous experiments in the peace-making field, ranging from the 
frequent use of or the threat to use armed force for prevention or peace-
enforcement purposes to the broad use of general armed forces to back up 
economic sanctions or respond to anarchy or social disintegration. 
A number of politicians, military men and scholars believe that the 
armed forces have now become inseparable from politics. For example, speaking 
at the United States National Defense University in January 1998, former 
American President Clinton underlined that diplomacy and military force are two 
sides of the same coin. Indeed, the recent operations carried out by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), including its operations on the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia, may well be regarded in this light, and here of course we 
should not ignore the activities of the European Union (EU) in the military 
sphere. Formerly, there was a clear division of labour between NATO, which 
was responsible for defence and ensuring so-called hard security, and the 
European Union, which was responsible for problems relating to economics, 
trade and the development of political and cultural cooperation–the so-called soft 
security issues. But, since the historical decisions that were adopted at the 1999 
Helsinki Summit regarding the establishment of military forces within the 
European Union, the situation has changed, with both NATO and the European 
Union addressing hard security issues. The paradox here is that, as far as Ukraine 
and Russia and the majority of the European countries are concerned, the main 
threats to their security lie in the soft security field. 
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We should also note that the sole use of military force to guarantee 
security is not sufficient. For example, in the case of the recent operation in 
Afghanistan, we can see that the American armed forces operating there are 
acting jointly with the armed forces and units of the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany. These three countries are all members of both the EU and NATO and 
this type of cooperation is performed on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. 
However, there is no military cooperation as such within NATO or within the 
EU, and I believe that Washington is rather sceptical about the prospect after 
their experience of cooperation within NATO during the operations in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
Moreover, generally speaking, military force cannot guarantee security, 
because security requires a combination of military and non-military action. This 
was the dilemma confronting Russia during its initial operations in Chechnya. In 
fact, during its first campaign the Russian Army fulfilled its mission and 
destroyed major concentrations of terrorists. But this did not bring peace to 
Chechnya, because the economic and all the other non-military elements needed 
to enable Chechnya to become a stable region were missing. 
Therefore, we believe that both military and non-military methods are 
necessary to combat terrorism effectively, beginning with physical destruction 
through to the financial destruction of the terrorists’ funding resources. This is 
the aim that Russia has been actively pursuing within the framework of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In particular, a programme for 
combating terrorism has been drawn up and a CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre set up 
on the basis of this programme. This Centre, which has been up and running 
since June 2000, is a special CIS organ that is designed to coordinate the efforts 
that are being made by the CIS countries’ authorities to combat terrorism. In 
April 2000, the Anti-Terrorist Centre organised its first joint exercises, with the 
participation of the Commanders in charge of anti-terrorist activities in nine CIS 
countries and the representatives of the coordinating bureau of the border guard 
services in the CIS countries–a bureau tasked with coordinating the combating of 
organised crime. These exercises were designed to develop the skills and 
interoperability of the interior troops’ security services and other law-
enforcement agencies on the territory of the CIS. 
In addition to enabling the setting up of well-balanced mechanisms for 
cooperation, these exercises proved to be an effective measure for preventing any 
kind of terrorist activities on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Of course, 
it is too early to say that everything is perfect. Not all the various problems have 
been solved and not all the CIS bodies have accepted the idea of a fully-fledged 
partnership. However, we are continuing our work and all parties are well aware 
that no single national security service can combat terrorism alone. At the same 
time, it should be stressed that regional security cannot be guaranteed without a 
new system that unites the efforts of all the stakeholders and which allows the 
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use of all the measures and means available in the countries in the region. 
Terrorism is today’s major challenge to humankind. It requires a systematic 
approach and I think we should probably start by taking small steps that will 
eventually lead us to a comprehensive security system. 
In fact, combating terrorism is the main feature of the NATO-Russia 
Rome Declaration, which is designed to build an entirely new relationship 
between Russia and NATO. Moscow believes that this important task should be 
based on mutual respect as well as on the need to find new areas of 
understanding. The major problem here is how to ensure that the new NATO-
Russia Council becomes an effective organ and not just a symbol of our new 
relationship. The Russian side believes that it is important to transform the logic 
of our interests into the logic of joint action based on the clear understanding that 
neither rocket power nor Cold War commitments can provide a universal remedy 
for modern threats. As President Putin said during the signing ceremony, Russia 
firmly believes that the Rome statement is not just a declaration but that it also 
provides a solid foundation for future activities and that the members of the 
NATO-Russian Council will also need to define new areas of cooperation for 
their future activities. It should, nevertheless, be noted that Russia originally 
proposed a wider range of issues for discussion. It is quite possible that the new 
NATO-Russia Council will, from the very beginning, work as a vehicle for 
political cooperation. I personally think it is important to start with political 
issues and then see how joint military activities can be developed. At the same 
time, terrorism should not be allowed to become the sole area of specialisation. 
Turning now to Ukraine, following the creation of the new NATO-
Russia Council, Ukraine proclaimed its goal of moving closer to the Alliance. 
Ukrainian President Kuchma said that following the change in the environment 
there was not one single political leader who would deny that the NATO of today 
is the only structure that is capable of providing security. And, according to the 
Head of the Ukrainian Security and Defence Council, the maintaining of 
Ukraine’s non-bloc status might even be dangerous or harmful. All this stems 
from the change in the situation in Ukraine and in relations between Russia and 
NATO. Many analysts believe that the changes in relations between Russia and 
the Alliance have opened up new prospects for Ukraine’s relations with NATO. 
Russia has been reforming itself, too. Without Russia and Ukraine, a system of 
comprehensive security cannot exist. This is the rationale behind the stepping up 
of relations between Ukraine and Russia and of their relations with NATO. This 
view is shared by a number of experts who also believe that NATO membership 
is a more realistic process for Ukraine than membership of the European Union. 
Another important point regarding security is that both Ukraine and 
Russia are potential real contributors to the European collective security system. 
However, some experts consider that the process of Ukraine’s accession to 
NATO is too complex. To begin with, Kyiv would have to review all its 
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armaments standards and solve a number of outstanding political issues and even 
if this process did get under way, it would take several dozens of years to 
complete. It should also be noted that there is not one single NATO member 
country that is seriously discussing Ukraine’s plans for Alliance membership. 
And, while Moscow has not expressed any opposition to Ukraine’s plans, the 
Russian military are quite sceptical about Kyiv’s intention of joining NATO, 
mainly because of Ukraine’s huge military capabilities. On the other hand, it is 
clearly understood that Ukraine is militarily fully sufficient and well able to 
defend its borders, which is probably the reason for the Russian military’s 
scepticism: that the Alliance will be able to digest such huge military capabilities 
in Ukraine. In this connection, the issue of Russia’s full membership in NATO is 
not even on the agenda because Russian experts do not believe that this process 
can be fully realised. However, there are plans afoot for Russia to develop a 
better relationship with the Alliance and to step up cooperation on major security 
issues. 
With regard to the Russia-Ukraine partnership, broadly speaking one 
can say that this relationship has gone through several stages of development, but 
that its major shortcoming is its declarative nature. There have been far too many 
declarations but very little action. The number of bilateral agreements that have 
been signed by Russia and Ukraine already run into the hundreds, but these 
agreements are not usually implemented and some of them are already out of 
date by the time they are signed. More specifically, the Russian leadership 
recently stated that they regard Ukraine as a fully sovereign country and a fully-
fledged partner, with its own interests that in many respects coincide with 
Russia’s, although in many other respects they do not. Indeed, I would not be 
telling the truth if I said that everything is fine in the Russia-Ukraine 
relationship. 
As far as Russian foreign policy is concerned, it has been consistent and 
pragmatic since President Putin took office, which was not the case in the past, 
and this is clearly illustrated by Russia’s reaction to NATO’s operations in the 
former Yugoslavia, which Russia opposed from the very beginning. At the same 
time, the so-called heroic relocation of the Russian detachment in Yugoslavia 
enabled Moscow to make its point and to participate in the peacekeeping 
operations. As I said, President Putin’s policy is quite consistent and pragmatic, 
although I would not go so far as to call it pro-Western. Indeed, when talking 
about Russia’s Western foreign policy, one has to understand that Russia is not 
just a European country but a Eurasian country and our national emblem is an 
eagle with two heads, one looking westwards and the other looking eastwards. 
Therefore, anything we do in the West will be scrutinised in the East and vice 
versa. At the same time, Russia occupies a unique geostrategic and geopolitical 
position, acting as a bridge between East and West. So, in that sense, our leaders 
certainly do take into account the fact that anything they do will be scrutinised in 
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both the West and the East. For example, there may be the possibility of Russia 
integrating itself fully into NATO, but this would raise the question as to who 
this alliance would be against then. We must not forget that there are countries in 
the eastern part of Russia that have territorial disputes and we also have to take 
account of China’s reaction to full integration. Therefore, the steps that are being 
taken by Vladimir Putin towards integration in the West are being supported by 
the development of the Shanghai Organisation for Cooperation in the East. 
In conclusion, I would just like to say that we are interested in creating 
a new security system that focuses more on resolving specific issues. Currently, 
both Ukraine and Russia are trying to combat illegal migration but neither Kyiv 
nor Moscow has sufficient resources to enforce legal migration. This problem is 
becoming increasingly acute and if it is not solved it may lead to dire 
consequences. Given the fact that the EU has a direct interest in getting this 
problem solved, there would seem to be a good case for setting up a foundation 
or organisation under EU auspices to help Ukraine and Russia solve the problem 
of illegal migration in a civilised way. 
Finally, I would just like to say that we are all interested in an equal 
partnership and that only an equal partnership will enable us to build a new 
European security system that will guarantee peace and stability in Europe, and 
peace in our region. 
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UKRAINE AND RUSSIA 
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1. Introduction 
For historical, economic, political, cultural and demographic reasons, 
relations with Russia have been at the centre of Ukraine’s foreign policy since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, Ukraine’s main preoccupation 
seemed to lie in shaking itself free of the former imperial power on which it is still, 
of course, dependent although it has succeeded in distancing itself from it. However, 
since 2000 and the election of Russian President Vladimir Putin, together with the 
political crisis in Ukraine and the removal of its Foreign Minister, Boris Tarassiuk, 
Ukrainian foreign policy seems to have been dominated by a rapprochement with 
Russia. 
 
2. Ukraine’s Rapprochement with Russia 
Speaking in January 2001, Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Anatoli 
Zlenko said: «For a certain period of time, relations with Russia were not normal; 
now these relations are normalising.... We are sharply strengthening the eastern 
vector of our foreign policy». The rapprochement with Russia is indeed far-reaching 
and has resulted in a new relationship in the political, economic and security fields. 
Political ties have improved considerably and the pace of Russian-Ukrainian 
diplomacy has also increased quite a lot, including the holding of frequent high-
level meetings. During the Yeltsin period, the dialogue between the two countries’ 
Presidents was at a very low level, whereas there have been eight presidential 
summits since the nomination and election of Vladimir Putin in 2000, with 
Presidents Kuchma and Putin meeting a record twenty times over the last two 
years.2 
However, the political dialogue is only one aspect of the new quality of the 
relationship between the two countries. Some of the many other aspects and signs 
include the appointment in May 2001 of former Prime Minister Victor 
Chernomyrdin as Russian Ambassador to Kyiv; the Ukrainian decision on the 
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border regime, allowing Russian and Belorussian citizens to continue to use their 
domestic passports when travelling to Ukraine and implying a special and close 
relationship between Russia and Ukraine; and the organisation in Moscow in 
December 2001 of a Congress of Russians of Ukrainian descent to encourage a 
rapprochement between the two countries, which was opened by Russian 
Presidential Administration Chief Aleksandr Voloshin as a sign of the importance 
Moscow attached to this event.3 Cooperation is not limited to dialogue, however, 
and sometimes also includes political concessions. One such example was the 
dismissal of Boris Tarassiuk from the post of Foreign Minister on 29 September 
2000, which is often viewed as a turning point in Ukrainian foreign policy; he was 
considered too pro-Western to warrant Moscow’s trust. 
Another aspect of Ukraine’s rapprochement with Moscow is the increase 
in Russian influence over the economy although Ukraine’s dependence on Russia 
has always been and still is high in this field, particularly in the energy sector. But, 
as from 2000, Russian capital has become increasingly active in the Ukrainian 
economy, with Russian investors buying up important sections of Ukraine’s 
industry, including steel plants and oil refineries, and Russian buyers purchasing 
two Ukrainian aluminium smelters. Cooperation has also been strengthened by the 
two agreements that were signed by Presidents Putin and Kuchma in 
Dnepropetrivsk in February 2001, namely, the aerospace cooperation agreement, 
which at the time was the latest in a series of steps aimed at integrating the two 
countries’ defence industries–according to Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine «does not have 
any alternative to the unification of efforts of the Ukrainian and Russian military-
industrial complex«4–and the deal to merge Russian and Ukrainian electricity grids–
described by Vladimir Putin as «a huge step forward towards further harmonizing 
our production ties«.5 Furthermore, Russia’s economic recovery has made it a much 
more attractive economic partner for Ukraine, as underlined by Aeroflot in 2001, 
which reported that passenger traffic to and from Ukraine alone had risen by nearly 
30% over the previous seven months and that several new weekly flights had been 
added to its schedule, partly to carry migrant workers.6 In the field of security, the 
cooperation agreement that was signed in January 2001 «signaled a new level in 
Russian-Ukrainian defence ties». When General Ivachov from the Russian Defence 
Ministry announced the agreement on 20 January 2001, he stressed that the goal of 
the agreement was the «joint parrying of foreign threats».7 
This rapprochement with Russia has also had an impact on foreign policy 
issues, including some degree of acceptance on the part of Ukraine of several 
Russian goals in the former Soviet space. This means that President Kuchma is now 
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6 See Financial Times, 21 August and 4 September 2001. 
7 See Financial Times, 22 January 2001. 
  
  69
less opposed to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) than he was a few 
years ago. Indeed, he agreed during the summit of Moldova, Ukraine and Russia in 
Odessa in March 2002 and confirmed during the meeting in Sochi in May 2002 that 
his country would become an associate member of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EEC), the former CIS Customs Union. He also said in Odessa that this 
was a step towards full membership of that body. As we know, Ukraine did not sign 
the 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty, although it did join the CIS Antiterrorism 
Centre that was set up in 2000.8 Another important point is that the political and 
advisory forum of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova 
(GUUAM), this loose coalition of states that was established in 1997 and which has 
been something of a nightmare for Moscow, is now playing a less prominent role 
than it was two years ago. 
Going by what the two Presidents say, this relationship is excellent. At a 
joint news conference in Sochi on 17 May 2002, Vladimir Putin said that «the 
quality of relations between Russia and Ukraine has recently been enhanced», 
adding that «one would not like to change anything» in these relations, while 
Leonid Kuchma commented that «there are no clouds over us, the air is clean and 
transparent, and the temperature is appropriate–neither too warm nor too cold, just 
normal».9 And, in March 2002, he signed a decree for the commemoration in two 
years’ time of the anniversary of the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav that placed Ukraine 
under Russian rule. 
Moscow is apparently so satisfied with Ukrainian policy that it has decided 
to reward Kyiv. Consequently, the Russian-German-Ukrainian agreement that was 
signed by President Putin, Chancellor Schroeder and President Kuchma on 10 June 
2002 on cooperation in developing and exploiting the pipeline infrastructure for 
transporting oil and natural gas from Russia through Ukraine to Western Europe, 
may mean the end of the proposals to construct a new pipeline through Poland and 
Belarus that would have bypassed Ukraine. In fact, this pipeline seems to be a 
political as well as an economic issue, and Leonid Kuchma has complained 
repeatedly about Russian plans to lay a gas pipeline that would bypass Ukraine and 
result in Ukraine losing its control over energy exports.10 
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3. The Implications of this Rapprochement for Russia 
 The rapprochement was described by President Putin in 2001 as one of the 
main achievements of recent Russian diplomacy. Indeed, Ukraine has been and still 
is one of the first priorities of his foreign policy.11 Vladimir Putin is a pragmatic 
man. He does not question Ukraine’s independence and he was the first Russian 
leader to attend the annual celebration of Ukraine’s independence on its tenth 
anniversary in 2001. At the same time, he is convinced of the need for a close 
relationship with Ukraine for he believes that Russia must have allies in order to be 
powerful in international life, and in his view Ukraine must be Moscow’s main ally. 
Since he has been in power, one of his main foreign policy goals has been to re-
establish Russian influence within the post-Soviet space. This does not, of course, 
mean rebuilding the former Soviet Union, but having neighbours who can be 
controlled to a sufficient degree as to never pose any danger as a competitor or a 
threat to Russian interests, and who will support Moscow’s foreign policy, which 
was not the case in the nineties. Ukraine is the key to Vladimir Putin’s policy. And, 
after so many years of hostile and strained relations, the Ukrainian political crisis 
created a new situation that offered a window of opportunity to Moscow and 
enabled it to recover its influence over Ukraine for the first time since 1991. 
But this achievement is limited by the support enjoyed by President 
Kuchma, that is, by the personalisation of this relationship. Indeed, if you listen to 
Russian officials and politicians and read the Russian press, on the one hand, you 
have Leonid Kuchma and ‘the pro-Russian forces’, and, on the other, you have the 
opposition groups, in particular Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc, that is 
described as an anti-Russian, pro-Western and nationalist coalition. During the 
March 2002 election campaign, Moscow openly supported the pro-presidential 
parties that back a pro-Russian foreign policy strategy, and declared its hostility to 
Viktor  Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine. In fact, Russian Presidential Administration 
Chief Aleksandr Voloshin, Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Victor Chernomyrdin 
and the Chairman of the Russian Duma’s International Relations Committee, Dmitri 
Rogozin, intervened in favour of the pro-presidential parties. As Victor 
Chernomyrdin explained, «we support those who are in favour of deepening 
Ukraine’s ties to Russia«,  and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Valentina 
Matvienko underlined, «we cannot support those who are against Russian-
Ukrainian integration«.12 For his part, Aleksandr Voloshin was quite open about 
Moscow’s political preferences. He said that For a United Ukraine, the (united) 
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine and the Communist Party of Ukraine were the 
forces that were promoting the strengthening of Russian-Ukrainian relations, and 
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added that: «Unfortunately, Our Ukraine includes political forces that have overtly 
anti-Russian positions».13 And, after both Houses of the United States Congress had 
adopted resolutions warning Ukraine that future US aid would depend on the 
holding of fair elections, Victor Chernomyrdin accused Congress of «dictating how 
the elections should be run in Ukraine,» and asked: «why doesn’t Ukraine come out 
with a similar statement, saying that one president has been elected in the US but 
another man is in power?» in reference to the disputed US 2000 presidential 
election.14 The Our Ukraine bloc’s foreign policy objective of integration into the 
European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is seen 
and presented as an attempt to break away completely from Russia that opposes its 
pro-Western foreign policy. Consequently, the results of the recent elections, which 
confirmed the emergence of pro-reformer and pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko as a 
strong candidate for the presidency in the November 2004 elections, represent a 
defeat for both President Kuchma and Moscow. 
 
4. The Implications of this Rapprochement for Ukraine 
 Four points should be mentioned with regard to the implications for 
Ukraine. First of all, its rapprochement with Russia marks a major shift in Ukrainian 
foreign policy. For, throughout the nineties, Kyiv’s declared foreign policy was to 
achieve a balance between Russia and the West, and its main priority and ‘strategic 
goal’ was, according to its leaders, integration into European structures. Although 
this ‘multi-vector’ policy was not always very clearly defined, it was nevertheless 
very successful so that, within the space of a few years, Ukraine managed to 
strengthen its independence and distance itself from Russia: «En restant à l’écart de 
la Communauté des Etats indépendants (CIS) et en jouant un rôle moteur au sein du 
GUAM, devenu GUUAM avec l’adhésion de l’Ouzbékistan en 1999, elle a réussi à 
peser sur les équilibres internationaux au sein de l’espace anciennement soviétique. 
Elle a aussi réussi à nouer des relations de coopération avec les Etats-Unis et 
l’OTAN et à apparaître, grâce au soutien de la Pologne, comme un pays d’Europe 
centrale».15 However, this policy now seems to have reached its limits, although 
integration into Europe is still a goal. Indeed, in his state-of-the-nation address to the 
Ukrainian Parliament on 18 June 2002, President Kuchma repeated his wish to 
pursue the «European choice, which is a continuation of the general policy of 
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Ukraine since the moment it became independent».16 But, while all Ukrainian 
political groups, from the Communists to the reformers, support Ukraine’s 
membership in the EU, not all of them are «willing to undertake the necessary 
domestic policies that would replace rhetoric with real reform».17 
 The second point is that there is neither a consensus nor any general 
opinion in Ukraine on the rapprochement with Russia. Since 2000, the Ukrainian 
opposition has been very critical of Leonid Kuchma’s policy. One of his arch critics 
has been Ioulia Timochenko, former Deputy Prime Minister in the Yushchenko 
cabinet, who won 7% of the votes during the March 2002 parliamentary elections. 
In 2001, she accused President Kuchma of «handing enterprises over to Russia in 
exchange for political support for his regime. Russia will soon control Ukraine’s 
energy sector, giving the Russians a blunt instrument with which to manipulate 
internal and external Ukrainian affairs».18 But, she is not the only one who has been 
critical of President Kuchma’s policy vis-à-vis Russia, with other Ukrainian 
politicians describing the February 2001 energy deal as a ‘capitulation’.19 Moreover, 
this policy has also come under attack by former Foreign Minister Boris Tarassiuk, 
who said that Moscow’s goal was to divert Ukraine from European integration. 
During the March 2002 parliamentary elections, a large part of the 
Ukrainian population who voted for Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc, for 
Ioulia Timochenko’s coalition and for the Socialist Party of Ukraine, also voted for 
Europeanisation. All these people are pro-Western, and some of them are in favour 
of Ukraine applying for NATO membership. Indeed, Viktor Yushchenko’s Our 
Ukraine bloc supports Ukraine applying for membership now, and, speaking at a 
NATO conference in Warsaw in May 2002, Boris Tarassiuk, who is a member of 
this bloc, said that he was in favour of Ukraine applying for NATO membership at 
this year’s Prague Summit.20 Another sign of the limits of Russian influence is the 
fact that: «voters turned their backs on the two Russian nationalist blocs (the 
Russian Bloc and the Union of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia bloc) that advocated 
Ukraine’s membership of the Russia-Belarus Union, Russian as a second state 
language, economic union with Russia and Russians constitutionally defined as a 
second titular nation: these blocs obtained a combined 1.16%».21 
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 Thirdly, the Ukrainian-Russian rapprochement has coincided with a period 
of dramatic political crisis in Ukraine, in which the rapprochement with Moscow 
was dominated by Ukraine’s tape scandal, which implicated President Kuchma in 
the kidnapping of journalist Georgy Gongadze. President Kuchma was politically 
weakened by this crisis and needed some support, but his policy towards Russia 
looked like a tactical move in his domestic struggles and explains why the 
rapprochement was regarded with suspicion by some people in Ukraine and the 
West. Indeed, although it appeared to be in President Kuchma’s interests to be 
supported by Moscow, is this always in Ukraine’s interests? The risk is that 
Vladimir Putin wants to give a helping hand to President Kuchma in order to gain 
some advantage for Russia in Ukraine, and it would be easy for Moscow to exploit 
the situation because of Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia in a number of 
fields. Indeed, energy debts, energy supply, pipeline politics and trade outlets all 
give Russia powerful leverage. And, although business is business and Russian 
capital has been invested in the Ukrainian economy because it is profitable to invest 
there, the danger is that Moscow will exploit this dependence. To quote Serhiy 
Tyhypko, the leader of the Ukrainian Labour Party, «if any particular country owns 
too much of our economy, or dominates an important sector, then it will very likely 
involve itself in our politics».22 
 The final point to be noted is that Russia is not like any of Ukraine’s other 
partners. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has tended to view Ukrainian 
independence as a temporary aberration, although Ukraine is constantly on Russia’s 
mind and the Ukrainian issue is a very sensitive one in Russia. In fact, some Russian 
political forces still find it extremely difficult to recognise Ukraine as an equal and 
sovereign state, and this is illustrated very clearly by the border demarcation issue. 
From the Russian perspective, demarcation should only be applied to the ‘external 
frontiers’ of the CIS (the former Soviet ones). Hence, the Russian-Ukrainian border 
must remain «transparent», and its demarcation is «out of the question», as Victor 
Chernomyrdin said in April 2002, because it is being imposed on Ukraine and 
Russia by the West. But, borders are a symbol of Ukrainian sovereignty, and to 
accept Russia’s division of borders into ‘internal’ and ‘external’ ones «would be 
tantamount to accepting a status of partial sovereignty only».23 There is no doubt 
that it will take some time for Russia to fully accept an independent Ukraine as an 
equal partner. 
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5. The Implications of this Rapprochement for Cooperation with 
NATO and the West 
From the Western point of view, the rapprochement between Ukraine and 
Russia is confusing.24 Because it is the cornerstone of President Kuchma’s foreign 
policy and marks a major shift in Ukrainian foreign policy and because it was 
decided within the context of the political crisis, it makes Ukrainian foreign policy 
difficult to understand, reinforces the idea of Ukraine’s inability to choose between 
East and West, and gives the impression of a lack of any clear strategic vision. This 
rapprochement and the new slogan ‘To Europe with Russia’ seem to indicate that 
Ukraine is doomed to operate under Moscow’s wing, thereby «deepening the view 
among many West Europeans that Ukrainians, Belarussians and Russians should be 
treated as one group», which is «something that Kyiv had long complained 
about».25 It also deepened the view that ‘ambivalence’, according to the term coined 
by Mykola Riabchuk, «is a socio-political phenomenon in Ukraine», that is 
«determinant in Ukraine’s development».26 
However, the rapprochement with Russia does not seem to have seriously 
affected Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO. Indeed, Ukraine is the most active CIS 
state cooperating with the Alliance and the future prospects are good. In particular, 
on 23 May 2002, Yevhen Marchuk, the Secretary of the National Security and 
Defence Council, decided to work out a «long-term strategy that would enable 
Ukraine to join the collective security system on which NATO is based». According 
to Mr Marchuk, «there is no future for Ukraine if it remains outside the bloc». 
Ukraine informed the Alliance about its new strategy during NATO Secretary 
General Lord Robertson’s visit to Kyiv on 9 July 2002, and it will probably 
announce its intention of joining NATO during the Organisation’s Prague Summit 
in November.27 
This statement came as a surprise because over the past few years 
President Kuchma has often ruled out NATO membership and because Russian 
opposition to membership has up to now always been very strong. One of the 
explanations is the new Russian-NATO relationship and the fact that–to quote 
Yevhen Marchuk–«de facto Russia is becoming a member of NATO and will take 
part in decision-making while not being a member formally».28 In fact, Presidents 
                                                          
24 See, for example, Tammy M. Lynch, “Post-election Return to Foreign Policy Status Quo”, The NIS 
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presentation made at the colloquium organized by the CERI and the Association Française des Etudes 
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27 See RFE/RL Newsline, 24 May 2002. 
28 See Interview in Den, 29 May 2002, cited in NATO Enlargement Daily Brief, 30 May 2002. 
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Kuchma and Putin met in Sochi on 17 May 2002, one week before Yevhen 
Marchuk made this statement, and it is unlikely that he would have made it without 
Vladimir Putin’s approval. And, the latter’s approval would seem to indicate a shift 
in Russia’s attitude, which seems to be confirmed by the statement made by him on 
28 May, the day on which the new NATO-Russia Council came into being, when, 
speaking about NATO enlargement, he said that «there is no reason why Ukraine 
should stay out of the new move going on in Europe».29 
Some of the other Russian reactions point in the same direction. For 
example, Boris Nemtsov, the leader of the Union of Right Forces in the Duma, said 
that: »Russia, through NATO at 20, is already a NATO member to the tune of 70% 
or 80%», and therefore has no reason to try and stop Ukraine from following suit.30 
A statement issued by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on 11 June 2002 also 
indicates a change in Moscow’s position. In this statement, he said that Russia’s 
goal was no longer to prevent NATO enlargement and continued: «We are actually 
creating an alternative to this process. This alternative opens up a path to a 
qualitatively new relationship between Russia and NATO and facilitates the 
transformation of NATO itself in a direction which is in the interests of common 
European security».31 Assuming that Russia is partly in NATO, it may then be in its 
interests to have Ukraine moving in the same direction, not moving against Russia 
but as Russia’s ally. This might not only help Moscow to strengthen its position vis-
à-vis NATO, but it might also fit in with Ukraine’s interests. In particular, it might 
prevent Ukraine from remaining isolated at a time when NATO’s enlargement 
process is spreading, with the participation of Russia, to the whole of Central 
Europe, although this will not change Ukraine’s dependence on Russia in any way. 
And, judging by Russia’s policy over the past few months, it looks as if this 
corresponds to what Vladimir Putin thinks. 
                                                          
29 Cited in Le Monde, 30 May 2002. The Russian press immediately stressed the impact of the new 
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30 See Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 24 May 2002, cited in The Ukraine List, 29 May 2002. 
31 See Kommersant-daily, 11 June 2002, cited in NATO Enlargement Daily Brief, 13 June 2002. 
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Like any medium-sized state, Ukraine’s main foreign and security 
policy interests and ambitions are largely of a regional nature. Consequently, 
upon gaining independence, Ukraine began to attach particular importance to 
regional cooperation and its relations with neighbouring countries, in particular 
to the development of close ties with the countries of Central Europe. In the 
spring of 1997, Kyiv officially declared that “the final fixation of Ukraine’s 
status as an inseparable part of the Central European region” was one of the 
country’s foreign policy priorities. Ukrainian diplomacy put a considerable 
amount of effort into securing international recognition of Ukraine’s identity vis-
à-vis Central Europe, and, at Ukraine’s insistence, a clause to this effect was 
inserted into the May 1997 Joint Statement of the Kuchma-Gore Commission 
and the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of July 1997. 
Establishing itself as an essential part of Central Europe was viewed by 
Kyiv as a necessary precondition for the ultimate success of Ukraine’s internal 
transformation as well as for the shaping of the country’s geopolitical future. 
Indeed, regional cooperation with the Central European states was viewed as an 
essential component of Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and it 
was hoped that stronger bilateral ties with the Central European states, in 
particular with the more advanced countries, such as Hungary and Poland, 
together with multilateral regional cooperation would help bring Ukraine closer 
to the Western integrated institutions. Relations with Poland were the most 
promising and in 1996 the two countries recognized their relationship as one of 
‘strategic partnership.’ In fact, it was, and still is, only with Poland that national 
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interests, parity of potentials and the level of mutual understanding and support 
converge closely enough to warrant speaking about a true ‘strategic partnership.’ 
However, due to the speed and the results of domestic reform, Ukraine 
has failed to become an integral part of Central Europe. As has been the case 
with a number of other issues, its decision to identify itself as a Central European 
country has remained mainly declarative. Already in 1998-1999, questions had 
been raised about earlier hopes of Ukraine speeding up its reform process and 
moving closer to its more advanced Central European neighbours, some of 
which, in particular Poland, were strongly supporting Kyiv’s declared European 
aspirations. However, over the past two years, the differences that existed 
between Ukraine and the Central European states at the very beginning have 
widened even further due to the speed of the transition process in Ukraine so that 
it in political, economic, cultural and psychological terms it is now closer to the 
other member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) than 
it is to the states of Central Europe. 
As most, or even all, of the Central European states become members of 
NATO and the European Union (EU), this will create a new situation in terms of 
bilateral trade and economic cooperation, travel and human contacts, the position 
of national minorities and cross-border cooperation between these states and 
Ukraine. It will also increase the existing gap between Ukraine and Central 
Europe and isolate Ukraine in the region, especially if Kyiv fails to deliver the 
necessary domestic changes and is left behind, or stays out of, the mainstream 
process of European integration. 
September 11 has given a new impetus to the process of European and 
Euro-Atlantic integration. The upcoming NATO Summit in Prague in November 
2002 is widely anticipated to give the go ahead to ‘big bang’ enlargement, with 
the taking on board of up to seven new members, two of which, Romania and 
Slovakia, border directly on Ukraine. The negotiations on EU enlargement are 
entering the final leg and the first post-communist countries of Central Europe 
are expected to join the Union in 2004. All this marks the conclusion of just one 
stage in the reconfiguration of Europe that began with the collapse of 
communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
But, Ukraine finds itself excluded from this process, and, as the fight 
against illegal migration moves to the top of the EU agenda, it finds itself being 
increasingly viewed as a source and a route of illegal migration. As a result, the 
tightening of visa procedures for Ukrainian nationals and strengthened controls 
at Ukraine’s western borders might soon become an unpleasant and harsh fact of 
daily life for millions of Ukrainians. From this perspective, the next several years 
will pose a serious test for Ukrainian-Central European relations. Unfortunately, 
the current level of interdependence and cooperation between Ukraine and the 
Central European countries is not sufficiently high to avoid Ukraine’s regional 
marginalization. Once successful and promising, its relations with these 
  
  79
countries have lost much of their momentum and are currently stagnating. At the 
heart of this lie Ukraine’s own serious problems: the failure to make the 
necessary domestic changes and inconsistencies in its foreign policy. 
In addition, notwithstanding some progress, the economic and social 
foundations for a sound Ukrainian-Central European relationship are not 
sufficiently solid. And, even when these relations were at their height, and 
relations were quite good at the political level, they were far less productive in 
terms of economic ties and societal closeness. Indeed, mutual trade, intra-
industrial links, and investments are still at a very low level and far below 
economic potential, and in some cases historical grievances and unresolved 
problems continue to cast a shadow over bilateral relations and to constrain 
mutual trust and confidence. This is why even the Ukrainian-Polish strategic 
partnership has remained more declarative than truly substantive. 
Ukraine needs more friends and lobbyists among the NATO and EU 
member countries to look after its interests. If only because of geography, Poland 
and the other Central European countries could well become such lobbyists, 
although the intensity and success of their efforts will depend very much on 
Ukraine’s own performance. Indeed, Kyiv needs to deliver two closely 
interrelated tasks–carrying out domestic reform and remaining consistent and 
firm in its declared intention of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Much 
precious time has already been lost, and only an extraordinary effort by Ukraine 
itself might now help to change the situation. Part of that effort should be 
devoted to bringing new dynamism into relations with the Central European 
states. And, since Ukraine has more to gain from closer ties with its western 
neighbours, it is Ukraine that needs to be more pro-active in promoting 
cooperation with the Central European countries. 
Recent experience has shown that accession countries that have stronger 
stakes in Ukraine, such as Hungary and Poland, are much more willing to 
consider Ukraine’s interests in the process of their own EU and NATO accession 
than those that have weaker ties to and/or interests in Ukraine, such as the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria. It is therefore critically important for Kyiv  to 
work hard to develop much stronger bilateral links with the more advanced 
Central European states and to increase Poland’s and other Central European 
countries’ interests/stakes in Ukraine and its integration into Europe. This will 
call for an increase in bilateral trade and economic cooperation, mutual 
investments, political dialogue and human contacts. The successful 
implementation of several large joint projects, such as the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk 
pipeline, might become one such link. It would also be beneficial for Ukraine, 
and stimulating for Ukrainian-Central European relations, if it could learn to 
apply the lessons learnt by the Central European states from their experiences of 
European integration and domestic reform. Indeed, this would encourage these 
states to actively support preferential relations with Ukraine during the process 
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of their accession to the EU, and make them far more willing to lobby for 
Ukraine’s interests once they have actually become members. 
Ukraine should also work with its western neighbours, first and 
foremost Hungary and Poland, to find solutions to minimize the negative 
implications of the forthcoming introduction of visa regimes for Ukrainian 
nationals. In this respect, the Central European countries will need to expand the 
consular sections of their respective embassies in Ukraine and improve consular 
services in order to cope with the dramatic increase in requests for visas. The 
three states should also work jointly with the EU in order to explore the 
possibility of simplifying the current procedure governing the issuing of 
Schengen visas to Ukrainian citizens. This might include the introduction of 
longer-term–up to three years, as is the case with US visas–multiple-entry visas 
for Ukrainian ‘frequent travellers’ to EU countries, such as officials, business 
people and academics. It might also be desirable for Hungary and Poland to be 
allowed to introduce and/or maintain special (simplified) national procedures 
governing the issuing of visas to Ukrainians for several years after these 
countries’ accession to the EU. 
Ukrainian-Central European relations have a far greater chance of 
succeeding if they are allowed to develop within the general context of European 
integration and to become an integral part of the construction of the future 
Europe. More than in any other region, the logic of bilateral relations and 
multilateral regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe has been linked 
to the logic of European integration and enlargement, and September 11 has 
demanded more clarity from each state in respect of foreign policy priorities and 
partnerships. Ukraine’s previous ‘balancing act’ policy has lost all remaining 
meaning and relevance. It is time to move on from vague declarations about 
‘strategic goals’ and long-term intentions of obtaining EU and NATO 
membership and to start taking concrete and clearly defined steps. As far as 
relations with NATO are concerned, Kyiv should make a formal application for 
membership and take the necessary action to achieve that level of democracy, 
economic development and military reform that is required of NATO candidates. 
This will also pave the way for stable relations between Ukraine and the Central 
European countries. 
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The decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of new states on its territory was one of accelerated political, social 
and economic changes in Central and Eastern Europe as well as an increasingly 
widening gap between the countries of Central Europe and the new-fledged post-
Soviet states. During this period, the first group of countries, in particular the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, succeeded in incorporating liberal-
democratic institutions into their national political and social structures and 
developing the ability to create and sustain economic growth. In fact, these 
countries have now become part and parcel of the European integration process 
and, by and large, albeit with some reservations, the same is probably also true of 
the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
In contrast, the second group of countries–in particular Ukraine–is still 
marked by uncertainty, with state structures hesitating between the need for 
institutional changes and an inert propensity to preserve old attitudes, ideas and 
mechanisms. This situation poses a very real dilemma in that the amorphous 
political and economic regimes that were established on post-Soviet territory 
might very well decide to direct their policies towards the creation of instruments 
and procedures to ensure their own self-sufficiency and self-propagation. This 
would not only considerably hamper these countries’ efforts to achieve economic 
growth and stable political systems, especially if such policies were implemented 
in a conscious and deliberate way, but it would also lead to political, social and 
economic stagnation, thereby posing a serious threat to the region’s future 
development. If these unfavourable trends are not checked in time, we may find 
ourselves having to face the risk of a new division emerging in Europe between a 
Central European region that is characterized by intensive economic 
development and the eastern part of this region that is in economic stagnation or 
even recession. In fact, the possibility of such a division emerging should not just 
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be viewed in terms of a regional threat but also in terms of the very real danger it 
would pose to European and global stability. 
There would, therefore, seem to be an urgent need to define specific 
mechanisms for preventing the fulfilment of this scenario, and one of the most 
important and effective mechanisms for achieving this goal would be the 
establishment and strengthening of a system of strong mutual ties based on 
cooperative activities. Indeed, there would seem to be considerable scope for 
such activities on the part of the Central and East European countries, including 
Poland. If we fail to achieve this goal, the role played by the Central European 
countries will be reduced to that of a political buffer between a wealthy West and 
a desperate East–a difficult and uncreative role that does not bode well for 
anyone. 
Clearly, the most promising and durable basis for ensuring a qualitative 
breakthrough in regional cooperation lies in the implementation of liberal-
democratic systems in the post-Soviet countries, together with economic changes 
oriented towards the adoption of the market economy. If this undertaking is 
successful, it will undoubtedly create a new social dynamism in the post-Soviet 
territory of Central and Eastern Europe. But, while the creation of this new social 
dynamism is the most promising and important task confronting the region, it 
also seems to be the most difficult one in that it entails long-term social, political 
and even economic programmes. It is not enough to stimulate global integration 
processes solely at the political level. Consequently, when dealing with Central 
and Eastern Europe, and more particularly with the post-Soviet territory, we 
should bear in mind the need to consider a set of variables specific to this 
particular region–a mosaic of issues linked to mind-sets, feelings of resentment, 
levels of self-consciousness and self-identity as well as historical legacies and 
burdens. Moreover, the success of this undertaking will require a qualitative 
change in the political attitudes and awareness of post-Soviet power elites, 
particularly the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarussian ones, as the political and/or 
security models that are eventually chosen for the region will, to a large extent, 
depend on the models of self-identity that the Russians or the Ukrainians have 
already chosen for themselves. 
As far as Poland is concerned, Warsaw has very few instruments 
available for reversing or changing any unfavourable trends that may develop in 
the post-Soviet territory. In any case, the following three main tasks of Poland’s 
Eastern policy seem to be clear based as they are on a social and political 
consensus: acting as a keystone in the arch of cooperation between two parts of 
post-communist territory–Central Europe and the post-Soviet states; promoting 
the development of democratic systems; and supporting the transition to the 
market economy. 
The axes of regional political importance have not changed since the 
completion of the first wave of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
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(NATO) eastward enlargement. Consequently, the future outlook for and the 
quality of Polish-Russian, Polish-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Russian bilateral 
relations and the security policies of the Baltic countries are still crucial for the 
region’s future development. However, from Poland’s perspective, it is Ukraine, 
its statehood and its ability to survive as well as the course it finally chooses to 
take in terms of its economic development that continue to pose the most 
important challenge to the region. Indeed, Warsaw recognized the need to 
support Ukrainian statehood as soon as the new-fledged state began to take its 
very first steps, and throughout the last decade the Polish political debate never 
questioned the importance of the Poland-Ukraine axis as a pillar of regional, if 
not to say pan-European, stability. 
In terms of Polish political consciousness, this attitude used to be 
regarded as fundamental to the concept of Polish national interests. And, 
following the first stage of NATO’s enlargement and on the eve of the 
enlargement of the European Union (EU) and our accession to the integrated 
European structures, we continue to perceive Ukraine and Ukrainian statehood as 
an important geostrategic asset. However, Polish-Ukrainian relations and 
interests will clearly have to undergo some qualitative alterations, not only 
because Poland’s national interests have changed slightly since NATO’s 
enlargement and our membership in Euro-Atlantic structures, but also, and more 
importantly, because some discrepancies have appeared over the last few years in 
Ukrainian and Polish political priorities as well as in their current political 
attitudes and approaches. 
Bilateral Polish-Ukrainian relations need to be built up again from 
scratch. From Poland’s standpoint, this means that both countries’ power elites 
have to discard the old system of pretending to cultivate friendship, mutual 
understanding and close cooperation and make a joint effort to define a 
completely new set of political tools as a matter of political urgency. These tools 
must be adequate to the new political arrangement and effective in achieving the 
goal of a bilateral relationship and defining a realistic set of common interests. 
Any attempt to evade this responsibility in favour of continuing a pseudo-
friendship and a pseudo-partnership will have a very negative impact. 
There is no doubt that a fresh start must be made immediately, because 
the quality and depth of a new bilateral Polish-Ukrainian relationship will to a 
large extent determine the course of political developments in the region as a 
whole. This new bilateral relationship will also determine whether Poland’s 
Eastern policy will simply become a function of European and/or Euro-Atlantic 
policy–as EU and NATO policies are often referred to–and may also encourage 
or prevent the development of a dividing line between collective security 
systems. Finally, this new relationship will determine the course of Ukraine’s 
own political development. 
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Much is at stake here, with Poland and Ukraine playing crucially 
important roles in the region. In fact, the May 2002 Rome Declaration on 
NATO-Russia Relations does not leave Ukraine much choice: either it 
substantially redefines (or simply defines) its political relations with Poland and 
the Central European region or it will get left outside the mainstream of 
European policy. This is due to the fact that the period of confrontation between 
NATO and Russia has come to an end, with the new NATO-Russia partnership 
raising some important questions about the Central and East European region. 
Indeed, from the Polish point of view and also perhaps from the regional 
perspective, the Rome Declaration has considerably altered the level of our 
region’s geopolitical importance and has actually lowered its geostrategic 
significance to quite a secondary level. Let us take a risk and assume that the 
only real source of the Central and East European countries’ strategic importance 
lay in the buffer qualities this region was able to offer up to the present time. 
Indeed, the front countries of the region were of high strategic and geopolitical 
importance to both the West and the East. But, the situation has now changed in 
favour of the major regional player, Russia. Hence, Moscow now has the consent 
and the blessing of the West to pursue its own particular interests in the region 
provided that its activities do not undermine Western strategic interests, although 
this caveat does not necessarily apply to the interests of the other countries in our 
region. 
It is quite possible that the Central and East European region has lost its 
protective umbrella now that it has ceased to be an exclusive sphere of Western 
influence. And, it may be that such protection is no longer necessary now that the 
Cold War has come to an end. But, once we are free of the old geopolitical 
nightmare, we have to ask ourselves what we do next and the answer to that 
question seems to be quite simply to create a network of strong multidimensional 
cooperative ties at the regional level. Let us take another risk and ask two more 
questions. First of all, did it take NATO’s transformation to show us that 
membership of an international organization does not need to be considered as a 
wonderful political remedy? And, secondly, why do we not turn our attention 
back to the oldest political story of all, when state power and a friendly 
neighbourhood used to be the real indicators of political status, international 
importance and level of security? So, the post-Rome period would seem to be a 
good starting point for reconstructing and redefining the regional network of 
relations. 
Building a stable, friendly, helpful and predictable Eastern 
neighbourhood used to be one of the main geostrategic goals of Poland’s Eastern 
policy. However, we perceive the Ukrainian challenge as the major regional axis. 
In order to create a positive environment for regional political development, 
Poland should offer its Ukrainian neighbour the opportunity to close the gap 
between the two countries’ economic and social development or simply prevent 
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this gap from getting any wider. Then, we should make it easier for Ukraine to 
stay in the mainstream of the European integration process by encouraging it in 
its efforts to bring about change. Finally, the Polish political elites should seize 
every opportunity to support the process of building a long-term non-
confrontational Ukrainian-Russian relationship. Indeed, the political stabilization 
of the post-Soviet territory will remain the most important goal of Poland’s 
Eastern policy for many years to come and no effort should be spared in trying to 
achieve that goal. 
Within the framework of promoting fundamental democratic change in 
Eastern Europe, Poland–together with the other Central European countries–has 
an important role to play in Europe in trying to prevent its Western and Eastern 
parts from becoming isolated from each other. However, this has to be a 
common regional undertaking aimed at minimizing the threats posed by 
instability in the post-Soviet territory and encouraging efforts to build stable 
democratic statehoods with viable economies. Therefore, Poland continues to pin 
its hopes and expectations on Ukraine. Indeed, from the Polish geostrategic 
perspective, a politically and economically stable Ukraine is viewed as: 
- a fundamental stabilizing factor for the post-Soviet territory as a whole; 
- a model of peaceful change for the region; 
- an important guarantee of the irreversibility of democratic change in the post-
Soviet territory; and 
- an important factor for promoting democratic change in Russia. 
What then are the chances of developing a new Polish-Ukrainian 
relationship based on genuinely common efforts and interests that can provide a 
strong foundation for building a friendly and stable regional neighbourhood? 
Despite some pessimistic forecasts, the idea does seem quite feasible. In the case 
of Poland, the problem seems to be clear-cut and easy to solve as Polish-
Ukrainian bilateral relations have recently become an important factor on the 
international political scene and are no longer the exclusive domain of Kyiv and 
Warsaw. Furthermore, a genuine Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement will also help 
to minimize political tension in the global arena. In fact, Poland’s political 
position as a NATO member country also depends to a considerable extent on 
whether the Polish political elites can launch and implement a new Eastern 
policy aimed at making the post-Soviet neighbourhood friendly and stable. 
However, it is Ukraine that holds the key to bringing about a positive 
and lasting change in both the Polish-Ukrainian bilateral relationship and in 
regional relations in general. This implies the establishment of a strong centre of 
reform that is firmly anchored to the Ukrainian political scene and which views 
fundamental political, economic and social change as a serious undertaking and 
not just as some kind of slogan. The Central European countries will also have 
an important role to play here in terms of providing a model of successful 
economic, political and social change. 
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It may be concluded, therefore, that the prospects for the development 
of effective regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe are good. Indeed, 
the geopolitical situation is favourable and there is also an awareness of the 
political importance of such cooperation on the part of some of the regional 
states concerned. However, the prerequisite for the success of regional 
cooperation is the restoration of an effective Poland-Ukraine axis and this cannot 
be achieved until Ukraine decides to pursue a course of genuine pro-integration 
and to implement a process of serious domestic reform. Only then will it be 
possible to make substantial progress towards the development of effective 
regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 11 September 2001, there has been a fundamental change in the 
international security environment and the nature of global security threats. 
Unlike the second half of the twentieth century when the possibility of a nuclear 
world war was viewed as the main global threat, the focus has now shifted to a 
number of new threats, in particular the threat posed by international terrorism. 
However, recent developments in world affairs would seem to indicate that the 
international community is not ready to react effectively to this new challenge. 
Consequently, we need to answer two fundamental questions before we can 
begin to set about devising an appropriate set of measures to cope with this 
challenge. First of all, to what extent does international terrorism threaten all 
regions of the world? And, secondly, does international terrorism cover other 
threats to world security, because overestimating the threat of international 
terrorism can be just as dangerous as underestimating it? 
The new international security environment is characterised by new 
global threats and a trend towards threat dispersal. Unlike the period of the cold 
war when the main threat of confrontation was posed by rivalry between the two 
superpowers, we now find ourselves facing a broad spectrum of threats of a 
local, regional and global nature. In addition, whereas the threat of a nuclear 
world war breaking out between the two superpowers was posed at the global 
level, international terrorism and the other new threats tend to emerge at the local 
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level before developing and spreading to the regional and global level. This can 
be seen very clearly in Afghanistan, with the establishment of the Taliban regime 
and the subsequent launching of al-Qaeda’s global network. Therefore, if we 
want to cope with these new threats effectively, we must establish a three-tier 
system of international security, comprising the appropriate global, regional and 
sub-regional structures. 
With regard to global structures, nuclear world war was averted during 
the cold war thanks to the global system of international security that was in 
place and which was comprised of the United Nations (UN), the system for 
monitoring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the strategic armaments 
accords agreed between the United States and the former Soviet Union. These 
global security structures now have to be reformed in order to enable them to 
cope with the new global threats. 
As far as the regional security structures are concerned, they have to be 
able to react adequately to the entire spectrum of regional threats. Indeed, 
regional structures that focus solely on antiterrorist activities and do not take 
account of other threats to regional security are dangerous. In this context, the 
functions of organisations such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) need to be reappraised. 
Finally, special attention should be paid to sub-regional security 
structures in the new security environment, because, unlike the global threats of 
the cold war period, the new threats tend to be both internal and external in 
nature and to emerge at the local level. This means that international security will 
be determined by the stability of a particular region, which, in turn, will depend 
upon the stability of its sub-regions. Consequently, there cannot be a stable 
Europe unless its sub-regions are stable. In this respect, mention should be made 
of a number of initiatives that have recently been launched in the security field, 
such as the Stability Pact for North-Eastern Europe. 
 
2. GUUAM 
Still within the sub-regional context, we must now turn our attention to 
the establishment and development of the sub-regional organisation of Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM). This grouping is 
continuing to develop despite all the scepticism that was expressed prior to its 
establishment and notwithstanding the fact that Uzbekistan has expressed its 
intention of withdrawing. Indeed, since the Yalta Summit in June 2001, the 
GUUAM group has been officially recognised as an organisation although it has 
decided to forego formal institutionalisation and to concentrate on developing its 
conceptual thinking in order to maintain its future prospects as an organisation. 
But, before we address its future prospects, we need to answer the following four 
key questions: 
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- First, what interests do the member countries share within the framework of 
GUUAM? 
- Second, what area or function of GUUAM should be given top priority–for 
example, economic cooperation or sub-regional security? 
- Third, how does GUUAM blend in with the region’s geopolitical 
configuration? 
- Fourth, what role might this organisation play in interacting with other 
organisations, such as the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(OBSEC), the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) and, of course, the UN? 
Given the fact that the debate on conceptual thinking has not yet 
provided any satisfactory answers to the above questions and that opinions 
continue to diverge as to what such thinking should be, it is reasonable to assume 
that the final conceptual conditions can best be worked out precisely by 
discussing all these opinions. One example of diverging opinions is the 
commonly heard statement that GUUAM should simply limit itself to being an 
economic sub-regional organisation and that any mention of security issues 
would ruin the idea of GUUAM because it would impinge on Russian interests 
in the Caucasian and Black Sea regions. 
Without wishing to belittle the importance of economic cooperation 
within the framework of GUUAM, there is nevertheless a certain element of 
weakness and absence of logic in the above statement. Obviously, those who 
make such statements do not take into account two factors that are intrinsic to 
this region, namely, its internal instability and its high geo-strategic importance 
for a number of external geopolitical powers, such as the United States, Russia, 
the Western countries, Turkey and Iran. As everybody knows, strong economic 
relations cannot flourish in internally unstable and externally conflicting regions, 
as in the case of the GUUAM region at the present time. Consequently, if 
GUUAM does not solve its own security problems and those of the region, 
sooner or later other sub-regional initiatives will be launched to perform this 
function. The establishment of ‘the Caucasian team of four’ and the Stability 
Pact for the Caucasus is clear evidence of this.  
Within the context of sub-regional security problems, reference should 
be made first of all to the settlement of conflicts in Pridnistroye, Abkhazia 
and Nagorno-Karabakh. Certainly, Kyiv should take the lead in expanding 
peacekeeping in a GUUAM format. Indeed, Ukraine does send military 
observers to conflict zones to operate within the framework of UN/OSCE 
mandates. Ukraine also has sufficient capabilities to assume a peacemaking role 
in the European part of the post-Soviet space. First of all, Ukraine’s own 
geopolitical location enables it to take account of all the various political, 
climatic, social, economic and cultural ethnic features of the Eastern European 
region, and, secondly, Ukraine has the appropriate educational centres and 
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structures and forces and facilities required for preparing and conducting 
peacekeeping operations. 
As far as the principles of peacekeeping are concerned, Ukraine is ready 
to contribute its contingents to peacekeeping operations provided that such 
operations are conducted under the aegis of the UN/OSCE and peacekeeping 
forces are multinational and commanded by an international army headquarters. 
Concerning the realisation of concrete forms of Ukrainian peacekeeping 
activities, such activities will be adjusted for each conflict on a case-by-case 
basis. For example, in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukrainian peacekeeping activities 
will presumably be limited to intermediary services, such as providing technical 
consultations and carrying out military observer activities. At the international 
level, Azerbaijan can rely on Ukraine’s support in restoring its territorial 
integrity.  
There are wider possibilities for peacekeeping activities in Georgia. On 
several occasions, Georgia has asked Kyiv to send Ukrainian military 
peacekeeping contingents to the conflict zone. The issue of the establishment of 
a Georgian-Azerbaijani-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion is still on the agenda 
and the parties concerned have already reached a preliminary agreement on its 
establishment. Ukraine is ready to send its contingent to settle the conflict in 
Abkhazia, which, along with Ukraine, relies on the support of the United States, 
as the country directly interested in strengthening security in the Black Sea 
region. 
As far as Moldova is concerned, Ukraine has already met its obligation 
to act as the mediator for the resolution of the Transdniester conflict and as the 
guarantor of the parties’ security. Together with Russia, Ukraine has signed the 
memorandum laying the foundations for stability in the mutual relationship 
between Tiraspol and Kishinev. A group of Ukrainian military observers is on 
duty in the security zone in Transdniester. 
Reinforcement regimes for the non-proliferation of nuclear and other 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction pose another important security problem to 
these countries, as well as the prevention of arms deliveries to conflict zones.  
The GUUAM countries’ common security goal should be to reach a co-
ordinated policy for the liquidation of the Russian military presence on their 
territory. 
 
3. GUUAM-Russia 
As far as Russia is concerned, Moscow is really very jealous in respect 
of the strengthening of GUUAM. This reaction should not be regarded as 
constant and well defined. Everything will depend on the way it chooses to 
develop. 
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If Russia continues to regard the surrounding outside world as ‘hostile’, 
any regional organisation that does not provide for Russian domination will be 
considered as hostile. 
If Russian policy continues to be aimed at ‘struggling for domination in 
the region’ and maintaining the former imperial or Soviet status quo, then 
GUUAM will be deemed to pose an obstacle to the achievement of Russia’s 
exclusive prevalence in the Caucasian region and its influence on and expansion 
to neighbouring regions. 
In the event that Russia does pursue such a policy, it will then strive to 
destroy GUUAM, to strengthen its military presence in the Caucasian and Black 
Sea regions and to ‘freeze’ the internal conflicts that exist in these regions. 
But the price to be paid for pursuing such a policy will inevitably be the 
extension of instability to its own territory, as has already been demonstrated in 
Chechnya. 
However, if Russia were to put the defence of its own territory rather 
than the domination of other regions at the top of its national security policy 
agenda and to concern itself with the security of its own borders rather than the 
ephemeral borders of a Soviet Union that disappeared a long time ago, then it 
would be interested in regional organisations such as GUUAM. Because the 
realisation of GUUAM’s tasks in the regional security field could reap Russia 
dividends in the form of security on its southern borders, the promotion of 
stability in the northern Caucasus and stable and non-confrontational policies on 
the part of the regional countries. By cooperating with GUUAM, Russia would 
remove the possibility of other power centres unfriendly to it establishing 
domination in the region. The GUUAM countries share common interests with 
Russia in the field of strengthening regional stability and fighting terrorism. 
The advantage of security cooperation within the GUUAM framework 
is that it enables better account to be taken of each of the countries’ military, 
political-military and military-technical interests as well as to exploit their 
national capabilities more efficiently. It is precisely each country’s common 
interests and potential possibilities that will define the prospects of GUUAM’s 
existence. 
 
4. GUUAM-CIS 
GUUAM’s second task is the pursuance of a common security policy, 
both within and outside the CIS structures. Such a policy would enable the 
countries to achieve their individual national security interests within the post-
Soviet space. So it is not by chance that it was mutually agreed to base the cradle 
of GUUAM in Vienna, following the negotiation process concerning the revised 
agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe. According to this agreement, 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova appeared to be in the area of the 
‘flank zone’. At the meeting of the General Consultative Group in Vienna on 8 
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April 1997, a joint Declaration was issued by Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, 
stressing that it would be unacceptable for the Russian Federation to be granted 
the possibility of launching its weapons and techniques within the borders of the 
‘flank’ region without the appropriate bilateral arrangements. In this way, for the 
first time, these countries managed to protect their common security interests 
despite the fact that these interests contradicted Russian interests. 
The GUUAM countries are not members of the CIS Collective Security 
System. As this system has revealed its inefficiencies, the GUUAM countries 
could not resolve their security problems within the framework of this newly 
formed structure. 
Despite the fact that the GUUAM member states are members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, these two organisations are completely 
different. While the CIS countries are united by a common past, the GUUAM 
countries are united by their intention to share a common European future. 
Basically, interrelations within GUUAM are completely different to the 
system of interrelations within the CIS. The helplessness of the Commonwealth 
stems, in particular, from the fact that it continues to follow the former Soviet 
system of relations between the centre and the republics, with Russia now 
playing the central role in the CIS vis-à-vis the republics that have now become 
independent. In contrast to the CIS, GUUAM does not have a centre; it is a 
continually evolving system of equal partners that share common interests. 
In addition, GUUAM and the CIS are pursuing different aims. Unlike 
GUUAM that is dedicated to providing regional integration, ever since the 
establishment of the CIS, its member countries have been pursuing three 
alternative aims. This means that some CIS states, such as Russia and Belarus, 
support the reconstruction of one state institute with its centre in Moscow, while 
a second group of states sees the CIS as a form of civilised divorce and a third 
group views the future of the Commonwealth in terms of putting relations on a 
bilateral basis. 
Unlike the CIS, the development of GUUAM should be built on the 
following aims: economic cooperation on the basis of the idea of rebuilding a 
‘New Silk Road’; political and economic integration into Europe; and 
ensuring regional and national security. GUUAM’s role, both inside and 
outside the CIS, might be that, working together, its member countries could 
form that ‘critical mass’, which would force both Russia and the other great 
geopolitical powers in the region to take the member countries’ interests into 
account. 
The common position of the GUUAM countries may promote reform in 
the CIS, thereby increasing its effectiveness and efficiency. But GUUAM cannot 
be the ship for which the CIS is the only harbour. GUUAM has an essential role 
to play in the format of such organisations as the OBSEC, NATO, the OSCE and 
the EU. 
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All members of GUUAM also take part in the functioning of the 
Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation. This joint participation in the 
work of the OBSEC gives GUUAM the opportunity to develop more harmonious 
economic relations with such regional leaders as Turkey and Russia. 
The OSCE should be the leading regional security organisation for 
GUUAM, and its member countries’ main efforts within the OSCE framework 
should be concentrated on the following areas: preventive diplomacy; arms 
control and efforts to strengthen military trust; and the propagation of democratic 
values. 
As the major threat to European security is posed by regional conflicts, 
the settlement and prevention of such conflicts have become the OSCE’s main 
function. In accordance with this trend, attention should be focused on ensuring 
more active participation by GUUAM representatives in OSCE peacekeeping 
missions and the elaboration of mechanisms for liquidating the causes of 
conflicts at an early stage. 
Arms control and efforts to strengthen military trust are an important 
way of ensuring the national security of the GUUAM countries. Reference 
should be made to their common interests and basic purposes in the security 
field, the integration of joint efforts and the co-ordination of their national 
policies regarding their integration into European security structures. In this 
respect, GUUAM might be regarded as the Visegrad group of the Central 
European countries, whose basic task is to coordinate their joint efforts for 
integration into NATO and the EU. 
 
5. GUUAM-NATO 
Great prospects for military cooperation between the GUUAM 
countries and NATO have been opened up by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme. With this programme, NATO is pursuing two strategically 
important targets: firstly, preserving its defence alliance by taking in new 
members and, secondly, transforming itself into a security structure that can react 
effectively to challenges to European stability. This broad approach has enabled 
almost all the European countries to take part in the Partnership. 
On the basis of this vision, the basic priority areas of cooperation 
between the GUUAM countries and NATO might be as follows: 
- joint cooperation in peacekeeping operations; 
- enhancing the efficiency of the North Atlantic Consultative Committee; 
- enhancing the fighting readiness of the GUUAM countries’ national armed 
forces and moving to NATO standards; 
- the democratisation of armed forces and civil control over them; 
- crisis and conflict management; 
- the compatibility of military doctrines and strategies; 
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- co-ordinating approaches and efforts in the field of strengthening stability 
and security in Europe, particularly in the GUUAM region; 
- access to NATO information and technology. 
 
6. GUUAM-EU 
All the GUUAM member countries–Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova–are now actively involved in the realisation of the 
grandiose European project for the revival of the old Silk Road. In this respect, 
the interests of the GUUAM countries coincide exactly with those of the EU and 
the NATO member countries. That is why the creation and strengthening of 
GUUAM may be regarded as part of the member countries’ integration policy–
their participation in European security structures. 
 
7. GUUAM-Ukraine 
The GUUAM countries’ general political-military and political-
economic interest lies in securing the functioning of the Transcaucasian oil 
corridors. These transport corridors will encourage the new geo-economic and 
geopolitical configuration of this European region. 
Ukraine is interested in power supplies–gas and oil in particular. 
GUUAM has emerged as a means of receiving power supplies by a cheap and 
short route from the zone of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, as well as 
ensuring the cheap delivery of goods, because delivery tariffs across the territory 
of Russia make them non-competitive. However, the realisation of the above-
mentioned geo-economic interests should be based on the following four key 
principles of GUUAM’s activities in the security field: 
- First, in institutional terms, GUUAM should be understood as a sub-regional 
organisation. Within the framework of achieving this principle, there is a 
need to complete the process of developing continually acting executive 
bodies as well as all the other attributes and mechanisms that are intrinsic to a 
rigorous international organisation. 
- Second, cooperation within the GUUAM framework cannot be aimed against 
third countries or groups of countries. GUUAM is not a military alliance or a 
collective defence system. Its activities should be aimed at strengthening its 
own national security and that of the region. 
- Third, in orientating its activities, GUUAM should focus on the internal 
aspects of security, beginning with the strengthening of internal security 
factors and the removal of internal threats. 
- Fourth, the development of close and comprehensive security cooperation 
with other international organisations present in the Black Sea-Caspian 
region, such as the UN, NATO, the OBSCE, the OSCE, the EU and the CIS. 
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Hence, the analysis of the outlook for GUUAM in the regional security 
field shows that the basic priority directions for it in this process will be the 
following: 
- orientating itself to NATO and the EU as a strategic prospect; 
- strengthening the OSCE as part of the foundation of all-European security; 
- developing regional security structures and bilateral military cooperation. 
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1. Introduction 
The Black Sea region was a stage to many civilizations and a transit 
route between East and West and North and South where people and armies 
moved and clashed and massive migrations of different cultures occurred in the 
past. The early settlers used the facilities provided by the Black Sea and mainly 
chose to settle on the coastal rim where their lifestyle centred on seafaring and 
trade. Later transcontinental trade developed within a wider setting shaped by the 
Silk Road that connected the Black Sea with both the Far East and the Far West. 
Intercontinental trade brought prosperity through the links established across 
various countries from Asia and Europe, creating a Silk Road trade area. 
Consequently, the Black Sea culture and the Silk Road trade area with their 
respective shared values overlapped to develop local cultures.2 
The development of the Atlantic trade area and the establishment of 
new trade routes in the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans led to the eventual 
eclipse of the Black Sea area in international economic and political systems. In 
the 18th century the Black Sea was engulfed by the confrontation between the 
rapidly growing power of Russia in the north and the receding power of the 
Ottoman and Persian Empires in the south. Until the collapse of the Romanov 
and Ottoman Empires, the Black Sea provided a buffer zone between these 
Empires. However, World War I not only led to their collapse but also to a 
change in the status of the Black Sea area. The newly established Soviet Union 
started to collaborate with the young Turkish Republic, and Bulgaria and 
Romania also began to develop closer economic and political links with Turkey. 
By the 1940s the Black Sea had once more turned into a theatre of military 
conflict. German and Russian forces came into contact on the western shores of 
the Black Sea, which was briefly converted into a war zone. Following World 
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War II, the Black Sea area once more changed its nature and evolved into a 
region of confrontation, or a major fault line, separating the Warsaw Pact from 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The end of the Cold War 
brought an abrupt end to that picture of the Black Sea area, and new economic 
and political relations started to develop around and across the Black Sea.  
It was at this juncture in history that the Turkish government invited the 
Heads of States or Governments of eleven countries, namely, Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and 
Ukraine, to a summit conference in Istanbul, Turkey. The summit took place in 
Istanbul in June 1992, and on 25 June the Istanbul Declaration was signed.3 In 
that declaration the idea of the establishment of Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) was launched. BSEC was eventually chartered at Yalta on 5 
June 1998 and, hence, gained legal international status by that act of the eleven 
founding states, which stretch from Albania in the west to Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Russia in the east.4 
 
2. The Black Sea Region 
For any geographical area to be designated as a region there needs to be 
some commonality that binds the states of that area together. Historical and 
cultural affinities tend to act as attractive elements that engender closer relations 
between states. The Central Asian and Arab states often act under such 
influences. Economic interests often provide similar incentives for cooperation 
between neighbouring states. Often mixed with cultural affinities, economic 
interests provide strong motives for close cooperation, or generate competition or 
even conflict between states, i.e. the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
and the European Union (EU). However, there are also security calculations that 
render cooperation between neighbouring states feasible and precipitate alliances 
and ‘balance-of-power’ games, which in turn become a defining factor of a 
region.5 Often many factors come into play at the same time. However, all such 
cultural, historical and economic factors can also act to hinder relations between 
neighbouring states. Hence, we can find regions, such as the Balkans, which are 
deeply divided over many issues, and hence live in a state of conflict. 
Geographical proximity, which compels neighbouring states to interact 
with each other, probably functions as the main factor that defines a region. 
Trade and transportation routes often encourage states to get into contact with 
their neighbours. For example, Turkish relations with Central and Western 
                                                          
3 Yannis Valinakis, The Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe (Paris: Institute 
for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1999), p.1. 
4 Nurver Nureş, “BSEC at Crossroads,” unpublished manuscript, Istanbul, 2002, p.1, and Valinakis, 
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Europe would require that goods and people travel through Bulgaria or Greece, 
and through Romania, Hungary, Macedonia, Albania, and Yugoslavia, 
respectively. Hence, Turkey is forced to become wary of developments in the 
Balkans. Furthermore, historical and cultural ties still connect large numbers of 
Turks with their relatives, former neighbours and acquaintances in Greece, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Social and economic interactions 
further incorporate Turkey into the Balkans. Finally, the political conflicts of the 
area that occurred in Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania also draw Turkey into closer 
contact with the Balkan states. Security concerns often constitute a major factor 
that defines a region. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council are good examples of regional developments, 
which emerged from security concerns and gained economic importance over the 
years.  
The Black Sea was a frozen border, which neither superpower wanted 
to contest during the Cold War. On the contrary, not much seemed to happen 
there during the 20th century. Hence, it was not an area of active conflict, and 
conflict there was more or less put on ice. A thawing of the past conflict and a 
new potential or opportunity for cooperation seems to be occurring there now.6 It 
did not take long for the littoral states to recognize that as an inland sea, with a 
tiny and meandering opening to the oceans, the Black Sea is faced with various 
challenges and dangers. Many river systems that flow into it bring pollution, 
mainly phosphates, into its waters, which influence all the littoral states. It is also 
a main route for oil traffic from Russia to the international markets. The status of 
the Black Sea in international law is relatively problem-free. Hence, an 
opportunity for regional rapprochement and cooperation seemed to be present 
right after the end of the Cold War. 
It was in that optimistic climate that a window of opportunity for the 
littoral states of the Black Sea seemed to have opened up. It was thanks to the 
initiative of the Turkish Prime Minister at that time, Mr Turgut Özal, that the 
above-mentioned conference was held in Istanbul in 1992. The name of the 
organization which emerged, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, was indicative 
of the fact that the main goal of the organization’s constituting states was 
primarily motivated by the idea of exploiting the economic benefits of their 
proximity. 
An organization, in which eleven members participate, demarcates a 
geography that those member states define as constituting the Black Sea Region. 
Whether they had sufficient historical, cultural and social background and 
affinity and sufficient economic relations predating the establishment of BSEC to 
hold them together therefore became a theoretical question. Not only have these 
eleven countries become BSEC members, but they have also shown their 
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willingness to systematically participate in the meetings and activities of the 
organization in question. The legal entity of BSEC and the socio-economic and 
political entity of the nation-states that make up the eleven member countries 
should be sufficient for us to consider the ‘Black Sea Area’ as a region. In short, 
in this paper, I will assume that the territories of the eleven member states of 
BSEC constitute the geography of the Black Sea Region (BSR). 
 
3. BSEC: Aim and Structure 
BSEC is made up of states that connect Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle 
East and the Balkans. The BSR has a geographical span of 20 million square 
kilometres, it is inhabited by 350 million people and is second only to the Gulf 
area in crude oil and natural gas reserves. The BSR also possesses other mineral 
resources, which are just as rich as its oil and natural gas reserves. The human 
capital of the area is also very rich, though some of it has been involved in a 
‘brain drain’, due to the economic hardships endured by the member states of the 
BSEC.7 The region extends over strategic trade routes, especially sea routes, and 
environmentally delicate inland seas. It has a vast agro-business and industrial 
potential, which is not yet fully developed, due to the economic restructuring 
which most member states have been going through in the last ten years.8  
BSEC was established to generate economic growth and international 
trade and to promote peace in the Black Sea region. Although economic interests 
have been a major motivating factor for the establishment of BSEC, the motive 
behind it was not really economic. On the contrary, BSEC was initiated in 1990 
by diplomats and political elites who seemed to consider international trade and 
cooperation as factors contributing to peace and security in the BSR.9 In the early 
1990s all the Black Sea littoral states were going through a rough and sudden 
period of adjustment to dramatic socio-economic and political transformations. 
The old security divide was withering away, and a new window of opportunity 
had developed to stabilize, if not develop, socio-economic and political relations 
in the Region. It was assumed that if functional economic relations between 
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Greece and their neighbours could be established, 
strong economic lobbies for peaceful relations would develop in each country. 
Such an environment would then inhibit political conflict in the former Soviet 
territories from spiraling out of control. 
BSEC was set up with the aim of promoting political, economic and 
environmental cooperation between the member states. Hence, it is organized to 
carry out tasks in all those three areas. The political tasks are carried out by two 
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structures, namely, the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Parliamentary 
Assembly (PABSEC). BSEC also serves the aim of promoting economic 
cooperation by means of the BSEC Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) and 
the BSEC Business Council (BSECBC). Finally, it deals with environmental 
issues through the interaction between scientists and experts. Academic networks 
have also been initiated across the region beyond environmental cooperation to 
an extent that we may even consider academic interaction as constituting a 
separate sphere of activity.10 
 
3.1  Political Structure 
  The Council of Foreign Ministers is the organization’s ultimate 
authority. The Council has a chairperson that rotates among the member states 
bi-annually, in alphabetical order.11 The Committee of Senior Officials acts on 
behalf of the Ministers and functions as a board where all BSEC matters are 
discussed and presented to the Council for final approval. Consensus is the 
principle in voting.12  In 1995 a ‘Troika’ was established composed of the 
present, former and future Chairpersons. It is a consulting body and discusses 
topics of a special nature assigned by the Council of Ministers and/or 
Chairpersons, and it was established with the hope of promoting continuity in 
policies.13 
The Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS), which was 
founded in Istanbul on 15 March 1995, acts as a coordinator, 
provides secretarial services under a Secretary General and is 
essentially an intergovernmental body that exercises its work and 
responsibility within the same parameter. The Secretary General, 
the top executive of the PERMIS, is appointed by the member 
states every four years and is responsible for the Secretariat’s daily 
management. In the assignment of professional staff to the 
Secretariat by the member states, equitable distribution, based on 
geographical location, is the practice.14 
The Parliamentary Assembly also has a secretariat that is located in 
Istanbul. The PABSEC provides an opportunity for the legislative assemblies of 
the member states to meet and discuss the issues and political problems of the 
region, as well as the legislative issues of the BSR. PABSEC meetings provide 
an additional opportunity for the member states’ legislators to interact, become 
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familiar with and develop an increasing awareness of the issues, concerns and 
problems of other member states and of the BSR.  
 
3.2 Economic Structure 
The BSEC Business Council, which was established in 1992, consists of 
private enterprise representatives, is equipped with a Secretariat based in 
Istanbul, operates under a Secretary General, is run by a Board of Directors and 
functions as a forum for BSEC businessmen.15 The businessmen and women of 
the BSR are thus provided with a structure, which promotes their chances of 
interaction, familiarity and contact. However, so far, especially in Turkey, the 
Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) seems to have been more active in 
promoting business contacts than BSECBC and there seems to be much room for 
expansion as far as trade relations are concerned between the BSEC member 
countries. 
The BSEC Trade and Development Bank provides the financial structure for 
promoting economic relations in the BSR. It was founded in Thessaloniki in 
March 1998 and started operations in July 1999 with a Turkish Chief Executive 
Officer. It is structured as a development bank, more or less along the lines of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) or the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).  
It is managed in conformity with commercial precepts and private 
banking norms and principles. Its initial capital is composed of 
quotas assigned to the member states in accordance with a 
specially fixed scale and is expected to reach the full authorized 
capital of SDR 1 billion (approximately US $1.35 billion) upon 
fulfilment of the quota purchases. The Bank’s niche is the 
promotion of regional cooperation as an integral component of 
economic development. It has a dual function: to finance bankable 
projects in the BSEC region and to cultivate channels of 
investment flows thereto by interactive relations with international 
banking and financial circles.16 
 
4. Environmental Cooperation 
The Black Sea has its specific characteristics. It is landlocked, except 
for a narrow strait, the Bosphorus, which connects it with the Aegean and the 
Mediterranean Seas. More than thirty rivers feed the Black Sea, yet its waters 
flow to the south through the Turkish Straits. It receives slightly more water than 
it loses from evaporation. Finally, it has a unique two-layer system. Its lower 
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layer, which constitutes about 90% of its water mass, contains concentrated 
hydrogen sulphide and is uninhabitable by any living organism. The top layer 
used to be rich with fish stocks, but there has been a dramatic loss in those 
species in the recent decades: “By the 1990s the environmental degradation of 
the Black Sea had reached a level that a prominent official of the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) would describe as an ‘unholy mess’”. 
According to Yu. P. Zaitsev, “one cubic kilometer of Black Sea water annually 
receives about 20,000 kg. of pollutants, while the same volume of Mediterranean 
Sea water [receives] only 3,775kg.” .… “that is a 5:1 ratio of the pollution in the 
Black Sea to pollution in the Mediterranean”.17  
Environmental concerns and pollution constitute a relatively conflict- 
free issue, which influence all the littoral states equally, and hence they were not 
that difficult to anticipate as comprising an area of fruitful cooperation for 
BSEC. Indeed, BSEC became an instrument of such cooperation and action. The 
Bucharest Convention of 1992 provided the legal basis for cooperation among 
BSEC members on environmental issues.18 However, UNEP officials and 
scientists still argue that there need to be major developments to cut back the dire 
impact of such pollutants as phosphates in fertilizers on the Black Sea 
ecosystem. Hence, such cooperative efforts were forged early on, yet they have 
not yet delivered any stellar success. Nevertheless, BSEC started to act as a 
platform where scientists, researchers and academics started to interact in a 
relatively stable pattern, and not only on environmental matters. In this domain 
there is the International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) that was founded 
in 1997 in Athens. It has its own status and operates independently under the 
umbrella of the BSEC.19 
 
5. BSEC: A Decade of Challenges  
After one decade of performance BSEC seems to have reached a stage 
where it had consolidated its organization and structure by 1999. It has been 
functioning as a forum or arena for dialogue and interaction. Politicians, 
businessmen, scientists and peoples of the region have started to interact with 
each other. However, the organization’s accomplishments have been rather 
humble. How has BSEC performed? 
 
5.1 Political Cooperation 
Although BSEC was not able to prevent political conflicts from 
developing, there is no evidence that the conflicts that emerged in the BSR 
                                                          
17 Martin Sampson III, “Black Sea Environmental Cooperation: States and ‘the Most Seriously 
Degraded Regional Sea,’” Boğaziçi Journal, Vol.9, No.1, 1995, p.53. 
18 Ibid., p.59. 
19 Nureş, “BSEC,” p.7. 
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immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union spiraled out of control. It 
would be unfair to expect any international organization to be successful at birth 
and it took years for ASEAN, the EU, NAFTA or any other similar regional 
endeavour to become respected and valued and stable sources of influence or 
respect. Hence, although it is difficult to identify the specific influence of BSEC 
on the course of events in the BSR, there is nothing to indicate that as a forum 
for political dialogue between the eleven participant states it has undermined 
peace and security in the region, either.  Overall, BSR has become relatively 
calm over the years, and only the war in Chechnya still lingers on, whereas other 
conflicts, such as the Nagorno-Karabagh, the Armenian-Azeri, the Abkhaz-
Georgian or the Osset-Georgian conflicts, have been put on ice. Tension between 
Turkey and Greece and Greece and Albania has also eased. The main methods of 
conflict management, if not resolution, have been diplomatic contacts and 
political dialogue in, as well as out of, the BSEC structure in the BSR.  
  BSEC has provided all member countries with an opportunity to 
develop contacts. The annual and bi-annual meetings of politicians and 
diplomats, as well as the activities of the General Secretariat, enabled all 
members to develop or initiate contacts. Hence, those member states in conflict, 
such as Armenia and Azerbaijan or Albania and Greece, could use the 
organizational context to exchange views and proposals and negotiate. Such a 
context should have enhanced diplomatic efforts to manage conflict. Multilateral 
contacts also came into play. Each party to a conflict was contacted by all 
member states. They were able to use the good offices of other members. Most 
probably, BSEC contributed to ‘damage control’, even if it could not bring about 
any solution to the area’s unresolved political conflicts. 
Such a performance amounts to much less than conflict resolution and 
instituting peace in the region. However, most states have not yet reached a full 
state of maturity in their nation-building process. In particular, the ethnic 
conflict-ridden parts of the region have serious difficulties in defining a national 
identity that is acceptable to all their citizens. For example, the Armenians in 
Nagorno-Karabagh have never accepted the political status of being citizens of 
Azerbaijan, which was a status handed down to them from previous Soviet rule, 
and the Abkhaz and the Ossets seemed to have similar difficulties in accepting 
their Soviet-imposed status of being citizens of Georgia. Similar difficulties 
emerged in most of the post-Soviet territories, although post-Cold War Bulgaria 
and Romania experienced relatively little difficulty in forging their new national 
identities. 
However, Moldova experienced similar difficulties with its Russian, 
and Gagauz (Turkish) inhabitants in the early 1990s. After a brief struggle with 
its ethnic Russian citizens, Moldova witnessed the establishment of 
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Transdniestria that is inhabited by the Russians and protected by the 14th Army.20 
Moldova adopted a constitution that established autonomous rule for the 
Russians and the Gagauz in 1994,21 but which failed to prevent Transdniesteria 
from establishing separate constitutional rule one year later. The territory of 
Moldova, that was known as Bessarabia, was part of the Ottoman Empire until 
1812 when it was conquered by Russia, which ruled Bessarabia until the end of 
World War I. However, Moldova shares the same culture as its southern 
neighbour, Romania, and indeed became part of a larger union with Romania in 
the aftermath of World War I until 1940. In 1940, the Red Army occupied 
Bessarabia and the Soviets established the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic 
by uniting Bessarabia with the eastern bank of the Dniester. Hence, deeply 
influenced by the political struggle between Russia and Romania, Moldova had 
to resist the further deepening of its relations with Romania, to avoid further 
complication of its relations with its Russian citizens when it became 
independent again.22 
The former Soviet Republics were often allotted territory by Joseph 
Stalin, who created ‘administrative’ borders, which created national complexities 
that would keep the Soviet government out of trouble.23 Hence, the nationalities 
were often intertwined in a complex fashion, which often made it very difficult 
or impossible for them to disentangle themselves from their Stalin-imposed 
status. Stalin had envisaged this ‘nationalities’ policy as a safety valve for the 
centralised Soviet system.24 Consequently, most post-Soviet states found 
themselves hosting various ethnic groups, that would rather be separate and 
establish their ‘new’ nation-states.25 Conflict and civil war became the standard 
in the early 1990s. Even Russia could not exempt itself from the new mess. The 
only case where Stalinist policy failed was the velvet divorce between the Ingush 
and the Chechens of the Ingush-Chechen Republic and the war of independence 
the Chechen religious nationalists launched against Russian rule. 
The creation of BSEC coincided with the nationalist and tribal 
challenges faced by the newly established nation-states and the member states of 
BSEC. However, BSEC did not have the necessary resources and facilities to 
manage the ethnic conflicts harassing its member states and was even less 
                                                          
20 William Crowther, “Moldava: Caught between Nation and Empire,” in Ian Bremer and Ray Taras 
(eds.), New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), pp.321-327. 
21 Ibid., p.326. 
22 Ibid., pp.316-327. 
23 Richard Pipes, “The Establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” in Rachel Denber 
(ed.), The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context (Boulder: Westview, 1992), 
pp.60-66 and 74-81. 
24 Ibid., pp.74-81. 
25 Graham Smith, “Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev,” in Graham Smith (ed.), The 
Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (London: Longman, 1990), pp.4-7. 
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equipped to cope with conflict between its member states. Such conflicts may 
even be hard for highly institutionalized international organizations to contain, 
manage or resolve. For example, the EU failed to manage conflicts and violence 
in Ulster, Britain, the Basque region of Spain, or Corsica, France. Similarly, how 
successful has ASEAN been in preventing or resolving emerging conflict in 
Indo-China and the Far East since its inception in 1967 until now? Both the EU 
and ASEAN are highly respected regional organizations, but their performances 
in dealing with domestic ethnic conflict do not seem to be much better than the 
BSEC’s. 
We should not omit to mention another consequence of the historical 
characteristics of most BSEC member states, namely, that most of these states 
became independent very abruptly so that their new political elites found 
themselves at the helm of government without much preparation or experience. 
For example, the first cohort of political elites, such as Zviad Gamsakhurdia of 
Georgia or Ebulfez Elchibey of Azerbaijan, were ardent nationalists who were 
not ready to yield on any nationalist demand or issue. Formerly, they had not 
occupied any public office and had spent most of their political careers in 
opposition, in prison or under surveillance by the Soviet authorities. They were 
good at resisting the establishment, but poor at governing or leading a country or 
a bureaucracy. Hence, their contribution to BSEC was modest at best. Soon they 
were removed from government and replaced by such members of the Soviet 
political elite as Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia and Gaidar Aliev in 
Azerbaijan, although dialogue and compromise over thorny issues had not been 
part of their relatively lengthy political careers. Nor were their political 
resources, especially the central government bureaucrats and diplomats they 
‘inherited’, always ready to adjust their mentality to the new situation. In 
addition, heavy emphasis on state initiative in the realms of the economy as well 
as sluggish bureaucratic organizations did not help the new leaders to develop 
economic relations with much speed. Hence, their contribution to regional 
cooperation was slow to develop. However, it was under this second type of 
leadership that BSEC started to show some modest results. 
 
5.2  Economic Cooperation 
When the Soviet economy ceased to function in the early 1990s, there 
was not much from that era for the newly established states to inherit. 
Transportation and communication networks had been established to serve the 
former Soviet system so that the independent states found themselves still tied to 
Russia by roads and communication lines although they felt the need to develop 
new roads, railroads, ports, pipelines, telephone and Internet links to the global 
markets. Politically speaking, they felt the need to develop alternative routes that 
bypassed Russia. In some cases, it was political conflict that necessitated the 
establishment of new transportation and communication facilities. Old railroads, 
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roads and ports could no longer be used by Armenia, Georgia or Azerbaijan due 
to political conflict between these states or among them. However, economic 
cooperation in any region requires transportation and communication facilities 
that enable the movement of messages, information, goods and people. None was 
easy or even possible for a while between some member states. War, as well as 
brigandage, created road conditions that undermined any movement of traffic. 
For a while, it became impossible to travel without the risk of being robbed or 
hurt across some of these new states. The lack of law and order also undermined 
trade and tourism across the member states. Finally, they not only lacked 
transportation and communication infrastructure, but also the financial means to 
build and run new ones. Therefore, it was no surprise that for most of the 1990s 
the member states did not improve their trade. This meant that the old trade 
patterns of the former Soviet system lingered on wherever any possibility of 
trading existed. 
  The non-Soviet members of BSEC, such as Greece, Turkey and 
Albania, had other priorities or worries to deal with. Greece was a member of the 
EU and NATO by the time BSEC was established and Turkey was also a NATO 
member and an associate member of the EU. Hence, their economic relations 
were closely connected with the EU and NATO member countries, although they 
still mainly traded with Germany, Italy and the United States. In particular, 
Turkey was also trading with Iraq and Saudi Arabia for its energy (oil) needs. 
Consequently, bringing Russia and the other former Warsaw Pact countries and 
territories into Turkish foreign economic relations was a slow process. Indeed, 
even today, except for Russia, neither Turkey nor Greece does much trade with 
each other or the BSEC member economies. Greek exports to the Black Sea area 
had risen from $355 to $1,544 million by 1995, and imports increased from $524 
million in 1989 to $1,695 million in 1995.26 However, as of 1999, the five most 
important trading partners of Greece were Germany, the U.S., Italy, Britain and 
France as export markets, and Italy, Germany, the U.S., France and Britain as 
import markets (see Table 1). 
  Turkey’s foreign trade partners have also been similar to those of 
Greece, yet there have been some interesting developments. In 1991, Turkey’s 
top five export markets were Germany, Italy, the U.S., France and Britain, with 
the former Soviet Union ranked sixth and Greece a distant fortieth.  However, in 
2001, Turkey’s top five export markets were Germany, the U.S., Britain, Italy 
and France, followed closely by Russia, while Greece had moved up to twelfth 
place and Ukraine occupied twenty-fifth place (see Table 1). Turkey’s main 
import markets were Germany, the U.S., Italy, France and Britain, followed 
closely by the former Soviet Union in 1991, with Greece once again occupying 
fortieth place. However, in 2001, Turkey’s main import markets were Germany, 
                                                          
26 Valinakis, The Black, p.41. 
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Italy, Russia, the U.S. and France, followed by Britain and Switzerland, with 
Greece moving up to thirtieth place and Ukraine occupying eighteenth place (see 
Table 1). 
Russia’s five main export markets are Germany, Belarus, China, 
Ukraine, and the U.S. as of 2000 (see Table 1). Its five main import markets 
were Germany, Belarus, Ukraine, the U.S. and Kazakhstan in 2000 (see Table 1). 
Foreign trade between the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
Russia has decreased over the years. In 1997, 17.8% of all Russian exports and 
17.5% of all imports into Russia originated from the CIS countries. In 2000, they 
fell to 14.6% of exports and 13.3% of imports, respectively (see Table 1). In 
addition, Russia does not seem to be developing specific trade relations with 
BSEC member countries, except for Ukraine, which should be interpreted as a 
carry-over effect from the former Soviet Union.  
 
Table 1 
Trading Partners  
(Ranks as of 1999 for Greece, 2000 for Russia and 2001 for Turkey) 
 
  EXPORTS   IMPORTS  
 Greece Russia Turkey Greece Russia Turkey 
Germany 1 1 1 2 1 1 
U.S. 2 5 2 3 4 4 
Italy 3 - 4 1 - 2 
Britain 4 6 3 5 - 6 
France 5 - 5 4 - 5 
Ukraine - 4 25 - 3 18 
Belarus - 2 - - 2 - 
China - 3 - - - - 
Kazakhstan - - - - 5 - 
Russia - n.a. 6 - n.a. 3 
Greece n.a. - 12 n.a. - 30 
Turkey - - n.a - - n.a. 
Note: n.a. not applicable 
Sources: DIE, “Foreign Trade Statistics” (www.die.gov.tr, 2002); DEIK, “Report on Greece” 
(www.deik.com.tr, August 2000); and DEIK, “Report on Russia” (www.deik.com.tr.2002). 
 
The most severe bottleneck for economic growth and cooperation in the 
region is shortage of capital in the member states and the timidity with which the 
rest of the world approaches the BSR: “The amount of foreign capital inflows 
between the BSEC countries has been small and BSEC firms are involved 
mainly in energy, machinery building and infrastructure projects”.27 Domestic 
savings are too low to self-finance any rapid growth programme in any of the 
member countries, except perhaps for Russia. There are three tiers of economies 
                                                          
27 Ibid., p.41. 
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by size among the members of BSEC. The first tier consists of Russia, Turkey 
and Greece, which have large economies with GNPs exceeding US $100 billion, 
followed by Romania and Ukraine comprising the second tier with GNPs 
exceeding US $20 billion, and, finally, there are the other members each of 
which has small-size economies and low to very low per capita GNP. Russia has 
the largest economy of all BSEC member countries and was ranked sixteenth in 
the world, followed by Turkey, ranked twenty-second, and Greece ranked 
twenty-ninth. However, Russia has been going through a massive privatization 
process and capitalist market development effort since the 1990s. Coincidentally, 
by the late 1990s, Russia was deeply influenced by the Asian market slump and 
started to suffer from severe recession, which did, however, seem to be over by 
2002. Soon after, Turkey followed Russia and by 2001 Turkey was experiencing 
a financial melt-down and a severe banking sector crisis. Greece, with its US 
$11,770 per capita GNP and US $124 billion GNP (see Table 2), is the only 
modern capitalist economy without any major economic woes to fuel BSEC in 
the early 2000s. However, Greece has been more concerned with deepening its 
economic relations with the EU area rather than playing a leading role in BSEC. 
 
Table 2 
Economic Size  
(BSEC Member Countries, 2000/2001) 
 
Countries Gross National Product 
(billions US $) 
GNP per capita 
(US $) 
Albania 2.9 870 
Armenia 1.9 490 
Azerbaijan 4.4 550 
Bulgaria 11.3 1380 
Georgia 3.4 620 
Greece 124 11,770 
Moldova 1.6 370 
Romania 34.2 1,520 
Russia 332.5 2,270 
Turkey 186.3 2,900 
Ukraine 37.5 750 
Source: IBRD, World Development Report: Attacking Poverty (Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press, 
2001), p.274. 
 
Russia managed to start pulling itself out of economic recession with 
the help of its oil exports and the favourable international oil prices. However, 
Turkey’s economy has been kept afloat by an International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) austerity programme and is still grappling with financial problems, while 
most of the other members have never shown any sizeable growth potential in 
the BSR in the last decade. The only possibility of generating economic growth 
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in the area and promoting regional trade is foreign direct investment (FDI). 
However, the BSR does not appear to look safe or stable enough for foreign 
investors to invest in. 
Law and order has not yet been fully established in some member 
states. The transaction costs of investment are very high and only some business 
enterprises, such as Turkish construction companies that have diaspora 
populations from the region and function in their domestic business environment, 
which until recently resembled the BSR economies, can perform effectively 
there. Hence, the economic growth performance of both the member states and 
the BSR has been erratic and mostly only slightly better than dismal since 1992. 
The central government bureaucracies are still too active for the taste of 
most business groups to consider investment in the BSR. These bureaucracies 
tend to impose various rules and regulations that are not only numerous but often 
also difficult to understand or keep track of so that getting a contract signed and 
activated often requires many and unforeseen difficulties. In addition, 
deregulation, decentralization and privatization have been slow-moving 
processes. Unless there are serious moves in all those directions and a 
concomitant withdrawal by the state from the economy, most member countries’ 
financial difficulties do not seem to have a chance of being treated in the near 
future. 
The only area where the profits are high enough for any major 
investment to flow into the market to justify high risks has been oil and natural 
gas, where a number of multinational corporations and consortia have been 
active. Major cooperative undertakings have also been possible in the fields of 
oil and natural gas transportation. Russia had initially been keen on retaining its 
influence over oil and natural gas transportation from the Caspian Sea Basin, 
which most other member states viewed as a political, strategic move by Russia 
and a threat to their security and independence. Moscow insisted that the other 
BSR oil- and natural gas-producing new states continue to use its pipeline 
system and port facilities in Novorossisk on the Northeastern Black Sea. But, 
this seemed to create a complication in the plans and efforts by the Azeris and 
the Georgians to establish their own separate pipelines and port facilities. And, 
Turkey, another member country, has also been trying to establish an alternate 
pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan through Tiflis in Georgia to Ceyhan in Turkey, 
connecting Azeri oil to its Mediterranean port and eventually a similar natural 
gas pipeline. After lengthy negotiations, it now seems as if those three countries 
and a consortium have agreed upon building and operating that pipeline by 2005. 
Russia, which had formerly and systematically objected to the project, declared 
in Rome, at the time of the signing of a treaty with NATO in May 2002, that it 
no longer had any objections to the Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan pipeline. Consequently, 
Georgian-Azeri cooperation as well as Turkish, Russian, Georgian and Azeri 
cooperation on oil and eventually also natural gas transportation looks imminent. 
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In the meantime, the Baku (Azerbaijan)-Supsa (Georgia) pipeline has already 
started to deliver oil to the world markets. And, the most recent signs would 
seem to indicate that, following the recent changes in Russian foreign policy 
towards the region, even Armenia seems to be willing to negotiate a settlement 
of its differences with the Azeris and to develop similar links with its neighbours. 
If this Transcaucasian cooperation is forged, there will then be a chance of 
establishing law and order across the region, and within each member state, and 
an environment of economic cooperation, and this will also give sustainable 
peace and economic growth a reasonable chance of being implemented. 
Similarly, an alternative Russian-Bulgarian-Greek oil transport scheme has been 
on the drawing board for a while, and it would not be much of a surprise to see 
that come to life soon, too. 
There is more reason to be hopeful about the future of economic 
cooperation if the oil and natural gas transportation across the region 
materializes. There are likely to be various externalities involved in this project. 
Such cooperation will strengthen functional economic relations between the 
member states so that oil as well as other goods and services may then be 
extended throughout the region. A mushrooming of border trade between some 
member states will probably follow oil and natural gas trade. Tourism, which has 
already reached major volumes, can now expand even further to include most if 
not all the BSEC member states. Cultural, educational and other activities are 
also likely to increase as a result of these developments. Hence, relatively large 
groups of economic, social and cultural interests will emerge in each member 
country to support and enhance this economic cooperation so that even when the 
political parties in office and political ideologies change, it will be increasingly 
difficult to change these close economic relations. Furthermore, there will be 
other non-regional interests, such as those of the EU, the U.S. and the oil 
companies, which will be keen on supporting cordial and fraternal relations 
between neighbouring countries in the region. While BSEC has not been the only 
or the major determinant in the recent developments, the context it has provided 
may well have helped the member countries’ political, economic and other elites 
to shape their perceptions and images of each other. 
 
6.  BSEC: An Appraisal 
  BSEC has not been short of lavish and oral support from its member 
states. However, there is scant evidence of there having been any serious effort 
to mobilize financial, human and other resources to aid the programmes 
envisaged by BSEC. In a recent paper, a member of the Turkish representation 
notes that: 
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Ever since its foundation the PERMIS (the BSEC Secretariat) in 
general has operated remarkably well; deserves trust and praise 
and hence fuller support by the member states. This is still not 
forthcoming. Their (the member states’) attitude vis-à-vis the 
BSEC and similarly the PERMIS, varying between shades of 
indifference and negligence, would have to change to real 
engagement.28 
Nureş argues that the decision-making rule of consensus creates lethargy or 
paralysis in the organization.29 He also criticizes the laxness of the member states 
toward their commitments.30 However, not all the woes of the BSEC 
organization are due to commitment or motivation. 
Indeed, most BSEC members have other and multiple commitments and 
national interests, which have motivated them to orient themselves towards other 
alliances, regional integration projects or international organizations. This means 
that Bulgaria, Romania and even Turkey give more priority to their EU 
membership; Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and 
even Russia have been trying to re-define and deepen their ties to NATO; and 
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan expend a lot of energy on becoming members 
of the European Council. All these efforts have coincided with the BSEC’s 
institutionalization process. However, such moves also indicate that the member 
states seemed to be banking more on Western Europe for economic 
development, security and peace, rather than on their own efforts and those of 
their fellow BSEC member states. 
The economic and in particular the financial woes of BSEC could not 
be effectively dealt with as all their members, despite their relatively large 
financial resources, found themselves in economic recession or even depression. 
The only exception to this economic downturn was Greece. However, Greece 
was more concerned about participating in the euro zone than leading BSEC and 
the BSR out of the economic mess the rest of the members had managed to 
create. Greece seems to have followed a policy of surveillance in respect of 
BSEC developments to monitor and check what its arch-enemy, Turkey, was up 
to. The Turkish economy was on an unstable path of development in the 1990s 
and at the beginning of the new century. Furthermore, the re-alignment of the 
Turkish electorate led to the stellar rise of the far right in Turkish politics so that 
by the mid-1990s Turkey was governed by political parties that were either more 
interested in establishing ‘Islamic’ solidarity in the world or developing ethnic 
nationalism. 
                                                          
28 Nureş, BSEC,” p.16 (the statements in parantheses were added by the author of this paper). 
29 Ibid., p.17. 
30 Ibid. 
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Finally, the BSEC project was originally launched by former Prime 
Minister and President Turgut Özal, which made it unattractive to the other 
political leaders who had their own pet projects to present to their electorates 
when seeking their votes. Turkey thus lacked the vision, motivation and financial 
resources to lead BSEC. Nor was Russia in any better economic or political 
shape to enhance economic cooperation in the Black Sea region and Ukraine had 
similar woes, too. Both Russia and Ukraine looked more concerned about either 
domestic or global politico-economic problems and almost unconcerned about 
regional issues. If Turkey had provided the leadership and allocated the financial 
resources for the various projects, Russia, Greece and Ukraine might have shown 
more interest in the BSR and also made an effort to match the Turkish challenge. 
However, no sufficiently challenging initiative or leadership was taken by any 
BSEC member to motivate the others to follow suit over a range of programmes. 
Under these circumstances, the BSEC secretariat does not seem to have 
much motivation or orientation to draw up and execute programmes. Under the 
auspices of the BSEC, various meetings, conferences, symposia and workshops 
have been held on a wide range of issues and attended by diplomats, legislators, 
political leaders, academics, businessmen and women, journalists and students. 
However, it has not been possible to mobilize the resources to carry the 
decisions, proposals and suggestions emanating from those fora. Consequently, 
so far, BSEC seems to have charted and programmed what needs to be done, but 
lacks the political will and economic resources to carry out what needs to be 
done.31 
In a recent article, the BSEC Secretary General, Ambassador Valeri 
Chechelashvili, stated that there are still three main interrelated problem areas.32 
He identifies the first one as the lack of financial resources.33 The second one  
“relates to the need for sufficient co-ordination and, in particular, the need for 
‘co-ordination enforcement’ mechanisms and instruments in the Organization”.34 
And, the third one is “how to increase the interest of the Member States”.35 The 
Secretary General goes on to argue that it is still uncertain whether the member 
states will pursue their foreign economic policy objectives through the 
Organization or outside its framework.36 This last point goes to the heart of the 
matter and is an existential one. As I argued earlier, it is quite unlikely that 
Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and even Turkey will pursue their foreign economic 
policies outside the EU framework and within the BSEC framework. Indeed, the 
                                                          
31 Valeri Chechelashvili, “BSEC: The Way from the Regional Economic Initiative to the Full-
Fledged Regional Economic Organization,” Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, Annual 1, 2001, 
p.9.  
32 Ibid., p.18. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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BSEC Secretary General perceives what he refers to as a “project-oriented 
endeavour” as the main role of BSEC in the near future,37 yet so far that is 
exactly where the BSEC seems to have failed. As a window of opportunity, the 
BSEC exists, although its members seem to lack the interest to glance through it. 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
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BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION: 
THE OIL TRANSPORTATION DIMENSION AND SECURITY 
 
 
 
 
Volodymyr SAPRYKIN1  
 
 
 
 
The main problem facing the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara is that 
the amount of oil currently transported through the Turkish Straits may double 
over the next few years. This will mean that the risk of major accidents involving 
tankers in the Straits will go up dramatically and pose the threat of an 
environmental catastrophe to a heavily populated Turkey. 
Very briefly, 49,000 ships pass through the Bosphorus and the Sea of 
Marmara each year, including 5,000 oil tankers transporting over 75 million 
tonnes of oil. Over the last fifty years, there have been 50 emergency situations 
in this area, 40 of them serious, and 167 major accidents. 
Turkey is also concerned about Russia’s plans to process the European 
countries’ spent nuclear fuel and the possibility of this spent nuclear fuel being 
transported to Russia via the cheapest route, through the Turkish Straits. 
As far as trade and economic relations between the Mediterranean and 
the Black and Caspian Sea regions are concerned, the Turkish Straits is criss-
crossed by a number of transportation corridors. It is also a popular recreational 
area and there is a high risk of accidents. 
The Montreux Convention that was signed in 1933 created the legal 
framework regulating the use of the Straits. The main purpose of the Convention 
was to resolve the problem of the free passage of military ships of all countries 
through the Straits. 
However, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and some eastern Mediterranean 
and Balkan states are not members of the Convention, and in 1994 the Turkish 
government took the initiative of unilaterally approving a new procedure 
regulating navigation in the Turkish Straits and the Sea of Marmara. This is an 
international long-term Convention on free shipment in the Straits that cannot be 
amended without the consent of all the signatory states. 
In May 1994, the International Marine Organisation, which is the 
agency that was created to regulate shipping in the Straits, expanded its 
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jurisdiction over shipping and the environmental protection of the Straits. It has 
responded to the Turkish initiative on the basis of a new document that has 
softened some provisions of Turkish regulations governing shipping, but it also 
includes a number of other controversial provisions. 
Through their representatives to the International Marine Organisation, 
the majority of Turkey’s neighbours, including Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, 
Greece and Cyprus, have regularly expressed their satisfaction with Turkish 
policy regarding the Straits, but efforts by the Russian Federation and Greece to 
cancel the most controversial provisions have failed because their efforts are not 
backed up by the United States, which is one of Ankara’s main allies. Many 
countries neighbouring Turkey do not fulfil Turkish and International Marine 
Organisation requirements governing shipping because they are considered 
illegal. 
Currently, 40% of the ships passing through the Turkish Straits use 
Turkish navigators and most accidents are caused by ships that do not use 
Turkish navigators. There is no radar traffic control system, although Turkey has 
recently begun to introduce a modern system which has produced some positive 
results. Regrettably, plans to double its capacity have not been met. 
However, the main threat to the Turkish Straits is posed by the activities 
of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Over 71 million tonnes of oil and gas 
products are exported through the Turkish Straits each year, including about 4 
million tonnes of crude oil through Bulgaria and Romania, thereby exceeding the 
transport capacity of the Straits. The introduction of a radar traffic control system 
in addition to other measures for improving the security and safety of shipping 
would increase the transport capacity of the Straits by up to 110 million tonnes. 
Turning to the position of the main players, Turkey has expressed its 
interest in developing other means of transporting oil and gas through the Straits 
in order to prevent the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara from being turned into 
an oil pipeline. 
As far as Russia is concerned, Moscow believes that the problem of 
safety in the Straits is Turkey’s problem and Russia is not willing to share 
responsibility for environmental and energy safety in the Straits. 
In the case of Kazakhstan, while recognising that environmental 
dangers do exist in the Straits, the Kazakh leaders say that these dangers have 
been exaggerated. 
With regard to the European Union, the United States and the 
international oil and gas companies, they are trying to implement a number of 
measures to improve safety in the Straits, in particular by introducing double-
shelled tankers, thereby reducing the risk of oil spills in the event of accidents. 
As far as Ukraine is concerned, its view is that the Montreux 
Convention is no longer adequate to the reality that has emerged in the 66 years 
that have passed since the Convention was signed. Kyiv believes that part of the 
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solution to the problem of safety in the Turkish Straits lies in reducing the 
amount of oil transported through the Straits by channelling part of it through the 
Odessa-Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline. In fact, this 667-kilometre-long pipeline, 
which was completed last year, was intended to resolve this very issue. 
The annual carrying capacity of the first part of this project has now 
risen from 9 to 14.5 million tonnes of crude oil and it is planned to increase this 
capacity by up to 40 million tonnes of crude oil a year. Although the project has 
now reached a decisive stage, a lot of issues have still not been solved, including 
the most important one of the signing of agreements between oil suppliers and 
consumers. 
The portfolio of orders for the transportation of oil is about 2.4 million 
tonnes of Caspian oil, and we are currently considering several temporary 
destinations for Ukraine to carry its oil to, including Romania and Slovakia. 
However, I believe that the most purposeful direction is the one to Poland, 
although the pipeline has not yet been extended to Plock. 
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POLITICAL-ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE  
BLACK SEA AREA: A ROMANIAN PERSPECTIVE ON 
OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
 
 
 
Iulia ANTONIAN1 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It is obvious that the continuation of the division between a secure and 
economically prosperous West and a less secure and less prosperous East is 
unsustainable and that there is, therefore, a need to create economic prosperity 
and political stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. “Good for stability, 
therefore good for investment, therefore good for prosperity.”2 It is equally 
obvious that developing and strengthening regional economic cooperation is one 
of the major steps towards achieving Euro-Atlantic integration and that it will 
also contribute to strengthening confidence and broadening stability and security. 
In addressing the question of political-economic cooperation in the 
Black Sea (BS) area, this paper will consider the BS region together with the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSECO) as representing the 
interests of both the riparian states and, to some extent, the countries in the 
Balkans and the Caucasus. Most analysts would agree on the comprehensive 
security relevance of any regional economic cooperation project in this area and 
in this respect the BSECO represents an institutionalized form of cooperation 
aimed at integrating a highly diversified area that is facing a wide range of 
security challenges. However, as long as regional initiatives are aimed at 
encouraging cooperation and improving market access, they might well help the 
BSECO member countries to improve their ability to link up with the global 
economy. Thus the central goal of this paper is to highlight some impediments to 
the development of regional economic cooperation and to recommend that the 
BSEC member states adopt a more active cooperation policy. 
 
                                                          
1 Mrs Iuliana Antonian is currently serving as an Adviser in the Defence and Security Policies 
Division of the Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defence Policy Department (EAIDPD) at the Ministry 
of National Defence, Bucharest, Romania. 
2 See “Security and Prosperity: Two Halves of the Same Walnut,” Speech by the Rt. Hon. Lord 
Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary General of NATO, to the British Chamber of Commerce in 
Belgium, Brussels, 15 March 2001. 
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2. Impediments to the Development of Regional Cooperation 
2.1 BSEC Status 
The intention of the BSEC states was to develop economic cooperation 
in accordance with the principles of the process of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Cooperation within the BSEC would be 
based on “the potential of the Participating states and the opportunities for 
enhancing the mutually advantageous economic cooperation arising from their 
geographic proximity and from the reform and structural adjustments” (Article 
3),3 and would not require strong commitments by the member states. Economic 
cooperation would be promoted gradually, according to Article 10. Instead of 
providing for regional integration, the agreement aimed at the “achieving of a 
higher degree of integration of the participating states into the world economy” 
through cooperation (Article 5). 
In addition to this clear indication of the commitment to globalization 
through regionalism, the Istanbul Summit Declaration made it absolutely clear 
that membership of the BSEC would not prevent countries from developing 
relations with “third parties, including organizations as well as the EC” or 
participating in other regional initiatives (Article 7). In fact, the BSEC did not 
emerge as an organization specifically intended to provide incentives for 
subregional integration. From this perspective, no clear-cut strategy for the 
creation of a BSEC community sharing the same goals and values has yet 
emerged, thereby inhibiting the development of economic co-operation in the 
region. 
Consequently, each country in this area encouraged the development of 
trade with the member countries of the European Community (EC) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but not with 
the riparian states despite their geographical proximity. However, there is one 
exception. Due to the fact that Russia and Turkey represent the biggest 
economies, they are the largest foreign trade partners for the majority of the 
countries in the region. This means that crude oil and oil products still represent 
an important export item for Russia and Azerbaijan in their trade relations with 
the countries in the region. 
 
2.2 The Need for a NATO and an EU Regional Strategy on the BS and 
the Lack of a Strategic Dialogue and Partnerships 
Another obstacle to the development of regional economic cooperation 
has been the almost complete absence of any kind of regional strategy towards 
the Black Sea area on the part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
                                                          
3 See Summit Declaration, Istanbul, 25 June 1992. 
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and the European Union (EU),4 together with their perception of this region as a 
crossroads for the problems of the neighbouring regions (South-Eastern Europe 
(SEE) and the Caucasus). Coupled with the riparian states’ great diversity of 
status and interests (NATO, EU members, NATO, EU candidates, members of 
the various political-economic initiatives launched by Russia), the geo-strategic 
realities have not really helped the BSEC to promote the BS as a robust 
economic region. However, following the recent changes in the Balkans and the 
Caucasus, the international organizations are now focusing their attention on the 
BS area. In this context, NATO has launched the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council/Partnership for Peace (EAPC/PfP) in response to the need to adapt to the 
new security environment, while the EU is analysing the BS Dimension of 
Enlargement.5 This geo-strategic focus on the BS will probably bolster regional 
economic cooperation and create a new starting point for countries in the region 
in their attempts to formulate a joint political strategy and promote a viable, 
long-term strategic dialogue. 
 
2.3 Lack of Regional Ownership 
The economic situation and the great diversity of the member states’ 
status and interests are preventing players in the BS area from assuming regional 
leadership/regional sponsorship. The success of the Balkan stabilization process 
has proved that the ‘regional ownership’ principle was worth implementing in 
the BS area. Maybe a collective leadership, along the lines of the EU/Troika 
model, could be successful in this area, if states can agree on a common 
denominator with respect to the risks and opportunities for regional political and 
economic cooperation as occurred in SEE. In fact, they found themselves facing 
the same old dilemma confronting the EU institution-building process: task-
driven–creating institutions as required for agreed projects–or institution-driven–
filling existing structures with a more substantial content. The time has come to 
reconsider BSEC by broadening its stability and security dimensions. 
 
2.4 The Persistence of Pre-BSEC Difficulties 
A significant step forward in adapting the BSECO to the new global 
risks and challenges and to its transformation into a regional multi-level 
organization with political aspirations in order to complete the transition to 
                                                          
4 Preference was given to the bilateral approach to the relationship, i.e. special relations, such as the 
Common Strategy with Russia in 1999, the special NATO-Russia Partnership or the NATO-Russia 
Council. 
5 Colin Powell proposed the setting up of a regional headquarters for the PfP programme in the 
Balkans, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The International Center for Black Sea Studies 
(ICBSS) organized the Halki Conference in 2001 for the third consecutive year, in cooperation with 
the Hellenic Foundation for European Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), and launched the idea of the BS 
Dimension. 
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democratic societies was achieved through the Yalta Declaration. Nevertheless, 
despite all the progress that has been made, the following detrimental pre-
BSEC structural obstacles persist: 
- The former artificially created complementarity or interdependence between 
the economies of former socialist states, which determined two different 
patterns of pre-BSEC trade between its current members: the sizeable but 
largely diverted trade among former Soviet bloc countries and the relatively 
insignificant volumes of trade these countries had with other countries, such 
as Greece and Turkey, despite their geographical proximity.6 One exception 
worth mentioning is increased trade between them and the Russian 
Federation. 
- The lack or inefficiency of both bilateral and multilateral trade channels, 
based in some cases on the absence of effective agreements between states. 
- The meagre situation regarding transportation and infrastructure. 
 
2.5 Regional Structural Changes/Proximity of Hotbeds 
Apart from the historical heritage, namely, the East-West confrontation, 
the region has been subject to the negative impact of the recent Balkan crises 
coupled with the difficult consequences of the painful and multiple processes of 
internal transformation and restructuring. As far as economic development, the 
pace of economic growth, ethnic groups, cultures and religions are concerned, 
the situation in the region varies enormously from country to country. Like any 
other transit or buffer zone, the region is also facing the risks of international 
terrorism, extremism, aggressive separatism, organized crime and drug 
trafficking, as stated in the BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future: Towards a 
More Consolidated, Effective and Viable BSEC Partnership. Unsolved local 
conflicts are undermining the region’s political, economic and social fabric and 
compounding the process of multilateral economic cooperation.7 In addition, 
trade partnerships and the free movement of goods, which play a significant role 
in the process of regional cooperation and integration, have also been 
jeopardized by the local ethnic conflicts that have broken out in some of the New 
Independent States since the collapse of the Soviet Union. And, the 
transportation of goods through conflict-torn territories has even had a direct 
impact on traditional foreign trade relations in the region. 
                                                          
6 See Serdar Sayan, “The Black Sea Economic Project: A Substitute for or a Complement to 
Globalisation Efforts in the Middle East and the Balkans,” 1998. 
7 See “BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future: Towards A More Consolidated, Effective and Viable 
BSEC Partnership.” 
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2.6 Lack of Information 
Lack of information about the BS countries’ production capabilities and 
export potential is another obstacle to the development of trade among the 
member countries. Therefore, it is important to accelerate the activities of 
international organizations and Chambers of Commerce in support of 
information exchange. Special customs and tax laws on trading in the Black and 
the Caspian Sea Basin region would considerably support the development of 
trade. 
 
2.7 Pipeline Projects  
Unfortunately, for some considerable period, disputes over the 
development of pipeline projects from the Caucasus to Europe have had a 
negative impact on regional cooperation. More recently, pipeline projects have 
gradually become a regional symbol and a possible tool for integration, or an 
incentive for countries to create shared economic interests. In this respect, the 
following two main principles should be emphasized: on the one hand, keeping a 
non-politicized perspective on the energy routes issue and, on the other, 
maintaining the diversity of export routes as a main requirement. In this context, 
cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey looks promising as it is 
being built upon the final aim of the region’s step-by-step integration into 
European political and economic structures. 
 
2.8 Current Difficulties Arising out of the BSEC’s Internal Deficiencies 
While endeavouring to develop multilateral cooperation projects and 
notwithstanding the substantial progress that has been achieved in many fields, 
the BSEC countries are fully aware of the following difficulties confronting them 
at the present time: 
- the shortage of financial resources and the failure to attract significant 
investments from abroad, which are hampering the BSEC member states’ 
participation in joint cooperative programmes and projects; 
- the lack of a coherent definition of aims, priorities and long-term issues; 
- a discrepancy between the proclaimed objectives and the degree of 
implementation of the projects adopted under the aegis of the BSEC; 
- low efficiency in implementing the adopted resolutions and decisions, and 
the absence of mechanisms for monitoring compliance by the appropriate 
national authorities; 
- insufficient coordination among important parts of the Organization; 
- too many projects and too much bureaucracy.  
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3. Conclusion 
To summarize, regional economic cooperation under the auspices of the 
BSEC has been undermined by a wide range of obstacles, including: 
- The status of the BSEC and the persistence of some pre-BSEC structural 
obstacles. 
- The lack of strategies towards the region on the part of the external players, 
combined with the absence of a congruent or mutually agreed policy among 
the countries of the region. 
- The persistence of crises and low-intensity conflicts. 
Despite all these structural obstacles, the BSEC has succeeded in becoming a key 
instrument in the ongoing process of the regionalization of the Black Sea area 
and is playing an important role in the development and formation of common 
interests and values. 
In the years to come, the importance of the BSEC region in world 
politics and in an increasingly globalized economy will grow considerably due to 
the recent geo-strategic changes, including new NATO-Russia relations, the US-
Russia partnership, new NATO-Ukraine relations and NATO/EU enlargement, 
American involvement in the stabilization of the Caucasus and international 
recognition of Russia as a market economy. New processes and structures are 
currently being created in the region and will probably have a beneficial impact 
on regional cooperation in the political and security field. However, the 
sustainable development of the entire Black Sea area will continue to depend 
upon the individual countries’ economic progress and effective relations among 
the BSEC member states, and constant effort and proficient management will be 
required by these countries’ governments in order to achieve this goal. 
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Ladies and Gentlemen, 
First, I would like to welcome everyone to Kyiv and to express my 
appreciation for this opportunity to address you.  
As you know, cooperation between Ukraine and NATO is developing in 
a number of frameworks, including the European-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Charter for a 
Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO. In 1995, Ukraine was one 
of the first partner countries to adopt the Planning and Review Process, whose 
main objective is to ensure effective cooperation with the Armed Forces of other 
Partner and NATO nations, as well as to exchange information about defence 
and budgetary planning within the PfP framework. 
This year, on 23rd May, the National Defence and Security Council of 
Ukraine, chaired by the President, approved a gradual but emphatic strategy for 
joining NATO. The decision was taken in the light of: 
- the significant changes in the world’s security tapestry; 
- the favourable internal conditions, particularly policy support for Euro-
Atlantic integration by both governmental  structures and society; 
                                                          
1 Colonel General Victor Ivanovych Bannykh is State Secretary for International Cooperation, 
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Kyiv. 
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- a new format in the relationship between NATO and Russia;  
- successful developments in the sphere of cooperation in the military field. 
I wish to underline that, in my view, the most developmental element of 
cooperation between Ukraine and the Alliance is the military part and that the 
level of military cooperation is essentially strategic in nature, because of its 
practical influence upon our reform processes.  I would like to touch upon some 
of the main aspects of Ukraine-NATO defence and security cooperation. 
The most pressing issue for us today is the question of reforming our 
Armed Forces. Our aim is to create a mobile and well-equipped Army to Euro-
Atlantic standards. With this in mind, the Defence Ministry has drawn up a 
Package of National Defence Reform Objectives. Moreover, flowing from all 
this, and as a matter of urgency, we are integrating the Planning and Review 
Process into our national system of Defence Planning. For this, we have a special 
legislative basis, which should help to ensure an effective system of planning, 
programming and budgetary support for our Armed Forces.  
The basis for the practical implementation of our National Defence 
Reform Objectives is the Defence Survey. Its objectives are to transform the 
structure of the Armed Forces in accordance with conceptual documents on 
security and resources.  The successful realization of this Defence Survey may 
give us the opportunity to make a significant ‘break-through’ in our relationship 
with NATO, particularly in terms of matching words and deeds. 
Bearing in mind the aim of defining more concretely the work needed to 
intensify the Ukraine-NATO dialogue in the Defence Ministry, we have drawn 
up a plan of immediate measures for 2002, in response to the NSDC’s decision 
of 23rd May. 
One example of intensified cooperation with the Alliance is the 
language training pilot project. Knowledge of foreign languages is obviously the 
basis for all interoperability. Without this, all our plans for cooperation with 
NATO would remain a pipe dream. Lists of posts for which knowledge of 
English is obligatory have been drawn up and approved by the Defence Minister. 
This academic year, the language training programme will be increased to 450-
500 hours per year per person attending Higher Educational Institutes. Moreover, 
the Central Staffs of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff will conduct all 
their official correspondence with NATO member countries and partners solely 
in English. 
In addition, we are currently focusing our efforts on the following two 
important Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with NATO: 
- Memorandum of mutual understanding on host nation support in 
international training and peacemaking operations.2 
                                                          
2 The MOU on Host Nation Support was signed on the fifth anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine 
Charter during the North Atlantic Council’s visit to Ukraine. 
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- Memorandum of mutual understanding on strategic airlift aircraft. 
The signing of these two MOUs will significantly enhance the 
understanding that underpins international cooperation between Ukraine and 
NATO. We are also pursuing further joint projects for the destruction of 
antipersonnel mines, surplus ammunitions and small arms, and rocket fuel.  
We are continuing our joint work on the individual training of civilian 
employees at the Defence Ministry.  For this, they attend a course on civil-
military relations and democratic control of the Armed Forces at the National 
Defence Academy of Ukraine. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
We have always understood that the implementation of Ukraine’s 
decision to intensify relations with NATO would never be easy. At the same 
time, I think you will agree that we are starting to make use of the full potential 
of the mechanisms available under the Partnership for Peace programme. This is 
particularly important, not least because our ultimate objective is a stable Europe 
built on consensus in which Ukraine would not be in last place. 
Thank you for your attention. 
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1. The Changing Nature of Conflict 
A study of history shows us that approximately every fifty years the 
world experiences a revolutionary change–a paradigm shift–in the nature of 
armed conflict, provoked by sociological, technological or other external factors. 
Examples from the past two centuries would be: the development of effective 
mass conscript armies during the Napoleonic Wars (c 1800); the introduction of 
rapid-firing rifled weapons in the mid-19th century; the industrialization of 
military production and relevant infrastructure that preceded World War I; and 
the development of nuclear weapons and their global delivery systems during 
and immediately after the end of World War II. 
It seems to me that we are now in the midst of just such a 
‘revolutionary’ change, ushered in by the dramatic developments of the last 
decade and brought into sharp focus on 11 September 2001.  The major factors 
underlying this change, which is still ongoing, I would tentatively identify as 
follows: 
- the new global power balance which has emerged following the end of the 
Cold War, and the consequent impact on the geostrategic significance of 
states; 
- the rapid advances of technology; 
- changing attitudes to the use of armed force in Western societies. 
                                                          
1 Mr Chris Donnelly is Special Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs to the Secretary 
General of NATO, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium. 
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2. The New Security Scene 
As far as Europe and North America are concerned, the specific 
elements of the above factors which have the greatest impact on the current 
security scene are: 
- the uncontrollable proliferation of technology; 
- the growing gap between rich and poor countries; 
- the information revolution. 
As a result we are faced today with the need to reassess what constitutes security, 
what are the threats to security, and what should be our responses to those 
threats, including the particular threat of terrorism. 
As is so often the case, it is not one single cause but the combination of 
new factors which creates the new security conditions and which will generate 
new security threats. Take, for instance, the issue of technology proliferation 
mentioned above. Technological advantage in warfare is always transient. It 
would be unwise to assume that ‘Western’ technological superiority will in all 
cases translate into overwhelming military superiority. Today, the rapid 
proliferation of technology means that even small developing countries–
especially those run by strong dictatorial regimes–can, by focusing their efforts, 
acquire weapons and delivery means which may pose a real threat to major 
powers. When this is coupled with fanaticism the threat is even more evident. 
Furthermore, the nature of modern weaponry means that, unless the 
technology gap is truly enormous (as it was between the United States and the 
Taliban), a determined and competent defender today could make a ‘forced 
entry’ too costly for any country to contemplate. Forces that can be projected and 
maintained overseas can be ten times more expensive than conscript forces for 
national defence. Compare, for example, the firepower that Canada and Israel 
can deploy for roughly the same defence expenditure. The West’s capacity for 
military intervention may be a lot less than is sometimes supposed. 
The growing gap between rich and poor countries poses a potential 
security problem in many ways, not just when combined with the problem of 
proliferation of technology. This gap is most dramatically evident if we compare 
the statistics for population growth and per capita income for the countries of 
North Africa and the Middle East with those of Europe, and project these over 
the next ten years. It is wrong to blame this growing wealth gap on ‘Western’ 
countries just as it is wrong to conclude that poverty alone produces, or even 
justifies, terrorism. In fact, in what is now becoming known as the ‘arc of 
instability’ stretching from North Africa to Central Asia, incompetent 
government, social injustice and lack of democracy are by far the greatest causes 
of discontent. But the discontent and desperation generate such serious security 
problems as illegal migration and drug smuggling and create the breeding 
grounds for fanaticism that can in turn produce regional instability and terrorism. 
This is a worsening problem and one that will have to be dealt with on its home 
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ground by proactive measures (which may be military, political or economic) as 
well as by protective or defensive measures in our countries. This, too, has 
important implications for our security policy. 
The information revolution is the third general factor that has so 
changed the security environment. This has several aspects. It is one of the 
factors which contributes to the proliferation of technology. It can accentuate the 
‘poverty gap’ by making it more evident. In democracies it has two major 
implications. Firstly, reliance on information technology can render a society 
very vulnerable to certain forms of terrorist attack. Secondly, democracies can no 
longer exert any control over the flow of information and therefore over the 
media. Yet dictatorships can, if they are sufficiently efficient, manipulate the 
media to a certain degree and thereby have a considerable influence on public 
opinion, including in democracies with which they may be in conflict. 
Governmental information and even military intelligence can no longer compete 
with the media for speed of information transit. As a result, every action which a 
democracy takes in pursuance of its security, be it a military operation or not, 
will in future be played out in a new environment–that of intrusive media 
attention. If we do not take account of this and plan accordingly, then our 
security operations will suffer severely. 
Added to these general trends we have seen, in the past decade or so, 
the welcome collapse of the Cold War confrontation and, with it, the bipolar 
security system. It is this which has precipitated the sudden and dramatic shift in 
the security environment. We have gone, in a very short time, from Cold War to 
Hot Peace.  We have witnessed a significant change in what constitutes security. 
 
3. Redefining Security: New Threats and Responses 
Only a decade ago, ‘national security’ was synonymous with ‘defence’. 
East and West faced the threat of World War III, characterized in Europe by the 
threat of invasion which was feared, with whatever justification, by both East 
and West. The threat was common, as was the response–mass armies based, in 
continental countries, on mass mobilization and conscript military service. 
Deterrence was by conventional defence backed up by the threat of nuclear 
weapons. ‘Security’ was measured largely in military strength. 
Today ‘security’ means much more than just military might. In as far as 
‘security’ retains its military significance, ‘deterrence’ is by guarantee of 
effective counter-attack (the difficulties and cost of which put a premium on 
crisis and conflict prevention). Otherwise, security has become a much broader 
issue. For most European/Euro-Atlantic countries, security today is primarily 
measured in non-military terms and threats to security are non-military in nature. 
These threats include: incompetent government, corruption, organized crime, 
insecure borders, smuggling (weapons, drugs, contraband, people), illegal 
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migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, shortage of natural resources (e.g. water) and, of course, terrorism. 
All developed nations face these threats.  But they face them in different 
measure, and therefore they will require a different response. This is in marked 
contrast to Cold War days, where threat and response were more or less the 
same everywhere. The need for differentiated response is the factor which today 
most complicates the evolution of security alliances (the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP)). If it is to be worthwhile, an alliance must offer each 
and every member a clear and unequivocal security advantage. It must repay 
their financial and political cost. Today, this means that an alliance must meet 
the now different security needs of each of their members rather than the 
common need of the Cold War. 
As security is no longer just a military concern, it is no longer just the 
preserve of Ministries of Defence (MODs) and Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
(MFAs) which have to date been the main ministries involved in security 
cooperation. It is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between external 
security and internal security. Security henceforth requires the coordination of 
the ‘external’ ministries (i.e. MOD and MFA) and their agencies (armed forces, 
intelligence services) with those of the ‘interior’ ministries: internal affairs, 
education, finance, overseas development, transport, environment, health, etc., 
with their agencies (policing forces, security services, disaster relief agencies, 
etc.). Security today takes in social development and demands the involvement 
of all elements of society in a way which security in the Cold War days did not. 
Meeting these new security requirements demands fundamental reform of 
national structures, patterns of investment and systems of government. Likewise 
it demands the evolution of international institutions on a truly radical scale. 
 
4. The Military Implications of the New Threats to Security 
Whilst security is now a broader concept, it still contains major military 
elements. Yet even here, a security threat will today require a very different 
military response than in the past. No longer can the threat to the defender be 
dealt with simply by passive defence or protective measures. These remain 
essential, but have changed in nature. Armies today may have to be deployed in 
support of domestic police operations. In addition, our armed forces will have to 
go out to deal with the threat in the countries from which it is generated. Forces 
today must expect to be projected–i.e. sent abroad–sustained there (perhaps over 
long periods) and used. This will not be passive peacekeeping or, as in the Cold 
War, deterrence by simply waiting. Troops must expect to fight. 
This faces armed forces with completely different demands than was the 
case a decade ago. Most countries in Europe maintained large, mainly static, 
armed forces which deterred just by their existence. The West never really 
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expected to have to fight a sustained conventional operation at short notice. 
Consequently, in the face of increasingly costly weapons and manpower, most 
NATO nations maintained large national military structures but very low 
reserves of expensive munitions–an unrealistic balance. Most countries could 
mobilize forces only in the event of total war. The problems European countries 
had in deploying forces for the Gulf War and the structural reorganization 
needed (for example in the British Army) to make a division viable in the field 
bear witness to this fact. (Warsaw Pact armies, it must be said, maintained a 
much higher degree of military capability–but in doing so ruined their 
economies.)  When we deployed troops for peacekeeping we did not expect them 
to have to fight–merely to patrol in blue helmets and white vehicles. 
Today, the truth is that we are much more likely to have to deploy 
troops actually to fight than was ever the case during the Cold War. As a result, 
the kind of forces a country needs to project, maintain and use military power 
abroad faces most European countries with the need for a total reform of their 
military systems. Very few of Europe’s current two million men and women 
under arms can be reckoned useable in this respect. Put bluntly, much of 
Europe’s defence budgets is spent on maintaining the wrong kind of armed 
forces for today’s threats. In a war on terrorism, most of Europe’s troops can be 
used only for certain limited tasks. 
Most European countries, therefore, face the difficult challenge of 
military reform on a massive scale. Armed forces need to be more capable and 
flexible. This means that they will be more expensive. Therefore, unless defence 
expenditure is to increase dramatically, they will be smaller. For small countries 
this means that they will no longer be able to field balanced national armed 
forces capable of conducting all the functions needed in an all-arms military 
conflict. This implies role prioritization which in turn implies that an alliance 
approach will be essential. In this respect, NATO and EU ESDP requirements 
are identical. ESDP cannot in the foreseeable future provide an alternative to 
NATO because most EU members have not reformed their armed forces to 
provide credible expeditionary capability. In addition, for independent actions, 
EU will have to develop C3, intelligence and logistics capabilities it does not 
currently have. 
This is the outstanding challenge today facing European national 
defence and security establishments and the international institutions–NATO and 
the EU. Both organizations will have to evolve rapidly and demonstrate that they 
can indeed offer their members some real security benefit in the new era if they 
are to survive and flourish. Otherwise, their member nations will not fund them.  
If the tool cannot do the job required, why pay to keep it? Equally, both 
organizations will have to collaborate and coordinate their roles, functions and 
operations. Neither will be able in the near future to do all the tasks necessary.  
Here too there will have to be prioritization and role sharing. Intelligence sharing 
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and active intelligence and security cooperation are becoming the key elements 
of this increasingly important collaboration. 
 
5. The Challenge of Terrorism 
I have attempted to paint this new security environment in some detail 
so as to put Terrorism in its proper context. Terrorism is only one of the threats 
to security today, and it is considered a much greater threat in some countries 
than in others, for obvious reasons. Terrorism has many manifestations. It has 
been with us for a long time. There are different definitions of the term, and to 
counter it requires actions on many different fronts. 
When we speak of the ‘War on Terrorism’ we should remind ourselves 
that terrorism is a tactic, a means. Whilst we seek to prevent it, our real target is 
not the tactic but the perpetrator. Our enemy is those groups and movements 
which seek to overthrow our social order and which use terrorism and many 
other tactics (e.g. information warfare) to that end. 11 September brought this 
into focus. The clear distinction between ‘war’ and ‘non-war’ is now blurred.  
So, therefore, is the distinction between the role of armies and policing forces 
also blurred. 
If we liken this new form of attack on our societies, which includes 
terrorism, to a disease–say, lung cancer–then as we attempt to treat the disease, 
we can draw on several sources of help. The armed forces are the surgeons. The 
security forces (police, gendarmerie) are the doctors, dispensing medicine, 
chemotherapy, etc. The overseas aid and crisis prevention agencies are the health 
workers who try to stop us smoking and help us avoid the causes of the disease. 
The intelligence and security services are the diagnosticians who should give us 
early warning of our health problem.   
Just as in medicine, all these agencies have indispensable roles to play. 
Just as in medicine, no one agency on its own will be effective–best effects are 
achieved when they all collaborate. Military power has an important role to play 
in the defeat of terrorism. But military force alone cannot defeat a terrorist threat. 
Military force can at least buy a breathing space. For example, it can deny 
terrorist groups a safe haven in space or time, as in Afghanistan, without which 
they cannot easily function. But this breathing space must then be used to tackle 
the problem at its source, or the military action may come to be ineffective or 
even counter-productive. 
Likewise, domestic protection can no longer be assured by passive 
defensive measures alone. There will be occasions when security can only be 
achieved by taking the war into the enemy’s camp. The problem facing much of 
Europe, of course, is that it does not have the military option to do that. It does 
not have the armed forces it needs to pursue the War on Terrorism by force. The 
challenge, therefore, is a manifold one and entails: 
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- restructuring military forces within an alliance context (virtually identical for 
NATO and the EU) so that they can play a useful role in this new form of 
warfare; 
- developing other national security forces (police, gendarmeries, border 
guards, intelligence and counter-intelligence services, etc.) so that they can 
cope with the new threat, and provide for their international collaboration; 
- developing the inter-ministerial cooperation necessary to enable the various 
ministries and agencies (police, intelligence services, etc.) which now need to 
cooperate to deal with the threat actually to do so effectively; and 
- investing more heavily in crisis and conflict prevention, including making 
overseas and planning part of the national security policy. 
The armed and security forces themselves need to agree in concert a 
framework for tackling the new security threats which breaks down old barriers 
to collaboration. The most widely used framework is a good place to start. This 
divides the tasks into ‘anti-terrorism actions’, ‘counter-terrorism actions’ and 
‘consequence management’: 
- ‘Anti-Terrorism’ is defensive and includes all measures taken to reduce the 
vulnerability at home or abroad of: people (soldiers, civilians, diplomats, 
workers, etc.); physical objectives; communication systems; social structures, 
etc. 
- ‘Counter-Terrorism’ includes all proactive or offensive measures which 
should aim to: identify and locate, deter, prevent and stop terrorist activities, 
whether internal or external. 
- ‘Consequence Management’ describes all efforts, preparatory or subsequent, 
to limit the effect of terrorism, stabilize the situation and repair the damage 
done. 
Both military and security forces will need new capabilities for intelligence and 
new weapons and equipment as well as a much higher degree of collaboration 
and training to fulfil these new tasks. 
 
6. Implications for NATO and the EU 
So, how should we begin to address the issue of change–of rethinking 
our approach to security? A good starting point would be to readdress the 
fundamentals of alliance membership in the perspective of new security threats. 
To be a good member of an alliance (be it NATO or a future EU ESDP) a 
country should be able to do the following: 
- provide an essential minimum of self-protection; 
- be capable of receiving help from other allies; 
- be capable of providing help to other allies. 
What do these mean nowadays? 
Self-protection no longer means simply self-defence. Some nations do 
still face a potential external military threat and will feel the need to keep 
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traditional defences in place. For others, classic defence of this sort is not a 
requirement at all. For some members, the threat of terrorism is very high, for 
others it is very low. In a modern alliance, there will have to be very significant 
differences in how members prioritize threats and allocate resources to dealing 
with them. 
Likewise the kind of help nations are likely to need from allies will also 
differ considerably. It will no longer just be classic military help. Interior 
ministries and other security agencies may now have to be prepared to open their 
doors to outside help in a way that they have not previously been prepared to do. 
The concept of what is alliance-related infrastructure will have to change. So will 
the understanding of which allied countries are on the ‘front line’ in facing new 
threats. Very important to realize is that this ‘frontline’ is no longer of necessity 
a geographical issue. Patterns of intra-alliance investment will have to change, as 
well as national investments. 
In providing help to others there are limited options, but much variation 
within them. Military options, as discussed above, will require forces capable of 
projection, maintenance and utilization. But armed forces will also have to be 
capable of being deployed in domestic situations in support of domestic security 
agencies. Providing forward basing and logistic support will also be very 
important. However, sharing the burden not only of cost but also of risk and of 
casualties will remain an important factor in deciding how allies will need to 
contribute to this function. Help, however, will not only be military. This does 
not offer an excuse for not making a military contribution, but is rather a 
recognition that, firstly, a response will no longer be purely military and, 
secondly, that even with the best will in the world it will be some time before 
many European countries are in a position to make substantive contributions to a 
projected military force. One way that this process could be speeded up would be 
for members to develop specialized military capabilities to contribute to a 
common effort, and to ensure collaboration by non-military security agencies 
which nations have hitherto been unwilling to do (as evinced by the EU’s 
difficulties in developing its ‘third pillar’). And, as we noted above, collaboration 
between the EU and NATO will have to improve considerably. 
An additional consideration which affects all the foregoing is the impact 
that the source of the new threats to security will have on the evolution of 
strategic geography. In the Cold War the threat came from a clear direction–from 
East or West depending on the viewpoint. This geographical orientation created 
‘frontline states’, ‘rear-area states’, ‘flanking regions’, etc., all of which had a 
fundamental impact not only on those nations’ national psychology but also on 
practical preparation for conflict. The new security environment overturns this 
hierarchy. Firstly, geography is no longer the sole determinant of the immediacy 
of a threat. Secondly, inasmuch as geography does play a role, then just as the 
new threats destroy the clear line between internal and external threats, so they 
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also throw up a new Strategic Alignment with a North-South or North West-
South-East alignment. Turkey has replaced Germany as the keystone state for 
European security. NATO’s Mediterranean countries, headed by Greece, are at 
greatest risk from the spill-over of a conflict in the Middle East. Now on the one 
hand this will require a huge effort to avoid political polarization into a ‘North-
South’ confrontation and the creation of a new political and cultural divide. On 
the other hand there is to a certain extent already a new geographical imperative 
and we must all face the fact that some countries will be playing a more 
important role in the new security environment than they were in the old. 
 
7. Implications for the Corporate Sector 
In all our countries, the current pace of events faces government offices 
with enormous burdens of overwork. There is no longer enough time to deal with 
everyday problems and find enough time for conceptual thinking. After all, the 
scope of change being forced upon institutions is the greatest that it has ever 
been in peacetime. Consequently there is a great need to generate ideas, stimulate 
thinking and debate on all aspects of security sector reform, to break down 
boundaries between different elements of the security establishment and to 
expand the frontiers of what is considered ‘security’. There is an equal need to 
increase the strength of the ‘security community’–the body of military and 
especially civilian personnel competent in the new security issues and capable of 
filling posts in national and international institutions and educating the 
population to understand the new needs of security so as to ensure their support 
through the democratic process. 
It is at this point that the issue becomes more than an academic one for 
the corporate sector. The corporate sector has always had an interest in national 
security, of course, but that interest was general and invested in the social and 
political basis of the country. Business did not usually involve itself directly 
except inasmuch as there was business to be done in the field of supplying the 
defence sector. ‘Security’ for the business world was mostly protection against 
competition, theft or fraud, and the occasional green ecological protestor. Very 
large conglomerates have always played a major role, especially in smaller 
countries, but the main focus was usually on economic and political issues, not 
security issues. 
The change in the nature of security, however, has created a new 
imperative: the need to break down the barriers not only between government 
agencies but also between those agencies and the corporate world. As societies, 
under the influence of commercial competition, become ever more efficient, ever 
more information dependent, and ever more ‘globalized’, they also become more 
vulnerable to disruption, even catastrophic disruption. Business is the first and 
most immediate institutional victim of terror.  Long before terrorism is a threat to 
governments or to social cohesion it will have put companies–especially small- 
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or medium-sized companies–out of business. Other threats to security, such as 
organized crime, corruption, and smuggling, are equally threats to society 
because they are first and foremost threats to the health of the business sector. 
Genuine business needs secure conditions to flourish. The whole concept of 
security as developed by NATO and the EU was based on economics. But the 
threat that inspired Schumann to found the basis for the European Economic 
Community and ultimately the EU was the threat of hot war. Today, security 
needs to be applied against a much wider range of threats in which business 
features directly, and not at a second remove as it did in the past. 
More immediately, business is itself a generator of stability and 
prosperity and a hedge against the new threats. Therefore it is of greater interest 
to governments as an element of security. Business needs governmental help in 
order to know in which countries and in which ways the new threats to security 
will arise. Security becomes a major determining factor in foreign direct 
investment (which, for example, doubled in Poland in the year after that country 
joined NATO). Today, business can provide governments with intelligence that 
they cannot easily get from other sources. Big business may be the actual prime 
target of cyber crime or terrorism pursued with a political, rather than an 
economic, motive. All these considerations demand a new relationship between 
the corporate world and the security sector. 
Equally, the answers to new security problems will likely lie in the 
hands of corporations. We need to explore new responses to security in 
collaboration with business. If we seek security merely by ratcheting up old 
procedures we risk creating such obstacles to trade and commerce that we 
destroy the market freedoms which form the basis of our society and ensure our 
prosperity. Governments and international institutions, in other words, can no 
longer solve their security problems without building a new partnership with 
business. Business can no longer ensure conditions for its secure operation 
without having a greater input into government policy. The need for partnership 
works both ways. The challenge we face in the immediate future–for this is a 
problem which is already with us–is to develop that partnership, to make it work, 
and to keep it flexible so that we can keep ahead of the threats in what will, from 
now on, be a rapidly evolving security environment. 
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1. Introduction 
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) from 15 to more than 25 
member states offers a unique opportunity to progress towards ending the 
division of the European continent that prevailed during most of the second half 
of the 20th century. If you look at the five decades of European integration, the 
most striking thing is that safeguarding peace was the central purpose of this 
venture right from the outset. The goal of safeguarding peace through integration 
is a thread that runs right the way through what may often appear to be a rather 
complex integration process. Even the most recent stride forward, the single 
European currency, is ultimately rooted in the same idea of safeguarding peace. 
Monetary union effectively makes the economic integration of Europe 
irreversible. There is simply no way of going back. 
With the collapse of the East European communist bloc, the prospect of 
uniting the whole of Europe presented itself. More than a decade later we are 
reaching the point at which a number of previous Communist totalitarian regimes 
are ready to integrate into a Union that was initially formed to create unity 
among the West European democracies that had fought each other during several 
terrible wars. With respect to regional security, this enlargement has parallels 
with the earlier Southern enlargement when Greece, Portugal and Spain joined 
the Union in the 1980s. The EU’s eastern enlargement is also about the political 
and economic stabilisation of new democracies, with many of the countries 
concerned also aiming for membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO). 
                                                          
1 H.E. Ambassador Norbert Jousten is Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in Kyiv, Ukraine. 
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However, huge preparations have had to be made by both existing and 
potential members in order to realise EU enlargement. On the EU side, the Union 
has had to adapt its own policies, finances and procedures to prepare for an 
enlarged Union. The first two challenges were met at the EU Summit in Berlin in 
March 1999 when budgetary ceilings were set for all areas of EU spending up to 
2006. These were accompanied by wide-ranging reforms to regional, social and 
agricultural expenditure. The EU Summit in March 1999 made some 22 billion 
euro available for pre-accession support between 2000 and 2006.  
 
2. EU Membership Conditions 
For the candidate countries, the three basic membership criteria were 
laid down at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993. The so-called Copenhagen 
criteria are: 
- the existence of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;  
- the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; 
- the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union.  
Around the time of the Copenhagen Summit, a number of Central, 
Eastern and Southern European countries applied for EU membership. 
Negotiations with six of them–Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia–opened in March 1998. In February 2000, negotiations 
started with another six candidate countries, namely, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Romania and Slovakia. Although the accession negotiations have been 
launched in two groups, each applicant is considered on its own merits. The 
Union has put in place a fully flexible, multi-speed accession process in which 
countries will be assessed on their own merits and join when they are able to 
meet all the obligations of membership. 
The first stage in the complex process is a screening exercise involving 
a series of meetings with the candidates. These enable the European Commission 
to present the acquis communautaire–the whole corpus of EU Treaties, 
legislation and practices that runs to almost 100,000 pages. This is followed by 
detailed negotiations on 31 individual policy chapters ranging from fisheries to 
external relations. Thereafter, the Commission continues to monitor the progress 
each applicant makes in actually implementing and applying EU legislation. In 
principle, each new member must be able to implement all EU obligations and 
responsibilities from the first day of entry, with temporary exemptions and 
transition measures kept to a minimum. 
To help the candidates prepare for membership, the Union has a number 
of specific pre-accession programmes. The best-known and longest-running 
vehicle for channelling financial and technical cooperation to the candidates is 
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Phare. This programme provides grants, rather than loans, and can be broken 
down into two main priorities. The first, with some 30% of the budget, is 
institution building to help national and regional administrations as well as 
regulatory and supervisory bodies familiarise themselves with EU objectives and 
procedures. The second, with 70% of the budget, helps the candidates bring their 
industries and major infrastructure up to EU standards by mobilising the 
investment required. The support is chiefly targeted at areas in which EU norms 
and standards are becoming increasingly demanding: the environment, transport, 
industrial plants, and quality standards in products and working conditions. 
Other aid programmes are specifically aimed at agricultural and rural 
development and at transport and environmental projects. There are also 
programmes to fight corruption and organised crime and to handle refugees and 
asylum seekers. In addition, numerous seminars and workshops for officials in 
the candidate countries are held on subjects as diverse as fiscal surveillance and 
customs clearance. 
 
3. Current Status 
Last weekend’s Seville European Council reaffirmed that, if the present 
rate of progress in negotiations and reforms is maintained, the European Union is 
determined to conclude the negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia by the end of 2002, if those countries are ready. Concerning Bulgaria 
and Romania, given the considerable progress achieved over the last few months, 
the Seville European Council indicated that a more precise timetable would be 
set for these countries’ accession process by the end of the year. Later this year, 
the European Council, under Danish Presidency, turned its attention to the 
regular accession country progress reports for 2002 and the Commission’s 
specific recommendations as to the countries with which negotiations should be 
concluded. This will clear the way for the final stage of negotiations to begin 
before the European Council meets again in Copenhagen in the middle of 
December 2002. 
It would therefore seem reasonable to expect that the Treaty of 
Accession could be signed in spring 2003. The objective remains that these 
countries should participate in the elections for the European Parliament in 2004 
as full members.  However, this common aim can only be realised within the 
envisaged time frame if each candidate country adopts a realistic and 
constructive approach. Thus, it appears that we might be able to close the circle 
from Copenhagen to Copenhagen. During this time, the candidate countries have 
gone through a remarkable development, not only by fulfilling the Copenhagen 
criteria but also by changing their entire political and economic systems. This is 
an achievement, which must not be underestimated. 
 
  
  142
4. Enlargement and Ukraine 
I would like to end by saying a few words about the EU’s relationship 
with Ukraine within the context of enlargement. Ukraine’s relations with the 
European Union are based on the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) from 1998 and the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine from 
1999. The basic principles underpinning the PCA are support to Ukraine’s 
consolidation of democracy and its transition to a market economy. In respect to 
the latter, the agreement’s provisions on goods, services, labour and capital–
introducing extensive legally-binding requirements–make it an important 
instrument for bringing Ukraine closer to the legal frameworks of the single 
European market and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) system. The PCA 
also contains a number of evolutionary clauses, including the prospect of a free 
trade area, which are dependent upon progress made in fulfilling the 
requirements of the PCA. 
The Common Strategy from 1999 further underlines the significance the 
EU attaches to Ukraine. It aims to develop a strategic partnership on the basis of 
the PCA, acknowledging Ukraine’s European aspirations and welcoming its 
European choice. The three objectives of the strategy include: 
- supporting the democratic and economic transition process in Ukraine;  
- meeting common security, energy and environmental challenges on the 
European continent; and 
- supporting or enhancing cooperation within the context of enlargement, 
including support for Ukraine’s integration into the European and world 
economy. This includes the WTO, and cooperation in the field of justice and 
home affairs, dealing with common problems related to trafficking, illegal 
immigration and transborder crime. 
With respect to enlargement, its consequences will overall be positive 
for Ukraine and will lead to increased opportunities, in particular concerning 
trade and foreign direct investment. Continued structural reform and progress in 
harmonising Ukrainian legislation with EC standards are of course vital to enable 
Ukraine to fully benefit from these positive consequences. Through the Tacis and 
other programmes, the Commission is paying increasing attention to border 
issues between Ukraine and the accession countries, the upgrading of border 
crossings and the enhancing of customs and cross-border cooperation. 
Enlargement is also likely to give fresh stimulus to EU-Ukraine relations, due to 
the fact that the neighbouring countries with which Ukraine has traditionally had 
very close political, economic and cultural ties will now become members of the 
Union and actively influence its future path. 
However, the enlargement process does of course also raise questions 
about how the Union will more generally organise its relationships with 
countries facing a longer road towards membership than those that will become 
members in the next few years. The proposal by some member states for a 
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special neighbour relationship between the enlarged Union and Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova should be seen in this context. Similar discussions about models 
for developing relations with South-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean basin 
are also ongoing at the current time.  
As noted in President Kuchma’s recent address to the Ukrainian 
Parliament on Ukraine’s European choice and the strategy of economic and 
social development from 2002 to 2011, consistent progress has been made in 
developing the EU-Ukraine strategic partnership since the PCA came into force 
in 1998. His address also emphasised the need for systemic transformation 
involving political, economic and social reform to move Ukraine towards the 
standards of real democracy and a socially oriented market economy based upon 
the supremacy of law and ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens to realise 
Ukraine’s European choice. 
With the further integration of Europe being pursued through 
enlargement and with the aspirations of neighbours such as Ukraine to join or 
work closely with this new Union, regional security on the European continent is 
being enhanced and helping us to build upon the progress already made in our 
cooperation and to step by step move ever closer towards building the 
foundations for making Ukraine’s European choice a reality. 
  
 
